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After the stock market disaster of 1929, Congress held extensive
hearings with a view toward preventing a recurrence. The initial result
of the ensuing legislative program was the Securities Act of 1933,1
designed to regulate the initial distribution of securities. The Securities
Exchange Act 2 was enacted the following year to control market operations after a public offering, including the actions of brokers, dealers,
and national securities exchanges. 8
For eight years, relatively little attention was given to the broad
grant of regulatory authority in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.4
Then, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted under that
section a broad antifraud rule, Rule l0b-5. 5 There was never much
doubt that criminal or administrative sanctions could be imposed for
breaches of the Rule. 6 Not until 1971, however, did the Supreme
Court, culminating twenty-five years of case development, finally hold
that a private right of action existed under lOb-5. 7
The Rule is the most widely litigated provision in the federal
securities laws. It applies to six distinct factual patterns: trading on the
basis of undisclosed material information; issuing misleading corporate
publicity; selectively disclosing important nonpublic data, commonly
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as "Securities Act" or "1933 Act"].
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970) [hereinafter cited as "Exchange Act" or "1934 Act'].
3 Four other major pieces of regulatory legislation were subsequently adopted: Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1970); Trust Indenture Act
of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21

(1970).
4 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or'instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or any facility
of any national securities exchange(b) *Touse or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) [hereinafter cited as "section 10(b)" or "10(b)"].
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as "the Rule" or "10b-5']. The
Rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
6 See Exchange Act §§ 15(b)(D), 32(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78ff (1970).
7 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971).
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called "tipping"; mismanaging a corporation; manipulating a securities
market; and-the topic of this article-trading and other activities
of broker-dealers. While broker-dealers may engage in some of the first
five activities, the emphasis here will be on the legality under 10b-5
of those actions which only a broker can perform.
Brokers as fiduciaries are subject to rigorous 10b-5 restriction. 8
Brokers may be held accountable for actions which would not violate
the Rule if they were performed by other persons. This higher standard
of behavior is suggested by the policies underlying the Rule." As
the Supreme Court has noted, the purpose of all federal securities
laws is "to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry."' 0 Brokers' added obligations are not dependent on principles
of agency law; they arise out of the brokerage firm's professional status
11
and the nature of the securities business.
Broker-dealers must conform to a wide variety of laws, rules, and
regulations in addition to lOb-5. Many of these provisions govern
broker behavior in narrow areas, and consequently can be invoked
more easily in certain fact situations than the broad antifraud and antimanipulative language of Rule lOb-5.12 A broker may, for example,
incur liability for material misrepresentations or omissions in registration statements when acting as an underwriter 18 or in an oral communication or prospectus, 14 by offering or selling securities without
the requisite registration, 5 by extending credit in violation of margin
8 Fleischer, Securities Trading and CorporateInformation Practices: The Implications
of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceedings,51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1281 (1965); Note, Fiduciary
Suits Under Rule 10b-5, 1968 DuK- LJ. 791, 792 n.7, 804; Note, Broker Silence and Rule
10b-5: Expanding the Duty to Disclose, 71 YALE L.J. 736, 742-43, 745-47 (1962); see O'Neill
v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768-69 (2d Cir. 1964) (acts which may not run afoul of lOb-5 when
performed by corporate insider may constitute violation if performed by broker, dealer,
or investment adviser).
9 The Rule seeks to promote equalization of bargaining position; to protect investors,
to achieve fairness, and to foster investor trust. Carroll v. First Natl Bank, 413 F.2d 353,
357 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970); Herpich v. Wallace, 480 F.2d 792, 801,
806, 808 (5th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 838, 847-48, 851-52, 856,
860 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
10 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 US. 180, 186 (1963).
11 Knauss, A Reappraisalof the Role of Disclosure, 62 MiCo. L. REV. 607, 638 (1964);
see Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROS. 691, 702-03 (1964);
note 45 and accompanying text infra.
12 Remedy under lOb-5, however, is still available despite the applicability of more
specific provisions. See generally SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 893 U.S. 453, 468-69 (1969)
(overlapping federal securities remedies "neither unusual nor unfortunate').
a Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
J- Securities Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
15 Securities Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(l) (1970).
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regulations, 16 or by manipulating a security listed on a national securities exchange.17 Antifraud provisions other than lOb-5 apply to brokers
acting in a brokerage capacity, 8 and brokers who are registered investment advisers are also subject to special restrictions. 19 Brokerage firms
which are members of a national securities exchange or the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) must also conform to additional rules.20 Further, state law is superimposed on the federal securities laws, exchange rules, and NASD rules. 21 A few recent cases may
mark the beginning of a resurgence of state fraud law.22 Nevertheless,
federal remedies continue to dominate the cases and the literature in
this area.
Broker-dealers' responsibilities under lOb-5 have developed not
only through court cases, but also through SEC disciplinary proceedings. In order to obtain relief in court or to impose sanctions on a
broker, the Commission need not prove all elements of the offense
which would be required to sustain a private right of action.23 It is
uncertain what additional elements a customer suing for damages
caused by the broker's lOb-5 violation must demonstrate.24
A problem with effectively analyzing proscribed acts and predicting their consequences is that in the typical broker disciplinary proceeding or court action, a number of offenses are charged with reliance
placed on more than one securities act provision. For example, a broker
might be accused of making various misrepresentations to his customers,
concealing certain facts from them, recommending unsuitable securities, and excessively trading their accounts. In its decision, the SEC or
the court may rely on lOb-5, Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2,25 Securities
16 Exchange Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970).
17 Exchange Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970).
18 Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); rules promulgated under Exchange
Act §§ 10, 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, 78o (1970).
19 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 US.C. § 80b-6 (1970).
20 Private rights of action can sometimes be implied for violations of stock exchange
and NASD rules. See, e.g., Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 858 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 885 U.S. 817 (1966).

21 "State law" includes state decisional and statutory law.
22 E.g., Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 222 (1968); Pierce v. Richard Ellis & Co., 62 Misc. 2d 771, 310 N.Y.S. 2d 226 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. 1970).
23 E.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
24 Issue preclusion could not be asserted by an injured customer against a broker disciplined by the SEC, NASD, or an exchange for his treatment of the customer; correspondingly, the broker could not invoke res judicata as a shield if he were exonerated in the
disciplinary action.
25 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-2 (1972).
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Act section 17(a), 26 and perhaps on other more specific rules. Without
greater definition of the grounds of such determinations, counsel is
forced to speculate on the parameters of lOb-5. He can be certain of his
advice only with respect to egregious breaches of the Rule.
I
THE BREADTH OF BROKER-DEALER LiABILrry

A.

Definition of Broker-Dealer

The typical, unsophisticated investor imagines that when he places
an order with his broker to buy or sell securities, the broker trades
on his behalf with another broker who represents a seller or buyer.
The broker is truly a broker when he acts in this fashion. The investor might be surprised to learn, however, that many times his
broker sells him a security out of the broker's own inventory or purchases it from him for the broker's own account. The brokerage firm
then functions as a dealer, and the relationship between the parties is
buyer-seller rather than principal-agent. 27 The distinction between a
firm acting as a broker or as a dealer assumes substantive importance in
a variety of contexts. For example, a fiduciary duty is always owed by a
broker to a customer but is only sometimes owed by a dealer to a customer.2 The statutory definitions of "broker" and "dealer" codify this
functional distinction.29 Exchange Act section 15 requires brokerdealers to register with the Commission if they use the mails or interstate commerce.80 Rule lOb-5, however, applies to broker-dealers
26 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
27 Douglas & Bates, Stock "Brokers" as Agents and Dealers, 43 YALE L.J. 46, 60-61 (1933)
cites five characteristics by which to distinguish brokers and dealers: (1) the form of the
confirmation, (2) whether a commission is charged, (3) the transfer price of the stock, (4)
the source from which the stock is acquired, whether from inventory or the open market,
and (5) the manner in which stock is acquired from outside sources.
28 See notes 45-73 and accompanying text infra.
Exchange Act Rule 15d-4, 17 C.F.P. § 240.15d-4 (1972), requires disclosure of the
capacity in which the broker acts. This is usually accomplished by a coded designation on a
printed form, the significance of which (if it is even noted) must invariably escape the
unsophisticated and unwary purchaser.
29 Section 3(a)(4) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1970), provides:
The term "broker" means any person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank.
"Dealer" is defined in Exchange Act § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1970), as
any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own
account, through a broker or othervise, but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account, either individually
or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a regular business.
Unless otherwise noted the term "broker" will include both brokers and dealers.
80 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:869

whether or not they are so registered,3 1 as well as to members and non33
82
members of national securities exchanges or the NASD.

Although the broker-dealer distinction is fairly clear in a typical
situation such as a straight sell order, in unusual fact patterns it is
sometimes difficult to determine whether a brokerage firm is acting as
a broker-dealer or in some other capacity, such as a finder.3 4 If there
were a written contract, one might be able to ascertain from its terms
whether the employment was as a broker or as a middleman. Frequently, however, there is no writing, and in those cases there are
few guidelines. Potential criteria include: (1) whether the firm typically
acts only as a broker for its customers, (2) who pays the firm's compensation and, if the customer pays, the relationship between the fee and
the ordinary brokerage commission, and (3) whether the customer has
placed the same type of confidence in the brokerage firm that customers
typically would. 35 In close cases, a firm may be assumed to be acting as a
broker-dealer if it engages in only one line of business and is registered
under section 15 of the 1934 Act,86 or is a member of an exchange or
the NASD.
•31 H.R. RaP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1964) (brokers engaged only in intrastate business, and who therefore need not register with the SEC, still subject to section
10(b)). The broker in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702
(N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970), was
not registered with the SEC. The district court did not consider this point when finding a
violation of the shingle theory. 286 F. Supp. at 707. See D. Earle Hensley Co., 40 S.E.C. 849,
852 (1961); Moore & Co., 32 S.E.C. 191, 194-96 (1951).
32 E.g., Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (Nov.
12, 1965) (member); D. Earle Hensley Co., 40 S.E.C. 849 (1961) (no indication of membership).
33 E.g., Harold Grill, 41 S.E.C. 321 (1963) (not member); Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40
S.E.C. 652 (1961) (member).
34 For example, suppose a member firm over the years has acted as a broker for a
European bank. The bank informs the firm of its interest in placing notes of any wellknown American company with foreign institutions. The brokerage firm subsequently
learns that a certain corporation is interested in selling notes and relays this information to
the bank. The bank then negotiates directly with the corporation, purchases the notes, and
distributes them in Europe. The ultimate purchasers sue the brokerage firm when the
corporation defaults on the notes alleging, in substance, that the firm acted as a broker.
The firm contends that it was merely a finder for the corporation and the bank, since its
sole function was to bring the two parties together.
35 See 12 Am. JuR. 2d Brokers § 1 (Supp. 1971) (if broker's employment limited to
bringing parties together, treat as finder); 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 2, at 8 (1938) (broker and
middleman distinguished).
In SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac.
93,232 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the court held, without much discussion, that persons
L. RaP.
who regularly tried to sell shares of shell corporations to others were "effecting transactions
in securities for the account of others," and were therefore "brokers" even though such
persons in some transactions could also be characterized as finders.
36 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970).
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Another classification-of-function problem arises when a customer
lends money to his broker or purchases an equity participation in the
brokerage firm. This article will discuss later whether the firm is then
treated as a broker or as an ordinary seller for lOb-5 purposes.3 7 A final
example of definitional blur occurs when a brokerage firm recommends
the purchase of commodity futures to a customer who has been trading
only in stocks and bonds. Commodities may not be "securities,"38 and if
they are not, the transaction would not be subject to lOb-5. Assuming the
securities laws are applicable, however, in this type of case a court must
decide whether the firm was acting as a broker for lOb-5 purposes.
Once a firm is held to be acting as a broker or dealer rather than
in some other capacity, a question arises as to whom the firm owes a
duty. For example, when a broker-dealer violates his duty as a broker
to a customer who is buying securities for future resale, can the ultimate purchasers of those securities assert that breach? One case has
suggested they cannot.3 9 There, persons from whom securities were
stolen sued the brokerage firms which unknowingly sold the securities
for the thieves. The court refused to hold the brokers liable.
Where is no . . .federal statutory liability for mere negligence
where a broker acts distinterestedly in its usual capacity as a seller
of securities in companies in which it has no proprietary interest and
without violation of any duty to its immediate customer ....[T]he
actual owners were not the defendant-brokers'scustomers nor even

within the cognizance of the defendant-brokers. Consequently, no
cause of action under ... Rule 1Ob-5 ... has been established. 40

This case is by no means dispositive. Absence of contractual privity
37 See notes 222-32 and accompanying text infra.
38 See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FE. SEc. L.

Rep.

93,355 (7th Cir. 1972) (commodities account not investment contract); Goodman v.

H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 445-46 (N.D.IM. 1967) (transactions in unregulated

securi-

ties, if standing alone, provide no basis for federal jurisdiction); Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 365-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (commodity
futures not investment contracts).
Some cases have circumvented this obstacle and have applied the securities laws. E.g.,
Johnson v. Espey, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,376 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (if commodities account in fact discretionary and broker represents profits will come
from his efforts alone, account is investment contract); Anderson v. Francis 1. duPont & Co.,
291 F. Supp. 705, 709-10 (D. Minn. 1968) (discretionary commodities account treated as investment contract); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., supra at 445-46 (single scheme involving
commodities and securities); Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
supra at 367 (unauthorized transactions in sugar contracts followed by conversion of funds
from customer's security account).
39 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH FmD. SEC. L. REP. 92,748, at 99,272 (N.D. Ill.
1970).
40 Id. at 99,276 (emphasis added).
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does not defeat other types of lOb-5 actions; 41 there seems to be no
point in reading such a limitation into broker cases. For example, if
a stockholder votes in favor of a merger in reliance on a broker's misleading opinion letter blessing the combination, he should be able to
sue the brokerage firm for damages. Similarly, a broker giving investment advice to the public for the sole purpose of reaping personal
profits by scalping4 2 should be answerable for an advisee's damages incurred when the advisee followed the advice, regardless of whether the
trade was made through the adviser. Four cases support the view that
contractual privity is not a sine qua non of broker liability. In the first
two, a broker who executed trades for a person holding a power of
attorney was disciplined for failing to inform the attorney's principals
of his double dealing.4 3 In the other two cases, brokers who knew or
should have known that the brokers for whom they were executing
trades were converting their customer's property were held liable both
as principals and as aiders and abettors or controlling persons. 44
The cases can be reconciled through a foreseeability argument. A
broker-dealer is liable to his customers for violation of any of the
special regulations to which a broker typically must conform. He also
owes at least some duties to that class of persons he should reasonably
expect his message to reach, such as stockholders reading a merger
proxy and customers in the four cases mentioned. But he assumes no
duty beyond that ordinarily imposed by lOb-5 to those persons whose
existence cannot be foreseen.
B.

Theories Governing Broker-Dealer's Responsibilities

Rule lOb-5 applies to persons who are neither brokers nor dealers.
However, broker-dealers and their employees are subject to more
stringent standards of liability than other persons who may violate the
Rule. The shingle (or implied representation) theory is the source of
much of this stricter regulation. Higher standards of conduct are imposed on a brokerage firm simply by virtue of its being in business45
because it hangs out its "shingle."
41 E.g., Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 193 (SD.N.Y. 1967) (accountant's liability);
see notes 43-44 infra.
42 Scalping is the practice of purchasing a security, recommending it to advisees, and
selling out at a profit when the market price increases in response to purchases based on
the recommendation.
43 Moore & Co., 32 S.E.C. 191, 196 (1951); William I. Hay, 19 S.E.C. 397, 406 (1945).
44 Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 144 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969) (direct and aider and abettor liability); Hawkins v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104, 122-24 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (direct and con-

trolling persons' liability).
45 See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
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Three years before lOb-5 was promulgated the Commission first
enunciated the shingle theory in an administrative proceeding 6 instituted to discipline a brokerage firm under existing antifraud provisions.4 7 The SEC alleged that the firm, acting as a dealer, sold some
securities to customers above market price and purchased others from
them substantially below market price without the customer's knowledge. The Commission held:
Inherent in the relationship between a dealer and his customer is
the vital representation that the customer will be dealt with fairly,
and in accordance with the standards of the profession. It is neither
fair dealing, nor in accordance with such standards, to exploit trust
far higher than might be realized from an
and ignorance for profit
48
informed customer.
Judicial approval of the shingle theory came four years later in
CharlesHughes & Co. v. SEC. 9 The Second Circuit affirmed the Commission's revocation of a broker-dealer's license for selling stock to
customers at prices substantially in excess of those prevailing in the
over-the-counter market without disclosing the mark-up,50 remarking
that the firm was "under a special duty, in view of its expert knowledge
and proffered advice, not to take advantage of its customers' ignorance
of market conditions." 51 Although neither of these decisions concerned
a breach of the Rule, the underlying shingle theory concept has now
12
been incorporated into lOb-5.
The shingle theory, with its implied representation of fairness to a
customer, automatically applies to a brokerage firm acting as a broker,
and may apply when the firm acts as a dealer, depending on the facts of
53
the case. The issue is not the legal dealer-customer relationship,
46

Duker &Duker, 6 S.E.C. 886, 888 (1939).

47 The proceeding was brought under Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970), Ex-

change Act § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1970), and the predecessors to Exchange Act
Rules 15l-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cd-2 (1972), and 15c4, 17 C.F.R . § 240.15c-4 (1972).
48 6 S.E.C. at 388-89 (footnote omitted).
49 139 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944).
50 The SEC and the Court of Appeals based their decisions on Securities Act § 17(a),
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), and Exchange Act § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1970). Since the
activities complained of occurred prior to 1942 (the year in which the Rule was promulgated), lob-5 could not have been relied upon.
51 189 F.2d at 487.
52 E.g., Harold Grill, 41 S.E.C. 321, 325 (1968); Barnett & Co., 40 S.E.C. 1, 4 (1960);
Best Sec., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931, 934 (1960); William Harrison Keller, 88 S.E.C. 900, 905 (1959).
53 See generally Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 675 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
per curiam, 867 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (immaterial what confirmation stated; decisive that
facts showed agency relationship). For a description of a confirmation slip and the disclosures it contains, see Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., Inc., 305 F. Supp. 489, 494-95
(S.D.N.Y.), motion to amend denied, 806 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 488 F.2d 1167
(2d Cir. 1970). See also Cant v. A. G. Becker & Co., Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH
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but rather the personal rapport between the parties. A dealer is deemed
to have made implied representations under the shingle theory if he
has gained the customer's confidence, even though he is acting for his
own account and not as an agent. 4 Dealers escaping the shingle theory's
obligations are nevertheless controlled by the duties lOb-5 imposes on
persons generally. Substantial problems arise, however, when such
dealers engage in actions which are prohibited by lOb-5 at least in part
because of the shingle theory. For example, would a dealer violate lob-5
by misappropriating a customer's funds? A nonprofessional (such as a
confidence man) would be liable for taking someone's money without
delivering certificates; a fortiori, a dealer should be held liable as well.
A more difficult question is whether a dealer not subject to the shingle
theory must disclose that he is selling an over-the-counter stock at a
price substantially in excess of the market price.5 5 Requiring disclosure
by dealers at all times imposes duties identical to those required under
the shingle theory. Perhaps the ultimate answer is a form of compromise; a dealer not subject to the shingle theory must disclose his extraordinary mark-up only when it is material. The policies underlying
1Ob-5 indicate that a lower threshold of materiality and reliance should
exist in this situation than in the usual concealment case. 6
Various formulations have been used to express the representations
which a broker-dealer impliedly makes under the shingle theory. In the
SEC's first case, the wording was that "the customer be dealt with fairly,
and in accordance with the standards of the profession."57 Sometimes
FnD. SEc. L. REP.

93,347, at 91,873 (N.D. IIl. 1971) (coded number not adequate dis-

closure as matter of law). On the other hand, a fiduciary relationship between the
broker and customer does not arise as a matter of law. Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d
1238, 1239-40 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970).
54 This was the situation in the Charles Hughes case. See notes 49-51 and accompany-

ing text supra.
55 In answering this question, it is assumed that the fiduciary theory is inapplicable
and quotations of the securities were not available. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text
infra.
56 See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra.
57 See text accompanying note 48 supra.
The fair dealing formulation could arguably be an implementation of the fairness

philosophy underlying the Rule. The "standards of the profession" wording introduces
a negligence standard. Leavell, Investment Advice and the Fraud Rules, 65 MICH. L. REv.

1569, 1585 (1967). The proper brokers to examine in order to determine negligence are
those in the United States as a whole, not those in the geographical area in which the
defendant or respondent firm is located. Otherwise, the desired uniformity of lOb-5 law
would be defeated. But see 6 L. Loss, SECURmES REcULATION 3726 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter

cited as Loss].
There are at least four sources from which to determine the standards of the profession: prior SEC and court cases, national securities exchange rules, regulations of the
NASD, and the comparable rules the Commission has promulgated governing nonmembers of the NASD (SECO rules).
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both ideas appear in a case; at other times only one can be found. 58
Professor Leavell has discussed at least three other formulations of the
shingle theory.59 These various formulations, like the profusion of
policies underlying lOb-5, permit flexibility by the courts and the Commission when considering dissimilar factual situations. In the last
analysis, however, they are merely different ways of expressing the same
high standard of broker conduct. 60
Regardless of the language employed, the shingle theory covers a
wide variety of activities. It governs relationships between a broker and
his customers and fellow brokers,6 1 and applies with equal force to
brokerage firms and their salesmen. 62 From its origin in cases involving
implied representation of a reasonable trading price,O the theory has
evolved to encompass various additional representations. A broker is
deemed to represent that he has an adequate basis for his recommendation to buy or sell a security; not having that adequate basis is accordingly violative of 1Ob-5. A recommendation also carries with it an implied
warranty that the securities are suitable for the individual customers;
if they are not, the broker-dealer again has not complied with the
Rule's requirements. By similar reasoning, the shingle theory is
responsible, at least in part, for a broker-dealer's liability when he conceals material facts, manipulates the market, engages in boiler room
activities," excessively trades a customer's account, accepts funds or
securities while insolvent, delays execution of a trade, buys, sells, or
pledges securities without authority, misappropriates a customer's funds
or securities, or delays delivery of securities. 65 The shingle theory in
58 E.g., Harold Grill, 41 S.E.C. 321, 325 (1963) (fair dealing); N. Pinkser & Co., Inc.,
40 S.E.C. 285, 291 (1960) (both ideas); Best Sec., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931, 934 (1960) (both ideas);
Leonard Burton Corp., 39 S.E.C. 211, 214 (1959) (fair dealing).
59 Leavell, supra note 57.
60 In addition to the fiduciary theory (see notes 70-71 and accompanying text infra),
the author notes that there must be an adequate and reasonable basis for recommending
a security, reasonable care demonstrated with regard to a security which was, or should
have been, registered under the 1933 Act, and no reckless misrepresentation. Cf. note 73
and accompanying text infra.
61 Almost all cases involve broker-customer relations, but a few have treated brokerbroker questions. George J. Wunsch, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8713
(Oct. 7, 1969) (secret profit to salesman at expense of other firms); John D. Ferris, 39
S.E.C. 116, 119 n.9 (1959) (shingle theory applicable to dealings with other dealers); see

note 158 infra.
62 Ross Sec., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 509, 514 n.7 (1963); A. J. Caradean & Co., Inc., 41 S.E.C.
234, 235 (1962).
63 See notes 46-51 and accompanying text supra.

For an explanation of a boiler room, see note 331 and accompanying text infra.
See Hiller v. SEC, 429 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1970) (adequate justification for opinion
required); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1969) (making recommendations
without adequate basis violation of lOb-5); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 457
64
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reality can be applied to any act the SEC or courts believe a broker
should not perform. The approach is a fiction; the representation is implied and then liability is imposed when the duty it is found to have
been breached. A more direct method would be to hold that a broker
violates lOb-5 if he engages in proscribed acts, without going through
the gymnastics required by the shingle theory.
It can be argued that the implied representations arising out of
the shingle theory may be negated by prior actual disclosure to the
customer of the offensive practice. As a practical matter, however,
few brokerage firms would admit to conduct violative of the theory.
There is also the question of what would constitute adequate notice.
Awareness by a knowledgeable investor might suffice as, for example, when the firm makes an unreasonable spread and the investor
had access to quotations,6 6 but a less sophisticated customer would have
to be told in an explicit and understandable manner. Even under these
circumstances, the Commission has opined that disclosure does not a
67
fortiori cure the violation.
The shingle theory's applicability in SEC administrative proceedings, reviews by Courts of Appeals of those proceedings, criminal cases,
or Commission suits for injunctions is unquestioned. In 1969, however,
the Second Circuit stated in dictum that the implied warranty that a
broker has an adequate basis for his opinions regarding securities "may
not be as rigidly enforced in a civil action where an investor seeks
damages for losses allegedly caused by reliance upon . . . unfounded
representations."6' 8 A better view is represented by a California decision
in a suit brought by a customer to recover damages from a broker who
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) (excessive trading of account a violation). But see Symposium, The Direction
of Management Responsibility, 18 Bus. LAiw 29, 75 (1962). See generally 3 Loss 1488-89; 4
Loss 3684-85, 3708; Cohen & Rabin, supra note 11, at 704-07; Knauss, supra note 11, at 638;
Comment, Current Problems in Securities Regulation, 62 MCH. L. Rsw. 680, 736 (1964).
66 The SEC rejected this position in an early case:
We emphasize again . . . that the fundamental principle underlying these
cases is that any person, regardless of his knowledge of the market or his access
to market information, is entitled to rely on the implied representation, made by
a registered dealer in securities, that customers will be treated fairly.
United Sec. Corp., 15 S.E.C. 719, 727 (1944).
Likewise, a dealer alleged to have violated the shingle theory with regard to a
sophisticated customer could argue that the theory was inapplicable because the customer
had not placed the requisite confidence in the dealer. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
67 Powell & McGowan, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 933 (1964) (sick, elderly man induced to make
subordinated loan to broker who was in financial difficulty; even with full disclosure,
broker should not have made this recommendation); Mac Robbins & Co., Inc., 41 S.E.C.
116, 119 n.15 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963) (most
practices involved, even though brought under lOb-5(2), would be fraudulent irrespective of disclosure); Cohen & Rabin, supra note 11, at 703 (shingle theory violation not
cured by disclosure).
68 Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1969) (dictum). But see Brennan v.
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had traded his account excessively: "It would be inconsistent to suggest
that a person should be defrocked as a member of his calling, and yet
not be liable for the injury which resulted from his acts or omissions."6 9
In addition to the shingle theory, there is a more limited doctrine
-the fiduciary theory-from which broker liability may arise. In the
leading case of Hughes v. SEC,70 a dealer who was also an investment
adviser was accused of failing to disclose that she was not selling securities to her clients at the best price obtainable. Revocation of the broker's
registration was affirmed on review in an opinion which recognized the
fiduciary (or trust and confidence) theory for the first time. Under this
theory a broker-dealer has a fiduciary duty to disclose any conflicting
interest and to act in the customer's best interest, whether acting as a
dealer who has gained the customer's confidence and trust or in the
71
capacity of a broker.
There are many situations where the shingle and fiduciary theories
are simultaneously applicable.72 Indeed, a former Chairman of the
SEC has stated that the two theories are closely connected and merely
represent different ways of expressing the obligations Congress has imposed on the broker-dealer.73
II
BROKER ACTIONS PRIOR TO ExECUTION
OF A CUSTOMER'S ORDER

Specific broker duties arise prior to the execution of a customer's
order. A broker who recommends the purchase or sale of a certain stock
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702, 707 (NJD. Ind. 1968), af'd, 417 F.2d
147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 US. 989 (1970) (no discussion of point); Newkirk
91,621, at
v. Hayden, Stone & Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE,.
95,321 (S.D. Cal. 1965) ("if a violation of the Act can subject a violator to loss of his
license, it should justify an action for damages").
69 Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 721-22, 69
Cal. Rptr. 222, 244 (1968). This result is also suggested by the basic policy considerations
underlying the Rule. See note 9 supra.
70 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
71 This approach is also referred to as the implied agency theory. Mason, Moran &
Co., 35 S.E.C. 84, 89-90 (1953); Wendell Maro Weston, 30 S.E.C. 296, 304 (1949); Herbert
R. May & Russell H. Phinney, 27 S.E.C. 814, 830 (1948). In SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191, 194 (1963), Mr. Justice Goldberg emphasized the role of
investment advisers as fiduciaries.
72 See, e.g., Herbert R. May & Russell H. Phinney, 27 S.E.C. 814, 850-31 (1948). The
shingle theory has been slowly preempting the fiduciary theory. See generally 6 Loss 3707;
Cohen & Rabin, supra note 11, at 703-04.
73 See Cohen & Rabin, supra note 11, at 703-04; Comment, supra note 65, at 738-39.
But see Lesh, Federal Regulation of Over-the-Counter Brokers and Dealers in Securities,
59 HARV. L. Rav. 1287, 1253 (1946).
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to a customer must have a reasonable basis for his recommendation,
and the stock must be suitable for the specific customer; the broker
must not conceal or misrepresent facts; he must not manipulate or fail
to disclose his control over the market in a security; and he must not
engage in boiler room activities.
A.

Reasonable Basis for and Suitability of Recommendations

A brokerage firm's recommendation to purchase or sell7 4 a security
carries with it the implied representations that there is a reasonable
basis for the recommendation and that the security is suitable for the
customer. There is little authority on what actually constitutes a recommendation. In the clearest case, the broker may say "Consolidated
Widgets is a good buy at 27" or "You ought to sell your Universal
Conglomerate bonds." Recommendations can be phrased in a considerably more subtle manner, however, and could include, for example, the
mailing of a report about an issuer (regardless of who prepared the information) to a customer when the broker knows the customer purchases
with reasonable regularity securities of companies about which he re5
ceives written material.7
74 Most authorities discussing the reasonable basis and suitability duties focus on
broker recommendations to buy a security. The same rules, however, should pertain to
recommendations to sell. Recommendations not to sell (to hold) a security present additional problems (e.g., plaintiff must be a buyer or seller), but the reasonable basis and
suitability rules should apply at least to the extent that such advice could give rise to a
private right of action. See Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 218-19 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (fraud for broker to induce customer not to sell with result that customer's loss
greater when he later sells). For simplicity, the focus here will be only on buy recommendations.
75 Foreseeability is required because the "general distribution of a market letter,
research report or other similiar material would [not] in itself constitute a recommendation." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8135 (July 27, 1967).
The reasonable basis and suitability rules are only two of the problems a brokerdealer may encounter with respect to his recommendations. A broker's opinion, addressed
to tenderees, that a tender offer is fair may be actionable if in fact the offer is unfair (cf.
Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 766-67 (D.N.J. 1955) (recommendation not actionable since price was fair)), and his recommendation to accept a tender offer should have a
reasonable basis. Kennedy, Tender Moment, 23 Bus. LAw. 1091, 1106 (1968). A broker's
recommendation to a trust in violation of state law has given rise to a cause of action for
damages. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.
Tex. 1965). But a recommendation against purchases and favoring sales of a corporation's
stock does not give the issuer a cause of action to recover for the decline in market price.
Defiance Indus., Inc. v. Galdi, 256 F. Supp. 170, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Recommendations of
a security by a firm making its market may raise special problems. See notes 323-0 and
accompanying text infra.
There is increasing evidence that selective disclosure of recommendations is a lob-5
infraction. Thus, the Commission has brought an action against a firm which informed
only certain customers of its switch from a buy to a sell recommendation. See Butcher &
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1. Reasonable Basis for Recommendations
A 1962 release of the Commission is perhaps the most concise statement of the reasonable basis rule:
[I]t is a violation of the anti-fraud provisions [which include lOb-5]
for a broker-dealer to recommend a security unless there is an adequate and reasonable basis for the recommendations and further,
...

such recommendations should not be made without disclosure

of facts known or reasonably ascertainable, bearing upon the
justification for the recommendation. As indicated, the making of
recommendations for the purchase of a security implies that the
dealer has a reasonable basis for recommending such securities
which, in turn, requires that, as a prerequisite, he shall have made a
reasonable investigation. In addition, if such a dealer lacks essential information about the issuer, such as knowledge of its
financial condition, he must disclose this lack of knowledge and
caution customers as to the risk involved in purchasing the securities without it.76
There is considerable authority, in accord with this release, that
broker recommendations must have a reasonable basis.7 7 The emphasis
in recent cases has been upon requiring a reasonable basis for a broker's
opinions, predictions of future events, and representations of existing
Sherrerd, Summary of Order for Public Proceedings, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,466 (Nov. 24, 1971). Chairman Casey indicated that this "may well
be" a violation. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1971, at 43, col. 5. A case has held that such selective
disclosure was a fraud, obtaining business by promising to engage in the practice is
prohibited even if no disclosure is selectively made, and a customer receiving the informa97
tion was not in pari delicto and could sue. Courtland v. Walston & Co., Inc., [1 1-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
In addition to 10b-5, other federal securities provisions apply to certain broker's
recommendations. E.g., Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970) (written information
given by an underwriter); Exchange Act § 26, 15 U.S.C. § 78z (1970) (illegal to represent
SEC approved security or transaction); Exchange Act Rules 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6
(1972) (inducing purchases during distribution), 15d-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-3 (1972)
(fraudulent to represent that Commission approved broker), and 15cl-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15d-5 (1972) (cannot induce purchase or sale unless control of broker by issuer, of
issuer by broker, or common control is revealed). National securities exchanges and the
NASD have also added requirements, but these are limited to written recommendations.
2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExcH. GUIDE 2474A.10(l); NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 1,
CCH NASD SEC. DEALERs MANuAL 2151, at 2018. Recourse to state statutory and common law may also be possible.
76 Distribution by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 6721, at 3 (Feb. 2, 1962) (footnotes omitted). This release was directed
only at recommendations in relation to unregistered distributions of substantial blocks
of securities of relatively obscure companies. These limitations may not represent the
parameters of a firm's obligations.
77 Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'g Richard J. Buck & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8482, at 6, 8 (Dec. 31, 1968); Floyd Earl O'Gorman,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7959, at 3 (Sept. 22, 1966); Crow, Brourman &

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:869

facts concerning recommended securities. 78 Most questions concerning
representations will be discussed below, 79 but the reasonableness of

their underlying basis is treated here as it applies to recommendations,
opinions, and predictions as well.
The variety of situations which the reasonable basis concept encompasses is not dear. Some aspects are undisputed: its ambit includes
oral and written statements80 and, although it was originally employed
Chatkin, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7839, at 3 (March 15, 1966); Ross
Sec., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 509, 514 (1963); Brown, Barton & Engel, 41 S.E.C. 59, 63 (1962); N.
Pinsker & Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 285, 291 (1960); Barnett S Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 1, 4 n.6 (1960);
Best Sec., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931, 934 (1960); Leavell, supra note 57, at 1586.
78 Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969) (facts); Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211,
219-20 (9th Cir. 1969) (prediction of future growth); SEC v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., 240 F.
Supp. 962, 967-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (facts about issuer and predictions and opinions of
future price); Richard Bruce & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8303, at 3,
6 (April 30, 1968), aff'd sub nom. Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1969) (representations
and predictions); A.T. Brod & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8060, at 2
(April 26, 1967) (statements and predictions); Floyd Earl O'Gorman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7959, at 3 (Sept. 22, 1966) (predictions and representations); Crow,
Brourman & Chatkin, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7839, at 3, 5, 8
(March 15, 1966) (price rise prediction, extravagant statements, and representations);
Arnold Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7813, at 3-4 (Feb. 7, 1966)
(predictions of price rise); Hamilton Waters & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7725, at 3-4 (Oct. 18, 1965) (representations and predictions); Harold Grill, 41 S.E.C.
321, 322 (1963) (representations); Alexander Reid & Co., 40 S.E.C. 986, 989-90 (1962)
(representations and opinions); Barnett & Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 521, 523-24 (1961) (statement
that price or market value would rise); Leonard Burton Corp., 39 S.E.C. 211, 214 (1959)
(prediction of price increase).
A broker-dealer cannot therefore avoid his responsibilities by characterizing his
statements as opinions and predictions rather than as statements of existing fact. Hiller v.
SEC, 429 F.2d 856, 858 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., supra at 968; Armstrong,
Jones & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8420, at 9 (Oct. 3, 1968), aff'd, 421
F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 20 (Nov. 12, 1965); Isthmus SS. & Salvage Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7400, at 7 (Aug. 20, 1964); Ross Sec., Inc., 41
S.E.C. 509, 514 (1963); Mac Robbins & Co., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 116, 119 (1962), aff'd sub nom.
Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Alexander Reid & Co., supra. See also note 114
and accompanying text infra. But see SEC v. Rapp, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,048 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (opinion, recognized as such, permissible), rev'd,
304 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1962) (declining to decide point then, which the court seems to
have answered eight years later in Hiller, supra). Highly optimistic predictions and
opinions are considered to be more deceptive since the customer is entitled to assume that
they rest on a particularly strong foundation. Alexander Reid & Co., supra at 990.
79 See notes 157-232 and accompanying text infra. The requirement of a reasonable
basis does not mean that estimates are per se violations of lOb-5 if they are slightly inaccurate. See generally SEC v. R.A. Holman & Co., 366 F.2d 446, 467 (2d Cir. 1966), modified
on other grounds, 377 F.2d 665 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 991 (1967).
80 Most cases have involved oral statements. E.g., Harris Clare & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8004, at 2-3 (Dec. 9, 1966); Underhill Sec. Corp., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7668, at 3-4 (Aug. 3, 1965); Aircraft Dynamics Int'l
Corp., 41 S.E.C. 566, 568 (1963); Barnett & Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 521, 523 (1961). Some cases

1972]

RULE 10b-5 AND BROKER-DEALERS

only against boiler room operations, 81 its scope has been significantly
expanded. 82 Since the shingle theory8 is the concept's genesis, brokers

cannot escape its reach, although some dealers may not be governedM
A more difficult question concerns the class of issuers to which the
have found violations in broker's reports. E.g., Melvyn Hiller, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 8476, at 2 (Dec. 24, 1968), aff'd, 429 F.2d 856, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1970) (unconfirmed report cannot be sent out, even if status disclosed, because it thereby gains
authority and credibility); Richard Bruce & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8808, at 5 (April 30, 1968), aff'd sub nom. Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1969) (report
impermissible if based on unconfirmed material, even if such fact disclosed to customers).
81 See notes 81-47 and accompanying text infra.
82 Many cases have required a reasonable basis in the absence of a boiler room. E.g.,
Armstrong, Jones & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8420, at 9 (Oct. 3, 1968),
aff'd, 421 F.2d 859 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 898 U.S. 958 (1970); Richard Bruce & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8303 (April 80, 1968), affd sub nom. Gross v. SEC,
418 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1969); Walston & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8165
(Sept. 22, 1967); A.T. Brod & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8060, at 2-4
(April 26, 1967); Floyd Earl O'Gorman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7959,
at 5 (Sept. 22, 1966). The boiler room cases include Crow, Brourman, & Chatkin, Inc.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7889, at 2 n.3 (March 15, 1966); Albion Sec.
Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7561, at 3 (March 24, 1965); Aircraft Dynamics Int'l Corp., 41 S.E.C. 566, 572 (1968); Alexander Reid & Co., 40 S.E.C. 986, 992 (1962);
Barnett & Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 521, 528-24 (1961).
88 Hiller v. SEC, 429 F.2d 856, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1970); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596
(2d Cir. 1969); Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring);
Richard Bruce & Co. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8308, at 5 (April 80, 1968),
affid sub nom. Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1969); Aircraft Dynamics Int'l Corp.,
41 S.E.C. 566, 570 (1968); B. Fennekohl & Co., 41 S.E.C. 210, 216 (1962); Alexander Reid &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 986, 990 (1962); Distribution by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721, at 8-4 (Feb. 2, 1962). The reasonable basis
obligation, of course, "applies with equal force to broker-dealers and to salesmen." Ross
Sec., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 509, 514 n.7 (1968). The need for high standards in investment advice
was pointedly brought home in a congressional report. See SEC, REPoRT OF SPECrAL STmY
OF SEcurarrEs Muir
pt. 1, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-87 (1968) [hereinafter cited as SPECiAL STUDY].
84 See notes 58-54 and accompanying text supra; cf. note 108 infra. Dealers may
have a greater duty if they have a personal interest in selling the security. Phillips v.
Reynolds & Co., 297 F. Supp. 736, 787 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (dictum).
As the shingle theory applies both to registered public offerings and to offerings exempt
from the 1933 Act, the reasonable basis requirement is applicable to both. See, e.g.,
Walston & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8165, at 8 (Sept. 22, 1967)
(municipal bonds; acting as underwriter); Crow, Brourman & Chatkin, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7889 (March 15, 1966) (no registration); Hamilton Waters
& Co., SEC Securities Exhange Act Release No. 7725 (Oct. 18, 1965) (undenrriter); Aircraft Dynamics Int'l Corp., 41 S.E.C. 566 (1963) (underwriting); Brown, Barton & Engel, 41
S.E.C. 59, 61-62 (1962) (underwriting); Distribution by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered
Securities, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721 (Feb. 2, 1962) (unregistered
distributions). The duty to investigate may at times be even broader than the duties
ordinarily imposed under the shingle theory. See SEC v. Chamberlain Associates, [19611964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE,.
91,228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (public relations
man involved in distribution of stock held to have duty to investigate).
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reasonable basis rule applies. Any opinion, prediction of future events,
or representation should have a reasonable basis regardless of the
type of company involved. A stockbroker may avoid the risk of liability
simply by not volunteering any information for which he has no adequate basis.
A recommendation, however, is less specific than an opinion, prediction, or representation and typically is made on a wider variety of
securities; hence, a different standard may be justified in determining
if it has a reasonable basis. Cases have been primarily concerned with
recommendations with respect to securities of speculative and unseasoned companies. 85 The rationale is that less information is available to
the public about these issuers. But with the extension in 1964 of the
Exchange Act's periodic reporting requirements to include over-thecounter companies, 86 and the increase in information now included in
those reports,87 the distinction between listed and unlisted securities is
less important.8 8 Since there is now little difference among types of is85 None of the cases cited herein invoking the reasonable basis rule pertain to blue
chip securities. See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969) (stock involved was
an over-the-counter security and investors "could not readily confirm the information
given them"; special duty owed by persons who sell unlisted securities); Distribution by
Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721,
at 1 (Feb. 2, 1962) (dealing with securities of "relatively obscure and unseasoned companies'); R. MUNDHEIM, CONFERENCE ON SECU~miVs REGULATION 76 (1965) (Mr. Heller). Certain securities exchange rules, however, are not limited to over-the-counter issues. 2 CCH
Am. STOCK Excis. GUDE
9495-10; 2 CCII N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GUiDE 2474A.10(1).
Of course, not all unlisted securities are obscure and speculative, and perhaps this
distinction should be recognized in the cases. In Crow, Brourman &- Chatkin, Inc., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7839, at 5 (March 15, 1966), the Commission rejected
the argument that because a security had been traded for four years and was owned
by a substantial number of people, it was seasoned and nonspeculative. The issue, however, is not whether the security is a bad risk, but whether there was at the time a reasonable basis for the statements made. Mac Robbins & Co., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 116, 131 (1962),
aff'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963).
86 Exchange Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970) (added in 1964), in conjunction
with Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1970), extended the periodic reporting
requirements to over-the-counter companies having total assets of more than $1,000,000 and a class of equity securities held of record by 500 or more persons. Exchange Act
§ 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1970), obligates issuers filing a 1933 Act registration statement
to file periodic reports unless the securities sold thereunder are thereafter held of record
by less than 300 persons.
87 The information required in the periodic reports was greatly expanded in 1970.
See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 9000 (Oct. 21, 1970) & 9004 (Oct. 28, 1970).
88 While these developments did tend to put listed and over-the-counter securities
on a more equal footing, there are still a few situations in which more information is
available for listed securities. For example, all listed securities are subject to the proxy
rules whereas only those over-the-counter companies subject to Exchange Act § 12(g), 15
U.S.C. § 781(q) (1970), must conform to such rules; periodic reports must be filed by all companies having a class of securities traded on a national securities exchange but not all other
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suers as regards available information, investors should have the protection of having recommendations of listed securities conform to the
reasonable basis rule, albeit perhaps under less stringent standards than
those applicable to over-the-counter securities.8 9
Most troublesome is the question of which types of recommendations are governed by the reasonable basis rule. A broker can make a
recommendation in a variety of situations: as the lead underwriter in a
public offering or as a member of the underwriting group, or while operating a boiler room, engaging in a concerted sales effort or distribution, volunteering similar advice at approximately the same time to a
limited number of customers, making an isolated recommendation to
one customer on his own initiative, answering a customer's request for
advice, or, with what is at best an implied recommendation based on
silence, 90 receiving and executing an unsolicited purchase order. The
broker's duties should diminish in proportion to his participation in
the sale of the security.
Requiring a firm to have a reasonable basis for a recommendation
(and hence to conduct an investigation) creates insurmountable practical problems when the firm is not too actively engaged in selling a
security. However, no court has gone so far as to apply the reasonable basis rule to an isolated recommendation, whether initiated by the
broker or solicited by his customer. 91 Minimally, a broker ought to have
a reasonable basis for recommendations made in any situation in which
he gives similar advice to a limited number of investors. Such practical
problems do not arise concerning representations, opinions, and predictions since (unlike recommendations) a firm need not make such
statements unless it has back-up data. Accordingly, the reasonable basis
concept should encompass all such statements.
issuers must make such reports. See Exchange Act §§ 12(g)(4), 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(g)(4),
78o(d) (1970). Information as to over-the-counter companies filed under the Exchange Act
can be found only in Washington, but copies of similar information required for listed

securities are available at the exchange where the security is listed. But see note 103 infra.
The developments in the lob-5 requirements concerning corporate disclosure may decrease

the significance of these differences.
89 See R. MuNDHrIM, supra note 85, at 78 (Mr. Heller).
90 Silence is within the ambit of conduct covered by the Rule. Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147. 154 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
91 The SEC's release on the subject refers only to distributions of substantial blocks
of unregistered securities of unseasoned companies. Distribution by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721, at 1 (Feb. 2, 1962). An
example of the confusion can be found in the Mundheim conference where three different

views were expressed. See R. MuNannmm, supra note 85, at 75-76 (Mr. Heller: rules apply
only to sales campaign and not to casual distribution); id. at 89 (Mr. O'Boyle: rules should
apply at all times); id. (Mr. Cohen, Chairman of the SEC: Mr. O'Boyle's position beyond

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:869

Applicability of the reasonable basis rule is only one open issue.
Little authority exists on what constitutes a "reasonable basis." Understandably, the opinions concentrate on what is not a reasonable basis.
A few cases reject reliance on specific factors92 while others discuss facts
which should excite suspicion and hence negate the validity of accumulated data, 93 but none affirmatively establishes criteria for defining the
required basis. Arguably, a firm should be considered to have fulfilled
its obligations if, in a reasonable manner, it amasses pertinent facts and
rationally analyzes them.9 One factor to be considered in determining
reasonableness is the broker's role in the transaction. As the number of
shares being sold by the broker, the number of customers approached,
and the dollar volume involved increase, so should the amount of facts
and depth of analysis required. Also to be considered is the type of
security with which the broker is dealing. More information and possibly a more rigorous review of the data are necessary for the securities of
an .obscure over-the-counter company than for those of AT&T. Judge
Clark, concurring in a leading case, went much further, stating that
a broker "warrantsthe soundness of statements of stock value, estimates
of a firm's earnings potential, and the like."9 5 Although some commentators have objected to the breadth of that statement, 98 the opinion did
limit a broker's exposure to situations where he knows he has no reasonable basis for his recommendation or is "'grossly careless or indifferent
Whatever may in general
to the existence of an adequate basis.'
",97

anything Commission had held, but does not disagree with O'Boyle's conclusion). See also
id. at 88 (Mr. White, then General Counsel to the NASD: NASD's reasonable basis rule not
limited to distributions).
92 A.T. Brod & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8060, at 3 (April 26,
1967) (broker not justified in relying on rising price of stock); Mac Robbins & Co., Inc., 40
S.E.C. 497, 502-03, remanded sub nom. Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961) & Berko
v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961) (rejecting reasoning that industry growth is basis for
recommending stock of company in that field).
93 See note 106 and accompanying text infra.
94 There is authority requiring predictions, opinions, and recommendations to be
"responsibly made on the basis of actual knowledge and careful consideration." Alexander
Reid & Co., 40 S.E.C. 986, 990 (1962) (footnote omitted); accord, Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc.,
41 S.E.C. 579, 383 (1963).
95 Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir.), rev'g and remanding Mac Robbins
& Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 497 (1961) (emphasis added).
96 R. JENMNGs & H. MARSH, Sfcurrmns REUULAnON 774 (2d ed. 1968); 6 Loss 3712; R.
MuNDHuE,
supra note 85, at 78 (Mr. Heller).
97 297 F.2d at 115. See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969) (salesman must
not "deliberately ignore that which he has a duty to know and recklessly state facts
about matters of which he is ignorant"; the SEC had held that the broker had a duty to
disclose adverse facts he knew or should have known); Diugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 109
(2d Cir. 1967) (if brokers did not know circumstances, they should have known); Melvyn
Hiller, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8476, at 2 (Dec. 24, 1968), aff'd, 429 F2d
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constitute a reasonable basis, the Commission has indicated that in two
types of situations an adequate basis can never be demonstrated. First,
"predictions of very substantial price rises to named figures with respect to a promotional and speculative security of an unseasoned company cannot possibly be justified. In [the SEG's] experience such predictions have been a hallmark of fraud."9 8 Similarly, the Commission
has concluded that there can be no reasonable basis for predictions of
earnings or earnings per share for such enterprises. 99
856 (2d Cir. 1970) (forecast of price rise "made 'with knowledge or reasonable grounds to
believe' . . . untrue'). This issue differs from the question of whether the activities were
"willful" and hence would subject the actors to a disciplinary proceeding. See A.T. Brod
& Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8060, at 4 (April 26, 1967) (willful if intentionally made).
98 Alexander Reid & Co., 40 S.E.C. 986, 991 (1962); accord, Armstrong, Jones & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8420, at 9 (Oct. 3, 1968), aft'd, 421 F.2d 359 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Charles P. Lawrence, SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 8213, at 3 (Dec. 19, 1967), aff'd, 598 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1968); A.T. Brod & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8060, at 2 X1.3(April 26, 1967); Harris Clare & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8004, at 3 (Dec. 9, 1966); Crow, Brourman &
Chatkin, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7839, at 6 (March 15, 1966); Arnold
Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Release 7813, at 4 (Feb. 7, 1966); Hamilton Waters &
Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7725, at 4 (Oct. 18, 1965); Underhill Sec.
Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7668, at 4 (Aug. 8, 1965); Albion Sec. Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7561, at 3 (March 24, 1965); Linder, Bilotti & Co.,
Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7460, at 2 (Nov. 18, 1964); Equity Gen. Inv.
Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No 7388, at 4 n.4 (Aug. 18, 1964); Aircraft Dynamics Int'l Corp., 41 S.E.C. 566, 570 (1963); Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 879, 883
(1963); B. Fennekohl & Co., 41 S.E.C. 210, 215 (1962); Mac Robbins & Co., Inc., 41 S.E.C.
116, 131-32 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 816 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1963). But see SEC v.
Rapp, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
91,048 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (price
rise prediction, recognized as such, permissible), rev'd, 304 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1962) (expressly finding it unnecessary to decide question).
In Melvyn Hiller, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8476 (Dec. 24, 1968), afJ'd,
429 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1970), a salesman's comparison of a stock with other securities which had
enjoyed a remarkable price rise was equated by the SEC with a prediction of a spectacular
price rise. Accord, Isthmus S.S. & Salvage Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
7400 (Aug. 20, 1964) (favorable comparison with Polaroid "was patently fraudulent");
Irving Grubman, 40 S.E.C. 671, 672-73 (1961); G.J. Mitchell, Jr., Co., 40 S.E.C. 409, 418
(1960); Whitehall Corp., 38 S.E.C. 259, 266-67 (1958). Guarantees of profit and promises
that prior losses will be recouped fall into the same category as predictions of a price rise.
Irving Friedman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8076, at 3 (May 16, 1967).
Exchange Act Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1972), the rule which prohibits false
and misleading statements in proxy statements, has a "Note" attached explaining that a
prediction of future market value is an example of a statement which "may be misleading." There is no limitation on its application to speculative securities. See note 85 and
accompanying text supra concerning seasoned securities.
99 Richard J. Buck & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8482,
at 8 (Dec. 31, 1968), aff'd sub nom. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969) (earnings predictions of sharp increases with respect to speculative security inherently misleading without disclosure of basis and uncertainties); Richard Bruce & Co., SEC Securities
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The cases do not concentrate on subsequent events as indicia of the
reasonableness of a prediction, opinion, or recommendation. Although
a broker is not an insurer of his pronouncements, events occurring after
a statement is made should evidence the reasonable basis of those statements in the absence of an intervening event affecting the issuer, the
industry in question, or the general economic and financial climate.
Thus, a decline or even a leveling of earnings should put into question
the basis of a predicted rise in results of operations.
A reasonable investigation is a prerequisite for a reasonable basis.
The duty to investigate exists absolutely whenever there is an obligation to have a reasonable basis for statements and recommendations.10 0
Exchange Act Release No. 8303, at 6 (April 30, 1968), af'd sub nom. Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d
103 (2d Cir. 1969) ("misleading" to predict "increase in earnings of a speculative security"
without disclosing uncertainties); James De Mammos, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8090, at 3 (June 2, 1967) (must disclose basis and uncertainties with respect to a speculative security), aff'd, No. 31469 (2d Cir., Oct. 13, 1967); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 17 n.42 (Nov. 12, 1965) (never justified in predicting
earnings per share approaching initial offering price for new enterprise); Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 379, 383 (1963) (cannot possibly justify predictions of earnings per share
equal to the initial offering price for a start-up operation); D.F. Bernheimer & Co., 41 S.E.C.
358, 362 (1963) (specific and definite estimates with regard to new company lend unjustified
appearance of predictability of profits).
The "Note" accompanying Exchange Act Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1972),
states that "predictions of ... earnings" are among those things which may be misleading.
100 The Second Circuit held in Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969):
Brokers and salesmen are "under a duty to investigate ...." Thus, a salesman cannot deliberately ignore that which he has a duty to know and recklessly
state facts about matters of which he is ignorant. He must analyze sales literature
and must not blindly accept recommendations made therein.
Id. at 595-96 (footnotes omitted), quoting Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1967).
The court continued: "By his recommendation he implies that a reasonable investigation
has been made and that his recommendation rests on the conclusions based on such investigation." 415 F.2d at 597. See generally R. MUNDHnM, supra note 85, at 75 (Mr. Heller);
Cohen & Rabin, supra note 11, at 705; Leavell, supra note 57, at 1590; Note, Proof of
Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule 10b-5, 63 MICH. L. REv.
1070, 1079 (1965); Note, New and Comprehensive Duties of Securities Sellers to Investigate
Disclosure, and Have an "Adequate Basis" for Representations, 62 MiC. L. R-v. 880, 883
(1964); Distribution by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 6721, at 3 (Feb. 2, 1962). It has been suggested that no duty to investigate
exists if adequate information is available. Wiesen, Disclosure of Inside Information-Materiality and Texas Gulf Sulphur, 28 MD. L. REv. 189, 192 (1968). This argument may be
a matter of semantics-if facts are publicly known or available to the salesman or broker,
he need investigate only that information, assuming he learns nothing to put him on inquiry. The duty to investigate remains, but the scope of the inquiry is limited to the
information at hand.
The duty may extend beyond brokers and their salesmen. See SEC v. Chamberlain
Associates, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
91,228 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
("Financial Public Relations Council [sic]" whose job it was to get market in security
started held to have duty to investigate material in report he sent out).
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As with the requirement for a reasonable basis, there is no definitive
guideline as to what constitutes a "reasonable investigation." Factors
utilized to determine whether there was a reasonable basis 01 ' may be
used to determine the adequacy of the investigation as well. 0 2 Under
such guidelines a broker exerting any sales pressure should initially
examine the filings with the SEC and published data on the security in
question. 10 3 At some point, as the amount of sales pressure increases, a
visit to the issuer and interviews with its management become a necessity.
It is clear that certain data may not be relied on to form a reason101 The standard seems to be one of reasonableness. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597
(2d Cir. 1969) (degree of investigation "will vary in each case'); Walston & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8165, at 4 (Sept. 22, 1967) (firm acting as underwriter had
to "make diligent inquiry'); Isthmus S.S. & Salvage Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7400, at 8 (Aug. 20, 1964) (underwriter's duty is "to exercise due care, reasonable
under all the circumstances'); Brown, Barton & Engel, 41 S.E.C. 59, 63 (1962) ("reasonable
and diligent inquiry" and "reasonable investigation'); Distribution by Broker-Dealers of
Unregistered Securities, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721, at 3 (Feb. 2, 1962)
("reasonable investigation'); Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33, 41-42 (1953) (underwriter
making predictions of price rise held to have a duty "to exercise a degree of care reasonable under the circumstances').
Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), imposes liability on underwriters for misleading registration statements. One defense involves a "reasonable investigation" (§§
ll(b)(3)(A),(B), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b)(3)(A),(B) (1970)), and the standard of reasonableness
is that "of a prudent man in the management of his own property" (§ 11(c), 15 U.S.C. §
77k(c) (1970)).
Suggestions of what constitutes a reasonable investigation can be found in R. MuNDn.mrm, supra note 85, at 86-93; Cary, Recent Developments in Securities Regulation, 63
CoLut. L. Rv. 856, 865 (1963) (remarks of Mr. Israels); Wiesen, supra note 100, at 192.
102 See text following note 94 supra.
In Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969), the court noted that "securities
issued by smaller companies of recent origin obviously require more thorough investigation." In Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 379 (1963), the SEC imposed on an underwriter "a special duty to ascertain and disclose the true facts not only at and during the
initial offering but also in the period thereafter when [respondent] was conducting an
active retail sales campaign." Id. at 383 (footnote omitted). In Brown, Barton & Engel,
41 S.E.C. 59, 63 (1962), respondents claimed they were not underwriters and therefore should
be held to a lesser standard of diligence. The Commission classified them as underwriters
within the meaning of Securities Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(I1) (1970), stating however
that they nonetheless "had a responsibility to make a reasonable investigation" because
they undertook a large distribution of stock. 41 S.E.C. at 64.
In Armstrong, Jones & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8420, at 8-9 (Oct.
30, 1968), aff'd, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970), the respondent was
accused of making predictions of price rises. The Commission rejected as irrelevant the
fact that customers initiated most of the transactions.
103 Cf. Exchange Act Rule 15c2-11(a)(3)(C), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11(a)(3)(C) (1972) (one
way for a broker to reactivate quotations in an inactive security is to have current SEC
material on file). The cost of keeping up-to-date microfishe copies of SEC filings is not
oppressive.
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able basis; instead, further investigation is required. Dependence on an
issuer's information may not always be warranted." 4 A salesman in a
boiler room may not rely upon literature furnished by his employer,
nor blindly accept such material even in the absence of a boiler room
situation.10 5 Finally, knowledge of any fact which arouses a suspicion
104 Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969) ("salesman may not rely blindly
upon the issuer for information concerning a company'); James De Mammos, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8090, at 4 (June 2, 1967), aff'd, No. 31469 (2d Cir., Oct. 13,
1967) (prediction of earnings sixteen times greater than prior year); J.P. Howell & Co., Inc.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8087, at 4 (June 1, 1967), af'd sub nom. Vanasco
v. SEC, 395 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1968) (statements at variance with prospectus being used);
Irving Friedman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8076, at 5-6 (May 16, 1967)
(boiler room raises sufficient doubts); Floyd Earl O'Gorman, SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 7959, at 3 (Sept. 22, 1966) (cannot rely on company's data in absence of financial information); Crow, Brourman & Chatkin, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7839, at 8-9 (March 15, 1966) (in absence of financial statements, not sufficient); Arnold
Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7813, at 3 (Feb. 7, 1966) (cannot rely
on uncertified financials with obviously questionable figure); Hamilton Waters & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7725, at 4 (Oct. 18, 1965) (phenomenal increase in
backlog); Equity Gen Inv. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7388, at 3-4
(Aug. 13, 1964) (contrary to offering circular); Lawrence Sec., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 652, 656 (1963)
(representations and recent offering circular conflict); Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33,
42 (1963); cf. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (Securities Act § 11 case; underwriters "may not rely solely on the company's officers or on the
company's counsel').
One firm, however, was able to convince the Commission that it was entitled to rely
on representations from management. Edgerton, Wykoff & Co., 36 S.E.C. 583, 591-93 (1955).
In that case, the broker obtained a letter from the issuer's production manager concerning
the size of an important contract, asked to see the contract but was told that the parties
had gone far beyond its terms, was in constant contact with the company's personnel, relied
on false public press releases promulgated by the company, and, although financial statements were not immediately available, discussed the financial condition with the company's
attorney and public accountant. The SEC was impressed: "The information released by
[the issuer] was confirmed with the only persons who were in a position to give any verification." Id. at 593.
More recently, the Second Circuit held that each case must be decided on its facts and
"absent actual knowledge or warning signals, a broker-dealer should not be under a duty
to retain his own auditor to reexamine the books of every company, the stock of which
he may offer for sale." Levine v. SEC, 436 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1971).
105 Boiler room cases include Walker v. SEC, 383 F.2d 344, 345 (2d Cir. 1967) (do not accept blindly); Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1963), af'g Mac Robbins & Co, Inc., 41
S.E.C. 116, 128-29 (1962); Irving Friedman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8076,
at 5-6 (May 16, 1967) (boiler room "sufficient reason to doubt" information); Ross Sec.,
Inc., 41 S.E.C. 509, 515 (1963); Harold Grill, 41 S.E.C. 321, 324-25 (1963) ("obviously inadequate information'); B. Fennekohl & Co., 41 S.E.C. 210, 215 (1962) (since boiler room
operation, "little if any reliance could be placed on sales literature" by salesman); see note
343 and accompanying text infra; cf. United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 US. 894 (1963) (Securities Act § 17(a) case; suspicious on its face); Herring v.
Hendison, 218 F. Supp. 419, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (private right of action under Securities

Act § 12(2)).
Employers' material may be suspect in non-boiler room situations. E.g., Hanly v. SEC,
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that the collected data are incomplete or inaccurate should nullify any
claim of a reasonable investigation. 106
If a broker is unable after a reasonable investigation to garner
sufficient information to form a reasonable basis, he must disclose this
to his customers107 and, at the very least, qualify statements and caution
415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969) (salesman "must analyze sales literature and must not
blindly accept recommendations made therein'); Equity Gen. Inv. Corp., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7388, at 34 (Aug. 13, 1964) (contrary to information contained
in current offering circular).
106 Among the facts which should arouse suspicion are those discussed in Richard
Bruce & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8303, at 6 (April 30, 1968), aff'd sub
nor. Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1969) (knew he faced great competition and past
earnings rise nonrecurring); James De Mammos, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8090, at 4 (June 2, 1967), aff'd, No. 31469 (2d Cir., Oct. 13, 1967) (representation
by issuer that earnings would increase sixteen fold); J.P. Howell & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8087, at 4 (June 1, 1967), aff'd sub nom. Vanasco v. SEC,
395 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1968) (variance between statement and prospectus being used); Irving
Friedman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8076, at 5-6 (May 16, 1967) (boiler
room "sufficient reason to doubt accuracy of information supplied to him" by issuer and
employer; even without boiler room, absence of financial statements should have alerted
salesman); Floyd Earl O'Gorman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7959, at 3 (Sept.
22, 1966) (in absence of financial information, cannot rely on data from company); Crow,
Brourman & Chatkin, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7839, at 6 (March 15,
1966) (absence of current financial statements and inability to find information in financial services); Arnold Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7813, at 3 (Feb.
7, 1966) (questionable figure in uncertified financial statements); Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 21 (Nov. 12, 1965) (absence of financials
should have put broker on notice that he could not rely on information "supplied by the
issuer or published sources'); Hamilton Waters & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7725 (Oct. 18, 1965) (phenomenal increase in backlog); Equity Gen. Inv. Corp.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7388, at 34 (Aug. 13, 1964) (information contrary
to disclosure in current offering circular); Lawrence Sec., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 652, 656 (1963)
(conflict between issuer's statements and recent offering circular); Heft, Kahn & Infante,
Inc., 41 S.E.C. 379, 388-90 (1963) (research assistant writing market letter; although may
be entitled to rely normally, since his requests to see information were refused he should
have been alerted); D.F. Bernheimer & Co., 41 S.E.C. 358, 362 (1963) ("should have been
aware from readily available information" contained in article and stockholder letter that
price of sulphur, the issuer's product, was inflated); B. Fennekohl & Co., 41 S.E.C. 210, 217
(1962) (boiler room operation should alert salesman); Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33,
42 (1953) (witnessing of issuer's machine jamming and old dates on purchase orders).
Indications that the brokerage firm and issuer share an office or that a member of the
firm is on the issuer's board have been used against the firm since suspicious facts were
more easily ascertainable. Hiller v. SEC, 429 F.2d 856, 857 (2d Cir. 1970) (duties more clear
because respondent a director of issuer); Shearson, Hammill & Co., supra at 18 (partner of
registrant director of issuer; should not have assumed turnaround situation because of
access to information); Aircraft Dynamics Int'l Corp., 41 S.E.C. 566, 569 (1963) (shared
offices and officers; therefore had easy access to financial information); D.F. Bernheimer &
Co., supra (officer of registrant was director of issuer; aware of uncertainties).
107 Richard J. Buck & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8482, at 8 (Dec.
31, 1968) (customer entitled to assume reasonable basis absent disclosure), aff'd sub nom.
Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969) (must disclose absence of essential informa-
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investors concerning the dangers of purchasing without such data.108

Brokers have asserted, with uniform lack of success in administration); Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 379, 382-83 (1963) (prediction implies adequate
basis exists); B. Fennekohl & Co., 41 S.E.C. 210, 215 (1962) (failure to disclose lack of adequate financial information); Distributions by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721, at 3-4 (Feb. 2, 1962) (if broker "lacks essential
information about the issuer, such as knowledge of its financial condition, he must disclose this"); Barnett & Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 1, 4 (1960) (no disclosure of absence of reasonable basis for price rise prediction).
108 Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969) (disclose risks to investors); Floyd
Earl O'Gorman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7959, at 3 (Sept. 22, 1966) (withhold or qualify recommendation or at least caution customers); Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 21 (Nov. 12, 1965) (withhold or appropriately qualify representations or, at very least, caution investors); Harold Grill, 41 S.E.C. 321,
322, 325 (1963) (caution customers); B. Fennekohl & Co., 41 S.E.C. 210, 215 (1962) (withhold
or qualify statements; caution customers); Distributions by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered
Securities, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721, at 3 (Feb. 2, 1962) (caution
customers); Mac Robbins & Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 497, 503, rev'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 297
F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961) & Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961) (should have cautioned
customers). The Commission has taken a different tack on occasion. See, e.g., Crow, Brourman & Chatkin, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7839, at 9 (March 15, 1966)
(should refrain from recommending security and caution investors about buying without

current information).
Even when the broker has obtained facts providing an adequate basis for his views,

he must clearly reveal to his clients any known or reasonably ascertainable data adverse
to his statements. Richard J. Buck & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Realease No. 8482,
at 7-8 (Dec. 31, 1968) ("known or reasonably ascertainable adverse information which
rendered [statements] materially misleading"; absent disclosure, customer entitled to
assume broker knows no "adverse factors which might affect the customer's investment decision"), af'd sub nom. Hanly v. SEC, supra (disclose known and reasonably ascertainable facts); Richard Bruce & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8303,
at 6 (April 30, 1968), affd sub nom. Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1969) (reveal uncertainties and known facts); Crow, Brourman & Chatkin, Inc., supra at 3 (guilty concealment of known precarious financial condition); Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., 41
S.E.C. 379, 382-83 (1963) (prediction implies no known facts which would make it unreliable); D.F. Bernheimer & Co., 41 S.E.C. 358, 361 (1963) (disclose "known or reasonably
available information'); Mac Robbins & Co., Inc., supra at 131-32 (must make "adequate
disclosure of material adverse information"; boiler room); Distributions by Broker-Dealers of
Unregistered Securities, supra ("facts known or reasonably ascertainable'); N. Pinsker &
Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 285, 291 (1960) (recommendation should be accompanied by "known
or easily ascertainable facts'); Barnett & Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 1, 4 (1960) (no disclosure of
issuer's lack of capital and income; must disclose "known or reasonably ascertainable
facts'); Best Sec., Inc., 39 S.E.C, 931, 934 (1960) ("known or easily ascertainable facts');
Leonard Burton Corp., 39 S.E.C. 211, 214 (1959) (must disclose uncertainties); Van Alstyne,
Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C. 311, 321-22, 324 (1952) (fair portrayal required disclosure of unfavorable financial statements; not sufficient just to state loss occurred); cf. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 390 & comment b (1958) (must disclose information known to agent
or which would have been discovered in an attentive search). The "reasonably ascertainable" language of the cases may derive from the duty to make a reasonable investigation,
i.e., to obtain "reasonably ascertainable" data.
In the Van Alstyne case, supra, the Commission held that the duty of disclosure may
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tive actions, the following defenses to the reasonable basis rule: the
customer was sophisticated, 0 9 knew the security was speculative,'" received a prospectus,"' did not rely on the statement,11 2 did not believe
the statement," 3 understood the broker to be expressing an opinion," 4
or realized a profit; 115 the prediction fortuitously came true;1 6 the
extend to include the fact that previous optimistic statements had not materialized (33
S.E.C. at 324), and rejected the broker's claim that the issuer's financial information
supplied to the respondent was confidential and hence should not be disclosed. Id. at 321.
Although the cases do not limit the duty to disclose adverse information, surely a

materiality concept must be implied. See Rule 10b-5(2).
The decisions seem to refer to adverse facts about the issuer, but in an appropriate
case the duty should extend to unfavorable data concerning the industry in which the

issuer is engaged, the security vis-A-vis the issuer (such as the fact that a bond is subordinated), or the market for the security (for example, that there are few bids but a
plethora of offers). See Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., supra at 329-30 (misrepresentation of
amount of stock available and big buy order); Henry P. Rosenfeld, 32 S.E.C. 731, 739

(1951) (misrepresentation by underwriter of number of shares remaining unsold).
109 Richard J. Buck & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8482, at 9
(Dec. 31, 1968), aff'd sub nom. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969) (sophisticated
and knowledgeable customer does not warrant less stringent standard); A.T. Brod & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8060, at 4 (April 26, 1967); Leonard Burton

Corp., 39 S.E.C. 211, 214 (1959).
110 Armstrong, Jones & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8420, at 9
(Oct. 3, 1968), aff'd, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Floyd Earl
O'Gorman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7959, at 4 (Sept. 22, 1966); Underhill Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7668, at 6 (Aug. 3, 1965);
Isthmus S5.S.& Salvage Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7400, at 7 (Aug. 20,
1964); Alexander Reid & Co., 40 S.E.C. 986, 989 (1962); Leonard Burton Corp., 39 S.E.C.
211, 214 (1959) (customer's independent knowledge of speculative nature of securities
no defense).
III Aircraft Dynamics Int'l Corp., 41 S.E.C. 566, 569 (1963); Ross Sec., Inc., 41 S.E.C.

509, 510 (1963).
.12 Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); Armstrong, Jones & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8420, at 9 (Oct. 3, 1968), aff'd, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Irving Friedman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8076, at 5 (May 16, 1967); A.T. Brod & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8060, at 4 (April 26, 1967); Linder, Bilotti & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7460, at 3 (Nov. 13, 1964); Isthmus SS. & Salvage Co., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7400, at 7 (Aug. 20, 1964); Aircraft Dynamics Intl Corp., 41 S.E.C. 566,
570 (1963).
113 Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 1963) (clients not misled); Irving Friedman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8076, at 5 (May 16, 1967) (not defense
that investor not misled); Isthmus SS. & Salvage Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7400, at 7 (Aug. 20, 1964).
114 Alexander Reid & Co., 40 S.E.C. 986, 989 (Feb. 8, 1962); see note 78 supra.
"15 Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 1963).
116 Ross Sec., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 509, 514 n.6 (1963); Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., 41 S.E.C.
379, 382 n.4 (1963) (must be warranted at time made; future price rise may be due to
broker's activities).
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broker was naive,117 acted in good faith, 118 was just puffing,119 or in120
vested his own money in the security.
Private litigants have been much less successful than the Commission in attempting to enforce the reasonable basis rule. In two confusing
opinions,121 the federal district court for the Eastern District of Penn17 A.T. Brod & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8060, at 3 (April 26,
1967).
118 Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 21
(Nov. 12, 1965); Isthmus S.S. & Salvage Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7400,
at 7 (Aug. 20, 1964); Floyd Earl O'Gorman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743,
at 4 (Nov. 12, 1963); Alexander Reid & Co., 40 S.E.C. 986, 990-91 (1962).
119 Irving Friedman, SEC Securities Act Release No. 8076, at 5 (May 16, 1967);
Hamilton Waters & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7725, at 6 (Oct. 18, 1965);
Aircraft Dynamics Int'l Corp., 41 S.E.C. 566, 570 (1963); B. Fennekohl & Co., 41 S.E.C.
210, 215-16 (1962). But see SEC v. Chamberlain Associates, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP.
91,228 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (for mining stock sales talk and puffing permissible); Bowman v. Hartig, 334 F. Supp. 1323, 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (no private right
of action for salesman's puffing where reasonable person would not rely); Phillips v.
Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (E.D. Pa.), motion to amend denied, 297 F. Supp.
736 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (puffing not grounds for civil liability unless grossly exaggerated).
120 Richard J. Buck & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8482, at 10
(Dec. 31, 1968), aff'd sub nom. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969); A.T. Brod &
Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8060, at 4 (April 26, 1967); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 21-22 (Nov. 12, 1965);
Isthmus S.S. & Salvage Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7400, at 8 (Aug. 8,
1964); DF. Bernheimer & Co., 41 S.E.C. 358, 361 (1963).
Other rejected defenses are discussed in Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211, 218-19 (9th Cir.
1969) (customers speculating); Richard J. Buck & Co., supra at 9 (prior business and social
relationships discounted); Armstrong, Jones & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8420, at 9-10 (Oct. 3, 1968) (irrelevant that customer initiated transaction and no
defense that no type of fraudulent representation made), aff'd, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Crow, Brourman & Chatkin, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7839, at 6 (March 15, 1966) (cannot rely on movement of stock
prices); Shearson, Hammill & Co., supra at 20 (that deficit in accordance with budget no
excuse for nondisclosure); Isthmus S.S. & Salvage Co., supra at 8 (broker's belief that a
good buy). The absence of a boiler room will not justify a variation from the rules. See
notes 81-82 and accompanying text supra.
A salesman may be disciplined for violating the reasonable basis rule although
he makes no affirmative misrepresentation. See Hanly v. SEC, supra.
121 Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa.), motion to amend denied,
297 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Pa. 1969). The court dealt with inside information and the fact that
the defendant was not an insider rather than the duties of a broker in making a recommendation or statement under the reasonable basis rule. 294 F. Supp. at 1255; 297 F. Supp. at
738. The court also cited a commentator for the proposition that actions which violate
disciplinary standards (as, it would seem, the defendant's did) should provide the basis for
damage actions, although holding to the contrary. 294 F. Supp. at 1255 n.6. The court
justified the absence of disclosure of a deficit on the ground that the broker's description
of prospects was generally sufficient to indicate the security's speculative nature (297 F.
Supp. at 788), a defense clearly unavailable in administrative proceedings. See note 110
and accompanying text supra. The court did, however, limit its holding by noting that
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sylvania refused to assess damages against a brokerage firm which recommended the purchase of a speculative security without disclosing
the issuer's large deficit. Such action would, however, subject the broker
122
to disciplinary sanctions.
A broker should be civilly liable for failure to perform his duties
under the reasonable basis rule if the customer can show that the concealed information was material and was not public knowledge.
2. The Suitability Doctrine
The outlines of the suitability doctrine are currently developing
under the rules ot the NASD, SECO Rule 15blO-3,12 3 and the federal
antifraud provisions.1 2 Since the suitability concept is in its infancy
with regard to IOb-5,2 5 this topic is best treated by discussing both lOb-5
and these other provisions.1 26
Under a simplified view of the suitability rule, a broker-dealer
would have to elicit data concerning his customer's investment objectives and financial needs, and, after investigation of the issuer, could
recommend 2 7 only those securities he believed to be consistent with
those objectives and needs. He must correlate his customer's situation
with the security he recommends, after investigating both. 28 This forthe result might have been different had the information concerning the deficit not been
available publicly through the issuer's annual report. 294 F. Supp. at 1255 u.5.
122 The court could have reached the same result by relying on the fact that the
information in question was public knowledge and the investors would not have been
influenced by the disclosure in any case. The Second Circuit has interpreted the case
to the effect that the reasonable basis rule "may not be as rigidly enforced in a civil action
where an investor seeks damages" and that "a broker is not a virtual insurer of his
recommendations even where he does not disclose all material facts." Hanly v. SEC,
415 F.2d 589, 596 & n.13 (2d Cir. 1969).
123 The SECO rules, promulgated under Exchange Act § 15(b)(10), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b)(10) (1970), established standards for broker-dealers who are not members of a
national securities association.
124 The N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 405, 2 CCH N.Y. STocK ExCn. GuDE
2405, commonly
referred to as the "know your customer rule," was originally designed to protect member
firms but has been developing as a suitability rule as well. SPEciAL STuDY pt. 1, at 316;
see Am. Stock Exch. Rule 411, 2 CCH Am. SToc ExC . GUIE 9431.
125 See notes 144-56 and accompanying text infra.
126 The ethically-oriented NASD and SECO rules may impose more stringent standards than the fraud-oriented Rule lOb-5. For example, the NASD's suitability concept
includes churning of accounts. See note 353 and accompanying text infra.
127 Recommendations to purchase or exchange securities as well as to sell should be
included within the lob-5 suitability concept. See generally the NASD and SECO rules,
quoted in note 128 infra, which cover purchases, sales, and exchanges.
128 The NASD rule is found in Art. II, § 2 of the Association's Rules of Fair Practice, CCH NASD SEC. DEALERs VmuAL. 2152:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security,
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mulation may be too limited in some respects. Speculative securities, for
example, are obviously unsuitable for some customers. By analogy, a
speculative transactionsuch as a short sale or possibly even the use of a
margin account may also be inappropriate, regardless of the type of
security involved. 129 One commentator has suggested that suitability
should extend beyond recommendations by brokers and encompass almost any purchase of a security by a customer. 130
The above statements of the suitability precept may be too
broad in certain particulars. First, there is some doubt as to whether
suitability duties arise only when a broker initially possessed data
about his customer, or whether a broker has an affirmative obligation to gather information concerning the investor. The SEC considers
the latter to be the proper interpretation under lOb-5,131 but the situaa member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation
is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such
customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and
needs.
I I .
Exchange Act Rule 15bi0-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1972), is substantially similar:
Every nonmember broker or dealer... who recommends to a customer the
purchase, sale or exchange of any security shall have reasonable grounds to believe
that the recommendation is not unsuitable for such customer on the basis of
information furnished by such customer after reasonable inquiry concerning the
customer's investment objectives, financial situation and needs, and any other
information known by such broker or dealer ....
The rationale underlying the suitability concept is that investment objectives and the
customer's situation should jointly govern investment decisions.
129 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp. 373, 376-77,
379-80 (S.D. Tex. 1965) (short sales and margin accounts discussed along with modicum
of suitability); see 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExcH. MANUAL
2405.10 (supplemental material
to the "know your customer" rule; margin accounts may not be permissible for certain
clients because of corporate limitations).
130 Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 Duax L.J. 445, 449 & n.9. On the other hand, when proposing and promulgating the SECO rule, the Commission spoke only in terms of recommendations. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 7984 (Oct. 25, 1966) & 8135 (July 27, 1967). In the second
release, the SEC stated that "a general distribution of a market letter, research report or
other similiar material would [not] in itself constitute a recommendation." SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8135, supra at 3.
131 The Commission has reached this result under lob-5 in boiler room cases where
typically the broker places long-distance telephone calls to unknown persons. Barnett &
Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 1, 4 n.7 (1960), citing Best Sec., Inc., infra; Best Sec., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931,
933 (1960) (boiler room tactics "not conductive [sic] . . . to a determination of its suitability for the customer'). Affirmances of NASD cases reach the same conclusion. See Gerald
M. Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133, 137 (1960) (substantial part of business was telephone calls to
strangers); Philips 8- Co., 37 S.E.C. 66, 68-69 (1956) (three customers, one in second transaction with respondent, one in first transaction with any broker, and one in latest of
several dealings with respondent). The SECO rule reflects this philosophy of the Commission. See note 128 supra.
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tion remains unclear under the NASD rule.18 2 Second, there has been
some suggestion that suitability does not apply unless the customer relies on his broker's recommendation. Clarification of this latter issue
may be found in an analysis of the underlying rationale of the doctrine.
The suggestion has merit if suitability is a question of who should bear
the risk of an unsuitable investment, with the loss falling on the broker
unless he can pass the risk back to the investor as, for example, by showing lack of reliance on the part of the customer.183 On the other hand,
reliance should be irrelevant (at least in administrative proceedings) if
the shingle theory dictates the lOb-5 suitability duties.1 34
132 See note 128 supra. The NASD rule provides that the member must have "reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer
upon the basis of facts, if any, disclosed by such customer." NASD Rules of Fair Practice
2152 (emphasis added). The Commission,
Art. III, § 2, CCH NASD SEc. DEAERns MANuAL
when reviewing an NASD imposed sanction, in effect eliminated the words "if any" from
the NASD rule. Gerald M. Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133, 137-38 (1960). The NASD, however,
has not acquiesced in this interpretation; its position seems to place a premium on
ignorance and encourage salesmen to learn as little as possible about their customers-an
unfortunate result. NASD, 1964 REPORT To MEmmEas 8 ("no affirmative obligation to ascertain a customer's resources and needs was imposed upon a salesman"; test of suitability
not imposed on securities industry); R. MUNDHEM, supra note 85, at 105 (Mr. White,
NASD General Counsel: not amending NASD rule to delete "if any" clause; rule does
not impose affirmative obligation to ascertain suitability). The NASD's disposition of the
Shearson, Hammill case has been seen as a definite retreat from Greenburg. SPEcIAL SamY
pt. 1, at 311-12. Compare the disposition of the Shearson, Hammill case in an SEC disciplinary action discussed in note 139 infra where the Commission held certain actions the NASD
had excused to be violations of lOb-5, an anomolous result indeed.
188 Fishman, Broker-Dealer Obligations to Customers-The NASD Suitability Rule,
51 MINN. L. Rrv. 233, 239 (1966); Mundheim, supra note 130, at 450 (rebuttable presumption of reliance is basis for suitability except where broker is order clerk). But query
whether even a broker acting as an order clerk ought not to have some duties if he suspects the ordered security is unsuitable. Cf. Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962) (insurance policies sold; agent held liable under common
law for violation of suitability requirement in part based on customer's reliance).
A number of lob-5 suitability cases contain reliance-type language. See Ramey Kelly
Corp., 39 S.E.C. 756, 759 (1960) (request for broker's advice); Herbert R. May & Russell H.
Phinney, 27 S.E.C. 814, 824 (1948) (had trust and confidence). Reliance may be a factor
in a lOb-5 private right of action. Compare Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249,
1256 (E.D. Pa.), motion to amend denied, 297 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1969), with Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 4448 (U.S. April 24, 1972).
184 Richard N. Cea, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8662, at 9 (Aug. 6, 1969)
(suitability part of duties flowing from shingle theory); Best Sec., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931, 933-34
(1960) (boiler room, including suitability, violative of shingle theory); 6 Loss 3719 (quoting
Chairman Cohen's speech); Comment, supra note 65, at 741 (suitability one aspect of
shingle theory); see notes 45-69 and accompanying text supra (shingle theory discussed).
In the Cea case, supra at 8, the Commission concluded that the broker did not have
to occupy a fiduciary relationship to the customer before the suitability doctrine came
into force.
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A broker-dealer governed by the suitability concept must gather
information about the security and about his customer. The investigation
required by the reasonable basis rule is one source of data about the
security.13a Since suitability apparently applies to a broader range of
situations than does the reasonable basis rule,136 a broker will upon
occasion be required to investigate a security solely to ascertain if it is
suitable. Such an inquiry would be less extensive than under the reasonable basis rule, since it would delve only as deeply as is necessary to
determine if the security meets the customer's needs. The scope of such
a suitability probe should include at least the speculativeness of the
security, its potential for producing income, and its chances for capital
appreciation. The customer is the best and most logical source of data
about himself. If he is unwilling to disclose such information after
reasonable interrogation by the broker, the broker should be permitted
to make any recommendation unless he knows or has reason to believe
the security is unsuitable. 13 7 When the Commission promulgated its
SECO suitability rule, it enunciated a most detailed list of facts needed
about a customer:
[A] broker or dealer ... [is] expected to make reasonable inquiry
concerning the customer's investment objectives, and his financial
situation and needs. Information concerning financial situation
and needs would ordinarily include information concerning the
customer's marital status, the number and age of his dependents,
his earnings, the amount of his savings and life insurance, and his
security holdings and other assets.' 38
135 See notes 100-06 and accompanying text supra.
136 Suitability is not limited to speculative securities or some type of major selling
effort as the reasonable basis rule may be. See notes 90-91 and accompanying text supra
(applicability of reasonable basis rule).
'37 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8135 (July 27, 1967) (promulgating the

SECO rule; can make recommendations); Mundheim, supra note 130, at 449 n.10 (not
required to prevent sale).
Other sources of information might include the nature of the customer's account; for
example, a nontrading investment account would suggest that speculative securities are unsuitable. Recent, widely disseminated news stories in the mass media might also qualify;
for example, a story about the client in the town's newspaper indicating that he had
fallen on hard times might be information of which the broker should be aware.
138 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8135, at 3 (July 27, 1967). The Release
goes on to state that the broker-dealer "may rely on the information furnished by the
customer." Id. But a broker suspecting or having reason to suspect the inaccuracy of the
facts he receives should not be permitted to disregard the questions raised, but should
have an affirmative duty to inquire further.
Other authorities formulate the requirements differently. See e.g., John P. Fleming,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8129, at 1 (July 21, 1967) ("financial needs, circumstances [and] objectives'); Boren & Co., 40 S.E.C. 217, 222 (1960) (NASD appeal;
should ask about "the customer and his needs'); Gerald M. Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133, 138
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The essence of suitability involves the efficacy of a broker's efforts to
reach an accommodation between his customer and the security, a topic
on which there is virtually no guidance. In the type of extreme cases
which are usually the subject of disciplinary proceedings, the standard
to which a broker's analysis must conform is unimportant because application of any criterion would indicate a violation.
A more refined analysis will eventually evolve under lOb-5. One
alternative would be to absolve a broker if he used reasonable business
judgment; another would involve invoking a more stringent rule. 13 9
(1960) (NASD sanction affirmed; "customer's other security holdings, his financial situa-

tion, and his needs'); Best Sec., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931, 933 (1960) ("financial situation and
investment objectives'); Mundheim, supra note 130, at 448, 474 ("risk threshold" should
be determined; a broader term than "investment objective'). See also Exchange Act Rule
15b10-6(a)(1)(B), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-6(a)(1)(ii) (1972) (SECO broker making recommendation must keep record of "customer's occupation, marital status, investment objectives" and other information concerning customer's financial situation and needs).
Release No. 8135, supra, continues: "The nature and extent of the inquiry to be
made by the broker-dealer will depend on all the facts and circumstances." As an example,
the Release states that the interval between recommendations may be of such brevity that
the broker need merely ask if any material change has taken place. Id.
139 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 430 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified
on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (negligence not sufficient under lOb-5;
plaintiff apparently attempted to argue breach of NASD suitability rule was evidence of
10b-5 breach); Leavell, supra note 57, at 1576-77 (NASD rule could logically be construed
as imposing a standard of skill and care in securities analysis, although not generally
thought of as doing so). The NASD and SECO rules by their terms establish a reasonable
basis standard-a negligence standard. When a practice, therefore, is completely devoid
of any sound basis, there can be no reasonable grounds for believing a security suitable,
irrespective of what customers may have told the broker. Thomas Arthur Stewart, 20 S.E.C.
196, 207 (1945) (NASD appeal).
Implicit in the suitability obligation is the mandate that salesmen be adequately
trained to be able to make a determination when in possession of the facts. C. Gilman
Johnston, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7390, at 3 (August 14, 1964) (NASD
sanction review); see note 558 and accompanying text infra.
Concerning a broker's obligations when his customer changes his investment objectives, see Fishman, supra note 133, at 248; Mundheim, supra note 130, at 475.
Examples of what the SEC considers unsuitable securities within lOb-5 include stock
not paying a dividend sold to an unemployed widow who counted on income and to another elderly woman who had stated she wanted capital gains and dividends (Century Sec.
Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8123, at 6 (July 14, 1967), aff'd sub nom.
Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969)); speculative securities of a brokerage house sold
to a 79 year-old retired man who was living alone (Powell & McGowan, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 933,
934-35 (1964)); a highly speculative security sold through misrepresentations and omissions
to customers who had indicated a need for non-speculative securities producing a reasonable
income (Herbert R. May & Russell H. Phinney, 27 S.E.C. 814, 824 (1948)); speculative
securities in a boiler room (Best Sec., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931, 933 (1960)); and speculative
securities sold to a customer asking for "securities not subject to fluctuations and yielding
a higher income" than present portfolio (Ramey Kelly Corp., 39 S.E.C. 756, 759 (1960)).
In Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 22
(Nov. 12, 1965), the Commission noted that "the record also contains glaring examples of
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The formula which is eventually adopted should not transform the
broker into an insurer of his investment advice, nor should it evaluate
recommendations in the bright gleam of hindsight. 140 Rather, it should
encourage the broker to compare his customer with the security prior
141
to making any recommendation.
Once a broker concludes that a security is unsuitable, by whatever
balancing process the Rule may require, he must convey his view to the
customer in clear and understandable terms.142 After disclosure, the
broker should be allowed to execute unsolicited orders for securities he
believes are inappropriate, but he may not make unsuitable recommen143
dations.
recommendations to investors in USAMCO stock [a speculative security] made to customers
contrary to their investment needs" (footnote omitted). Possibly a mild rebuke was directed
at the NASD based upon the Association's exoneration of certain conduct which the SEC
condemned. See note 132 supra. More likely though, the SEC was holding the action to be
a violation of lob-5 since it cited two antifraud suitability cases as authority for the clause
quoted above and placed the discussion under the topic "Fraud in USAMCO Transactions"
and the subtopic "Fraudulent Representations." Among the objectionable sales of USAMCO
stock were those to a 13 year-old boy, a 70 year-old widow of limited means who desired
safe investments, another widow of limited means who was interested in high quality
securities, a customer of limited income having three young children, a husband and wife
earning $8,000 annually with .$6,000 in savings who did not wish to speculate, and a
woman earning $5,000 per year who did not want to speculate but had safety, long-term
growth, and occasional dividends as her investment objectives.
There may be securities which are unsuitable for all, or at least most, investors
(Standard Bond & Share Co., 34 S.E.C. 208, 210-11 (1952) (NASD appeal; bonds which issuer
stated would not be repaid when due in the near future)), and no security is suitable for all
customers. Boren & Co., 40 S.E.C. 217, 222 (1960) (NASD review; cannot assume mutual
funds suitable for all customers).
140 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8135, at 3 (July 27, 1967) (proposing SECO
suitability rule; do not second-guess broker or make him insurer; judge on facts available at
time of recommendation); Fishman, supra note 133, at 247-48 (do not make broker an insurer or subject his system of securities analysis to evaluation; subsequent price performance not relevant); Mundheim, supra note 130, at 448, 475 (do not use for investment
judgment or to make brokerage firm insurer of market performance; subsequent price
movement "irrelevant").
141 If a broker fails to conform to the suitability rule, few defenses are available in
administrative proceedings. Philips & Co., 37 S.E.C. 66, 70 (1956) (NASD appeal; rejected
defenses that customers mature and intelligent and considered stock suitable, that customers
had exercised their own independent judgment, and that customers had even recommended stock to two other customers); Thomas Arthur Stewart, 20 S.E.C. 196, 208 n.12
(1945) (in SEC review of NASD decision, findings that customers pleased, did not perceive
groundlessness of recommendations, and got their money back in subsequent transactions
not considered sufficient defenses); cf. First Sec. Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589, 592 (1961) (churning
cases under NASD rule; motivation and intent irrelevant). Indeed, to take the extreme
case, a broker who does not attempt to ascertain whether or not an investment is suitable
should be held to have violated the doctrine even if by chance he recommends a suitable
security on which the customer realizes a large profit.
142 Cf. Powell & McGowan, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 933, 934-35 (1964).
143 Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d. 690, 719, 69 Cal.
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A difficult and unresolved problem is the extent to which 10b-5
incorporates the suitability doctrine. The SECO suitability rule was
not adopted under the antifraud provisions. 1' The earlier Special
Study of the Securities Markets, however, could be construed as having
urged the Commission to adopt a suitability concept under the general
antifraud rules. 145 The SEC indicated its belief in its power to incorporate a suitability provision into IOb-5 by promulgating under another
antifraud provision a very strict suitability requirement for purchases
of life insurance-security combinations, 146 and has applied suitability
under the Rule to boiler room activities 147 and certain other situations. 148 Generally, however, actions may have to be more egregious to
Rptr. 222, 242 (1968) (common-law cases; "refrain from acting except upon [customer's]
express orders'); Mundheim, supra note 130, at 449 (permissible to sell).
144 In the proposing release (SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7984, at 2 (Oct.
25, 1966)), the Commission noted that the SECO suitability rule would "supplement" the
existing antifraud rules, but in the promulgating release (SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8135, at 3 (July 27, 1971)), the Commission stated that the rule would not be
"adopted under the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act, [and] would not affect the
obligations of broker-dealers under those provisions."
145 The Study recommended that "greater emphasis. should be given by the Commission and the self-regulatory bodies to the concept of 'suitability'." SPECIAL STUDY pt. 1, at
329. In light of the remainder of the recommendation, it is probable that the Study was
addressing the SEC in its overseer capacity. R. MUNDHEIM, supra note 85, at 104 (Mr.
Loomis, then General Counsel of the SEC and later a member of the Commission); Mundheim, supra note 130, at 459.
140 Exchange Act Rule 15c2-5(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5(a)(2) (1972), which applies
to all sales, requires that a written statement be delivered to the customer concerning
suitability.
147 Barnett & Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 1, 4 n.7 (1960); Best Sec., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931, 933
(1960); see Mac Robbins & Co., 41 S.E.C. 116, 120 (1962) (boiler room case; boiler rooms
operate "without any concern for the suitability of such securities in light of the customers!
investment needs or objectives'), af'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963).
148 Alfred B. Tallman, Jr., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8830 (March 2,
1970) (no indication in opinion of any gross abuse but suitability violation still sustained);
Richard N. Cea, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8662, at 7-9 (Aug. 6, 1969)
(opinion does not state actions are gross violations although disciplining broker); Shearson,
Hammill 9-Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 22 (Nov. 12, 1965) ("glaring examples of recommendations ... contrary to their needs'); Powell & McGowan, Inc.,
41 S.E.C. 933, 935 (1964) (recommendation "so grossly inappropriate as to constitute overreaching and a violation" of lOb-5); Ramey Kelly Corp., 39 S.E.C. 756, 759 (1960) (absence
of suitability where customer informed broker of investment objectives and broker induced
her to purchase unsuitably speculative securities); Herbert R. May & Russell H. Phinney,
27 S.E.C. 814, 823-24 (1948) (induced purchases of speculative securities by misrepresentations; customers had disclosed investment objectives).
Another lob-5 requirement akin to suitability may be violated when a broker advises
or permits a customer to purchase mutual fund shares in quantities which preclude volume
discounts. Shearson, Hammill & Co., supra at 34-35 (salesman revealed break point but
should not have let customer purchase below it just to give salesman a gift); Mason, Moran
& Co., 35 S.E.C. 84, 87-92 (1953) (concealment of break point).
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violate lOb-5 than to run afoul of the ethically-based NASD and SECO
rules. 149
Some commentators have objected to the importation of suitability
into the Rule because its incorporation would (1) force the Commission
to pass on the merits of the securities involved (which it has not done in
the past 1 0) and to evaluate the terms of the transaction rather than the

broker's conduct in effecting the trade,151 (2) impose the additional
costs of defending private suits on the securities community, 52 and (3)
raise problems of adequately training brokerage personnel.'ta The
validity of these objections is open to question.' In addition, the first
is based on the assumption that suitability requires the Commission to
second guess a broker's judgment-that is, to determine whether the
security was indeed suitable. Instead, the rule should be regarded as
procedural in nature. 5 5 The broker is required to elicit information
149 See R. MUNDH-m, supra note 85, at 103-04 (Mr. Loomis, then SEC General
Counsel and later Commissioner: SEC should not use suitability as lOb-5 concept except
for "absolute indifference to standard of responsible conduct"); cases cited in note 148 supra.
But see note 139 supra (Shearson, Hammill case discussion).
150 R. MuNmHmm, supra note 85, at 99 (Mr. O'Boyle); Comment, supra note 65, at
742; cf. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on
other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (dictum) (private rights of action under NASD
suitability rule would involve judicial review of market judgments). See also Securities Act
§ 23, 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1970) & Exchange Act § 26, 15 U.S.C. § 78z (1970) (action or inaction
of Commission not approval of transaction or security); Securities Act Rule 425, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.425 (1972), and Exchange Act Rule 15cl-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-3 (1972) (cannot state
Commission has approved security).
151 R. Mutm
Pm
, supra note 85, at 99 (Mr. O'Boyle); Comment, supra note 65, at 742.
152 R. MUND Eim, supra note 85, at 101 (Mr. O'Boyle).
'53 Id. at 102.
154 The Commission in the past has reviewed the speculativeness of securities, the
point on which it might have to rule under the suitability theory. In a number of lOb-5
suitability cases, it has held securities to be speculative. John P. Fleming, SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8129, at 1 (July 21, 1967); Ramey Kelly Corp., 39 S.E.C. 756, 759
(1960); Herbert R. May & Russell H. Phinney, 27 S.E.C. 814, 824 (1948). Additionally, it
faces this problem to a certain extent when reviewing appeals from NASD sanctions. See
Fishman, supra note 133, at 245 (SEC has evaluated securities indirectly); notes 85-89 and
accompanying text supra (for the reasonable basis rule, SEC has concentrated on speculative
securities of unlisted companies); note 331 and accompanying text infra (boiler-room
activities apply to speculative securities). Finally, state securities commissions evaluate
securities on a regular basis.
Concerning the broker's conduct objection, the Commission would be evaluating the
broker's performance of his suitability duties rather than the terms of the trade.
Finally, the arguments that brokerage firms would have to incur expenses in defending
suits and would have difficulty in training their personnel, when carried to their logical
conclusions, suggest that no lob-5 private right of action should exist and that brokerage
firms should train employees only to the level of competency that is most economical. It is
unlikely that these positions will be found any more acceptable in the future than they
have been in the past.
155 Fishman, supra note 133, at 248.
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about the customer and the security and compare the data; if he fails to
obtain the information, he should be disciplined. But failure to correctly evaluate datum once it has been obtained should be grounds for
action only on a showing of lack of reasonable business judgment or
some comparable standard.
There have been few cases, thus far, to justify the industry's fear
of liability in private rights of action, but the trend is in that direction.15 6
B.

Misrepresentation to or Concealment from Customers

A brokerage firm's obligation to tell the whole truth arises out of
the shingle theory, concepts of agency or implied agency, and the Rule's
general duty to disclose. 157 A brokerage firm is governed by this obligation, whether acting as a broker or dealer in a particular trade, 158 and
since an agent-broker is subject to this requirement, privity of contract need not be proved. This duty is in addition to other disclosure responsibilities imposed on broker-dealers 5 9 and is applicable
356 The Seventh Circuit has indicated that section 15 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o (1970), and therefore, by easy analogy, Rule lOb-5, can give rise to a private right
of action for suitability doctrine violations. Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970). Also, a California court applying state law held
that a broker had acted "fraudulently" when violating the suitability doctrine. Twomey v.
Mitchum, Jones 8- Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 720, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 243 (1968).
This is oblique authority for a lOb-5 cause of action. Other courts have successfully avoided
deciding whether a private party can recover. E.g. Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
295 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (SD. Tex. 1969) (dismissing NASD rule claim; lob-5 claim not
subject of motion to dismiss); Philips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249, 1255-56 (E.D.
Pa.), motion to amend denied, 297 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (may be actionable but
plaintiff cannot recover since was aware of level of risk); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
283 F. Supp. 417, 429-31 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th
Cir. 1970) (estoppel bars lob-5 claim; indication of reluctance to grant remedy and proof of
violation of NASD rule not sufficient to prove lob-5 case).
157 RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENcY § 381 comment d, § 390 (1958) (agency at common law requires disclosure); Note, Churning: A Critical Analysis, 14 N.Y.L.F. 315, 334
(1968) (agency and implied agency). See generally notes 45-73 and accompanying text supra
(shingle and implied agency theories).
158 In Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 297 F. Supp. 736, 737 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1969), the court
noted that a brokerage firm acting as a dealer may have an even greater duty of disclosure.
Misrepresentations by a broker-dealer are just as objectionable if made to a customer or
to other broker-dealers. Pennaluna & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8063, at 8-10 (April 27, 1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d 861, 868-70 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
US. 1007 (1970); Gearhart & Otis, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7329, at
22-23 (June 2, 1964), aff'd, 348 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C.
311, 317-31 (1952) (semble); see note 61 and accompanying text supra.
359 See rules promulgated under Exchange Act §§ 15(c)(1), (2), 15 US.C. §§ 78o(c)(1),
(2) (1970). See also rules under Exchange Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
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as well to the special situation in which broker-dealers sell securities in
their own enterprise. 160
A broker-dealer's prediction, representation, or opinion must have
a reasonable basis supported by data gathered in a reasonable investigation.161 The sounder authorities indicate that a broker may also not

"puff" his merchandise.

62

Further, commentators have indicated that
a broker's duty of disclosure is greater than that of an ordinary investor.163 In light of the basic policies underlying the Rule, 164 a brokerdealer's special relationship to the securities system and his usually
superior knowledge suggest that he should indeed be held to a higher
standard.'6 5 By lessening the burden of proof for establishing one or
more elements of a lOb-5 offense, including reliance by a customer oi
materiality of the information, such a higher standard might be effectuated. In other words, a misstatement or omission by a broker might
be actionable while the identical statement made under the same circumstances by another person would not be. The law in this area is not
yet sufficiently clear to reach a final determination on this point. 16
Nevertheless, a broker can be disciplined in administrative actions if he
"willfully"'167 misrepresents or omits material facts, whether or not the
160 See notes 222-32 and accompanying text infra.

161 See notes 76-122 and accompanying text supra. These duties may lack universal
applicability.
162 See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
163 Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAw. 939, 942 (1962);

Note, supra note 8, 71 YALE L.J. at 747; see Note, The Prospects for Rule X-ZOB-5: An
Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALr L.J. 1120, 1143 (1950):

[IT]he corporate insider and the corporation may have a broader duty to disclose
than that owed by independent brokers and dealers, who in turn have a broader
duty than that owed by the ordinary in-and-out investor, who may in their [sic]
turn have no higher duty to disclose than that imposed by common law, which
was usually no duty at all.
In complete accord is Weeks & McCormick, Broker-Dealer Disclosure of Corporate In-

side Information, 18 CLEv. ST. L. Rav. 549, 561 (1969). See also Mason, Moran & Co., 35
S.E.C. 84, 90 (1953) (prospectus requirements "were not intended to abrogate the greater
disclosure duties traditionally imposed on brokers and dealers in a fiduciary position').
While some of the above was mere speculation during the Rule's infancy, much remains meritorious. See Comment, Securities and Exchange Commission Rule X-1OB-5:
Guided Missile or Flying Saucer?, 32 Tax. L. REv. 197, 200-01 (1953); Note, The Downstairs
Insider: The Specialist and Rule 10b-5, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 695, 705-06 (1967); Note, supra,

71 Yale L.J. at 742, 745.
164 See note 9 supra.
165 This conclusion pertains to misrepresentations made by a broker-dealer to his

customers, to prospective customers, or to the public at large (as when a broker gives an
opinion as to the fairness of a merger or tender offer). See notes 39-44, 158 and accompanying text supra.
166 Professor Knauss has suggested that as a broker's involvement with his customer
increases, so does the broker's duties of disclosure. Knauss, supra note 11, at 636.
167 Exchange Act § 15(b)(5)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5)(D) (1970).
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customer ultimately relies.168 In a private action, a plaintiff should recover if he shows that he relied on the broker's material misrepresentation, that the broker knew or should have known of the falsity of the
representation or omission, and that a causal connection existed between his loss and the broker's statement. 169
Whether a firm should bear responsibility along with its employee
is essentially a question for agency law and relates to the duty to supervise. 170 Conversely, misrepresentations made in sales literature should
be imputed to a brokerage firm's employee only if a reasonable employee with the same experience in the securities business should have
been aware that the representations were being made and were untrue.

71

Some representations or omissions can be made by any party to a
transaction. 7 2 Others, which are listed below, are either solely within
the province of broker-dealers or take on particular significance when
made by them. Not all have been held violations of the Rule. Although
cases typically involve more than one misrepresentation or concealment
in addition to other fraudulent activities, any representation or omisSee note 112 and accompanying text supra.
169 Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1956) (no reliance requirement voiced;
customer can recover loss proximately resulting from misrepresentation or omission);
Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 305 F. Supp. 489, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y.), motion to amend
denied, 306 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1167, 1170-72 (2d Cir. 1970) (material
fact concealed and customer relied); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F.
Supp. 702, 706-07 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
989 (1970) (flagrant violation for broker to send letter to customers lying about reason for
late delivery of securities and concealing firm's insolvency and tremendous volume of short
sales); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 435, 443 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified
on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (broker "rescinds" sale to customer without
informing her that stock had trebled between sale and rescission; customer followed advice
with few exceptions in other transactions); Hendricks v. Plato Realty Invs., [1967-1969
Transfer Binder] CCH PE. S-c. L. REP. 92,290, at 97,387-88 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (intent to
defraud not necessary but reliance is); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 445
(N.D. Ill. 1967) (dictum) (misrepresentations clearly give rise to private right of action);
Stockwell v. Reynolds, 252 F. Supp. 215, 218-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (misrepresentations which
induce retention are actionable); Glickman v, Schweickart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670, 672-73
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (cause of action exists when alleged that misrepresentation made with
scienter and relied on). But see Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249, 1255-56 (E.D.
Pa.), motion to amend denied, 297 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (opinions not actionable;
also, no reliance).
170 As to the latter, see notes 542-58 and accompanying text infra.
171 See Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1967) (even if broker-dealer did not
know information being shown by salesmen false, should have known). This is a different
topic from the liability of supervisory or controlling personnel. See Exchange Act § 20(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970); notes 541-58 and accompanying text infra.
172 See generally A. BROMBERO, Sacurrmr LAiw: Fatm--SEC RurLE lOb-5, at § 4.2
(1969); 3 Loss 1448-74; 6 id. at 3558-647.
168
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sion by itself could constitute a lOb-5 infraction under certain circumstances.
The following are a few of the misrepresentations and omissions
peculiar to stockbrokers: concealing the identity of their principals; 73
concealing illegal pledges; 74 concealing their addresses; 175 concealing
their directorships or officerships in the issuer; 17 concealing their financial condition; 77 concealing their interest in securities purchased for a
customer's account; 78 concealing any long 7 9 or short'8 0 position in a security; concealing their manipulation of the market;' 8 ' concealing their
sales of a security they are recommending; 8 2 concealing market maker
status;1 3 concealing misappropriation of customer's securities; 8 4 concealing potential bar by regulatory authority from conducting business;' s5 concealing tender offers;' 8s concealing that a prospectus is no
longer accurate; 8 7 concealing relevant information to induce customer
173 Kenneth Leo Bauer, 26 S.E.C. 770, 775-76 (1947).
174 SEC v. Charles Plohn & Co., 433 F.2d 376, 377 (2d Cir. 1970).
175 Kenneth Leo Bauer, 26 S.E.C. 770, 775-76 (1947).
176 Haley & Co., 37 S.E.C. 100, 106 (1956) (concealing that salesman was issuer's organizer and president); William 1. Hay, 19 S.E.C. 897, 405 (1945).
177 SEC v. Charles Plohn & Co., 433 F.2d 376, 377 (2d Cir. 1970); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702, 706 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F2d 147 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); see notes 479-86 and accompanying text infra
(broker executing while insolvent); note 229 and accompanying text infra (when selling
broker's own securities).
178 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 427 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). See generally Joseph Garofolo, SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 9429, at 2 (Nov. 22, 1971) (concealing control over issuer); Exchange Act Rules
15cl-5, 15c1-6, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15cl-5, 240.15cl-6 (1972).
179 Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 305 F. Supp. 489, 495 (S.D.N.Y.), motion to amend
denied, 306 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1167, 1170-72 (2d Cir. 1970) (in
connection with concealment of market making function).
180 Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702, 707 (N.D. Ind. 1968),
afJ'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
181 E.g., Richard N. Cea, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8662, at 4-5 (Aug.
6, 1969); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 12
(Nov. 2, 1965); Harry Marks, 25 S.E.C. 208, 216-19 (1947); see notes 233-68 and accompanying text infra (broker manipulating, controlling, and making a market).
182 Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 913 (1960); see notes 475-76 and accompanying text
infra (self-preferment by broker).
183 See notes 323-80 and accompanying text infra.
'84 See notes 500-26 and accompanying text infra.
185 Cf. William J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601, 608 (1942) (decided under other two
general antifraud rules; bar possible because of false financial reports filed with the New
York State Attorney General).
186 Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 966 (2d Cir. 1969),
aff'g [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP.
92,301, at 97,433 (W.D.N.Y.
1968).
187 Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33, 43 (1953); Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C.
311, 331-32 (1952).
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to purchase, 18s sell, 89 or hold' 90 securities; concealing true market
price;' 91 misrepresenting the availability of a security; 192 misrepresenting that the issue has been oversubscribed; 19 3 misrepresenting that they
themselves have bought stock; 194 misrepresenting that they have a research department; 95 misrepresenting that they possess inside information; 9 6 misrepresenting their age or experience; 197 misrepresenting that
they have sold the customer's securities; 19 8 misrepresenting that their
partners will continue to hold the issuer's stock; 199 misrepresenting that
their research department recommended the security; 20 0 misrepresenting
that they are members of a national securities exchange; 20 1 misrepre20 2
senting that they will disseminate a report in the future on the issuer;
misrepresenting that they would not buy at a certain price; 20 3 misrepresenting that they would repurchase stock; 20 4 misrepresenting knowledge
188 E.g., Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 593-94 (2d Cir. 1969); Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211,
218-19 (9th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1956); Haley & Co., 37 S.E.C.

100, 106 (1956).
189 MS. Wien & Co., 23 S.E.C. 735, 746 (1946).
190 Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
191 See generally notes 397-478 and accompanying text infra (broker's secret profits).
192 Indiana State Sec. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 118, 119 (1957); Van Alstyne. Noel &- Co., 33
S.E.C. 311, 329-31 (1952); Henry P. Rosenfeld, 32 S.E.C. 731, 739 (1951).
193 R.A. Holman & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7770, at 5 (Dec.
15, 1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966), modified on other grounds, 377 F.2d 665 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 US. 991 (1967).
194 Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 593-94 (2d Cir. 1969); Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 436, 449
(1958); Haley & Co., 37 S.E.C. 100, 105 (1956) (broker misrepresenting that he invested great
deal); see Cortlandt Inv. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8678, at 4 (Aug. 29,
1969) (disclosure that broker purchased stock but concealment that he sold before statement made).
196 J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88, 90, 98 (1962), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Hersh v. SEC,
325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964).
196 See notes 582-83 and accompanying text infra.
197 Shapiro v. Schwamm, 279 F. Supp. 798, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Henry P. Rosenfeld
Co., 32 S.E.C. 731, 734 (1951).
198 Klein v. Auchincloss, Parker & Redpath, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP.
92,627, at 98,824 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 436 F.2d 339 (2d
Cir. 1971).
199 Bruns, Nordeman 8. Co., 40 S.E.C. 652, 662 (1961).
200 Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 20

(Nov. 12, 1965).
20' J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88, 90 (1963), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Hersh v. SEC,
325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964).
202 Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
203 RMl. Bayly & Co., 19 S.E.C. 773, 784 (1945).
204 R.A. Holman & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7770, at 6 (Dec.
15, 1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966), modified on other grounds, 377 F.2d 665 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 US. 991 (1967).
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of one of their customers; 2 5 misrepresenting margin; 206 misrepresenting the method of financing the purchase; 207 misrepresenting the fact that
others have purchased the security;2 08 misrepresenting the number of
issuer's shares they owned; 20 9 misrepresenting the reason for the decline
in a security's price; 210 misrepresenting the reason for lateness of a delivery;211 misrepresenting relevant information to induce a customer to
hold, 212 purchase,2 13 or sell2 14 a security; misrepresenting information in
order to obtain possession of a customer's securities; 215 and misrepresenting the true market price. 216
Any misstatement or omission by a broker-dealer is objectionable
whether made orally2 7 or in a written document such as a market letter,218 report, 219 or solicitation letter.220 Concealment of a lOb-5 offense
may in and of itself constitute a violation of the Rule. 21
205 Klopp v. SEC, 427 F.2d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 1970) (SEC did not base sanction on
substantial evidence).
206 See notes 381-96 and accompanying text infra.
207 Glickman v. Schweickart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (misrepresenting that means of financing was usual and involved no greater risk than normal margin
transactions); see notes 381-96 and accompanying text infra (margin violations).
208 Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 436, 449 (1958) (misrepresentation that a member of the
duPont family bought security).
209 Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 19
(Nov. 12, 1965); Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 436, 449 (1958).
210 Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
211 See notes 528-38 and accompanying text infra.
212 Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211, 219 (9th Cir. 1969); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F.
Supp. 215, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
213 E.g., Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 78, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1956); Courtlandt Inv. Corp., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8678, at 4 (Aug. 29, 1969); Richard N. Cea, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8662, at 4 (Aug. 6, 1969); G.J. Mitchell, Jr., Co., 40 S.E.C.
409, 413 (1960).
214 Richard N. Cea, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8662, at 5 (Aug. 6, 1969);
Futures Unlimited, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7181 (Dec. 3, 1963);
Mercer Hicks Corp., 32 S.E.C. 212, 214 (1951); M.S. Wien & Co., 23 S.E.C. 735, 746 (1946).
215 Bernard & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8273, at 1 (March 15, 1968)
(misrepresenting to get customer to furnish securities as collateral for broker's bank loan);
Amalgamated Inv., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8253, at I (Feb. 9, 1968)
(after obtaining securities, broker sold them without authorization); Kenneth Leo Bauer,
26 S.E.C. 770, 773 (1947); see notes 500-27 and accompanying text infra (misappropriation
by broker).
216 See generally notes 397-478 and accompanying text infra (broker's secret profits).
217 E.g., Richard N. Cea, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8662, at 4 (Aug. 6,
1969); Adams & Co., 41 S.E.C. 501, 502-03 (1963); Bristol Sec. Co., 39 S.E.C. 763, 764 (1960);
Herbert R. May & Russell H. Phinney, 27 S.E.C. 814, 824 (1948).
218 Cortlandt Inv. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8678, at 4-5 (Aug.
29, 1969); J.H. Goddard & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7618, at 2-3
(June 4, 1965); G.J. Mitchell, Jr., Co., 40 S.E.C. 409, 411-13 (1960) (sales literature); Shelley,
Roberts & Co., 38 S.E.C. 744, 749 (1958) (sales literature). See Proposed Exchange Act Rule
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Misrepresentation and concealment have also been found when a
broker-dealer raises capital by selling his own securities. The same
222
principles apply whether the instrument sold represents stock or debt,

or whether the customer pays in cash, contributes securities of other
issuers, 223 or makes a loan to a firm or one of its employees. 224 Unlike
other broker-customer transactions, in these situations the financial interests of the parties are diametrically opposed; thus, a broker in such
circumstances should perhaps be held to a higher standard than the
ordinary issuer of securities because of his position vis-4-vis his customer and the securities industry. Further, only full and meticulous
disclosure will suffice when the broker occupies a position of trust and
confidence. 225 Such a high standard is in contrast to that applicable in
sales to members of the public who are not customers or in loans from a
bank. Neither of these situations should require significantly greater
duties of disclosure than those required of an ordinary issuer.226 Nevertheless, a number of false statements may be made, any one of which
could be sufficient under the proper circumstances to constitute a
lOb-15, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8425 (Oct. 10, 1968) (requirements for disclosure in sales communications and advertisements).
219 E.g., Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 7743, at 15-17 (Nov.
12, 1965).
220 James F. Morrissey, 25 S.E.C. 372, 377-78 (1947).
221 See notes 268 & 319-21 and accompanying text infra.
222 Superior Sec. Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7767, at 1 (Dec.
10, 1965) (common stock); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7743, at 22-23 (Nov. 12, 1965) (loan with right back in stock); Lile & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7644, at 4 (July 9, 1965) (loan); Futures Unlimited, Inc.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7181, at 1 (Dec. 3, 1963) (common stock and
debt); Mercer Hicks Corp., 32 S.E.C. 212, 213 (1951) (units of common stock and preferred
stock); see Pickard & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8447, at 1 (Nov. 14,
1968) ("inducing persons to subordinate their securities and cash to general creditors of
registrant" by misrepresentations and omissions).
223 Tadashi Yamamoto, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8536, at 1 (Feb. 25,
1969) (securities from customers); Lile & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7644, at 4 (July 9, 1965) (funds obtained); Gill-Harkness & Co., 38 S.E.C. 646, 648-49
(1958) (cash and securities).
224 Francis R. Gregory, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8491, at 1 (Jan. 13,
1969) (to registered representative); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 7743, at 22-23 (Nov. 12, 1965) (to employee); Lile & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7644, at 4 (July 9, 1965) (to firm).
225 IAle & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7644, at 4 (July 9, 1965)
("particularly questionable" to obtain loans where trust and confidence exist; candid disclosure required); Gill-Harkness & Co., 38 S.E.C. 646, 650 (1958) (trust and confidence requires full and meticulous disclosure of all pertinent information); Wendell Maro Weston,
30 S.E.C. 296, 304 (1949) (fiduciary duties necessitate meticulous disclosures).
226 Because of a broker's greater knowledge of the securities business, and general
policy considerations underlying lOb-5, a higher standard is suggested under all circumstances.
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breach of the Rule. Among these are misrepresentations and omissions
228 finan227
regarding the application of proceeds of sale, the business,
2
30
229
cial condition, and organization of the firm, and the safetym1 and
value of the security sold.232
C. Broker Manipulating, Controlling, or Making
the Market for a Security
It is possible for brokers to engage in a number of manipulative
and related schemes by virtue of their unique position in the securi227 Tadashi Yamamoto, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8536 (Feb. 25, 1969)
(not really to be used for exchange seat); Charles P. Lawrence, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 8213, at 2-3 (Dec. 19, 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1968); Copley & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7679, at 1 (Aug. 13, 1965) (loan from bank);
Futures Unlimited, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7181, at 1 (Dec. 3, 1963)
(source of stock sold); Gill-Harkness & Co., 38 S.E.C. 646, 651 (1958) (implied representation
that buying from firm where sale actually made of president's stock).
228 Ijle & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7644, at 4 (July 9, 1965)
(business good and hoped to open branch office); Futures Unlimited, Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7181, at 1 (Dec. 3, 1963) (business, commissions, and earnings
potential of firm praised); Gill-Harkness & Co., 38 S.E.C. 646, 651 (1958) (firm expanding);
cf. William J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601, 607 (1942) (decided under Securities Act § 17(a)
and Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2; failure to disclose in offering circular serious violation of
applicable laws).
229 Pickard ScCo., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8447, at 1 (Nov. 14, 1968)
(financial condition and withdrawals of capital concealed); Superior Sec. Co., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7767, at 1 (Dec. 10, 1965) (misrepresentations regarding minimum
capital, president's investments, and subordination agreements); Jerome, Richard Sc Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7688, at 1-2 (Aug. 27, 1965) (loss concealed); Lile
& Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7644, at 4 (July 9, 1965) (loss and net
capital difficulties not revealed); Powell & McGowan, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 933, 935 (1964) (concealment of losses, violation of SEC net capital rule and capital deficiency); Gill-Harkness
& Co., 88 S.E.C. 646, 650-51 (1958) (operating losses, net capital deficiency under SEC rules,
and insolvency); Wendell Maro Weston, 30 S.E.C. 296, 299 (1949) (concealment of losses);
Hammill S Co., 28 S.E.C. 634, 637 (1948).
230 Jerome, Richard & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7688, at 1-2 (Aug.
27, 1965) (concealment that two outsiders controlled operations); Futures Unlimited, Inc.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7181, at 1 (Dec. 3, 1963) (misrepresentations concerning integrity of management).
231 Francis R. Gregory, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8491, at 1 (Jan. 13,
1969); Futures Unlimited, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7181, at 1 (Dec. 3,
1963); Gill-Harkness & Co., 88 S.E.C. 646, 651 (1958); see Copley & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7679, at I (Aug. 13, 1965) (misleading statement concerning market
value of stock used to secure bank loan).
232 Tadashi Yamamoto, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8536, at 1 (Feb. 25,
1969) (wouId pay 6% interest); Francis R. Gregory, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8491, at 1 (Jan. 3, 1969) (misrepresentation of intent to pay interest on note and ability to
repay note); Futures Unlimited, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7181, at 1
(Dec. 3, 1963); Gill-Harkness & Co., 88 S.E.C. 646, 651 (1958) (value would increase substantially and pay 5% or 6% dividend); Mercer Hicks Corp., 32 S.E.C. 212, 213-14 (1951)
(failure to disclose assets of less than cost of stock sold and dividends paid out of capital

surplus).
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ties market. 23 3 Three points should initially be noted. First, even

though the majority of cases deal with stock manipulation, some decisions are concerned with debt instruments. 234 The same principles
should apply regardless of the type of security involved. Second, individuals employed by broker-dealer firms, as well as the firms themselves, are capable of violating the Rule, although few suits have
proceeded solely against an individual. 23 5 Finally, brokers must conform to a number of requirements, in addition to lOb-5, pertaining to
23 6
manipulative activities.

Authorities dealing with securities listed on a national securities
exchange are discussed separately from those dealing with securities
which are not, both for convenience and because of the differences between the two markets.
1. National Securities Exchanges
For our purposes it can be assumed that two types of brokers
operate within the framework of national securities exchanges: those
who buy or sell listed securities for their customers, and others, called
specialists, 237 who attempt to keep an orderly market by preventing
233 For a discussion of manipulation generally, see 3 Loss 1529-622; 6 id. 3752-79. Any
form of manipulation discussed there should be equally applicable to brokers. The remainder of this section will deal with those forms of manipulation available only to
brokers.
234 Halsey, Stuart &Co., Inc., g0 S.E.C. 106 (1949), M.S. Wien & Co., 23 S.E.C. 735 (1946),
and Kidder Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559 (1945), involved manipulation of debt securities.
235 One proceeding against an individual was Harry Marks, 25 S.E.C. 208 (1947)
(manager of firm's branch office). Numerous proceedings against firms have also included
individuals as respondents. E.g., Delafield & Delafield, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8480 (Dec. 26, 1968) (partner of brokerage firm); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (Nov. 12, 1965) (members of executive committee
and personnel in branch office).
236 As with most other lOb-5 violations committed by broker-dealers in the sale of
securities, Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), applies. In addition, manipulation on exchanges is covered by Exchange Act § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1970), activities in
the over-the-counter market are subject to Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2
(1972), and concealing control of an over-the-counter market while engaged in a distribution is prohibited by Exchange Act Rule 15cl-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-8 (1972). Stock exchanges, the NASD, and common law also impose their limitations. See Am. Stock Exch.
Gen. Rule 4,2 CCH Am. STocK Exca. GUIDE 9224 (cannot purchase security at successively

higher or lower prices for certain purposes); N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 435(6), 2 CCH N.Y.
STOCK ExCH. GUImE

2435 (may not participate in any manipulative operation); NASD

Rules of Fair Practice Art. HI, § 5, CCH NASD SEc. DzAums MANUAL
2155 (quotation
must be bona fide).
237 The role of the specialist is discussed in SPECIAL Srumz pt. 2, at 57-171; G. ImrFLn,
THE STOCK MARKEr 203-18 (8d ed. 1963); Wolfson &cRusso, The Stock Exchange Specialist,
4 REv. or SEc. REG. 897 (1971); Note, supra note 163, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rv. at 697-700.
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substantial price fluctuations. In simplified form, a trade on an exchange is consummated when a broker with an order from his customer
to buy (or sell) a security approaches the specialist, who either matches
the order against one or more sell (or buy) orders placed with him by
other brokers or, if necessary to offset an imbalance in buy and sell
orders, sells (or buys) for his own account. Both types of brokers have
opportunities to engage in manipulative practices.
In the leading case involving a specialist, 238 the defendant specialist
was found guilty of violating lOb-5 when he helped rig a market by
disclosing confidential bids and offers placed with him and recorded
on his books and, occasionally, by buying to support the market. By
extrapolation, a specialist would violate the Rule by buying or selling
for any reason other than to maintain a fair and orderly market, or by
disclosing data on his books without a legitimate reason to someone
who then traded the security or tipped the information to someone
239
else who traded.
Brokers other than specialists are also able to engage in a number
of manipulative activities on exchanges. Almost all actions that violate
Exchange Act section 9(a)240 are also prohibited by lOb-5. In one
case, 241 a broker violated Rule lob-5 by effecting eighty-three percent of
the sales in a particular stock on the American Stock Exchange in
an afternoon, thereby depressing the price of the stock for the purpose
of inducing a large stockholder to sell his shares to the broker's customers. In another decision, 242 analogous to the over-the-counter
market domination cases, 248 the Seventh Circuit found a violation of
238 United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306, 314-15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904
(1964); see Shipman, Two Current Questions ConcerningImplied Private Rights of Action
Under the Exchange Act: Authority of the Administrative Agency to Negate Existence for
Violation of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 925, 987 (1966) (specialists
and floor traders within lOb-5).
239 See Re, Re & Sagarese, 41 S.E.C. 230 (1962), for the Commission's view concerning
the seriousness of a lOb-5 violation by a specialist. See also Exchange Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78k(b) (1970).
Should a specialist learn from a holder of a large block that the holder is going to sell
in the near future, the specialist would violate lOb-5 if he began to go short in anticipation
of, and to induce the sale of, the block. See text accompanying note 241 infra.
240 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1970).
The second, and most important subdivision of § 9(a) proscribes any effecting of "a
series of transactions ... creating actual or apparent active trading.. . or raising or depressing the [security's] price ... for the purpose of inducing [its] purchase or sale ...
by others." Id.
241 Delafleld & Delafield, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8480 (Dec. 26, 1968).
242 R.J. Koeppe & Co. v. SEC, 95 F.2d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 1938).
248 See notes 248-331 and accompanying text infra.
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Securities Act section 17(a)(2) 244 when the broker did two-thirds of
the trading in a listed stock, made the closing trade on many days,
usually raising the closing price over the preceding day's dose, increased
the price approximately 200 percent during the period, made sales in
the over-the-counter market,245 sold his own stock at many times its
cost, and hired persons to tout the stock. When he finally stopped supporting the market, the stock price abruptly fell to one-third its prior
level.246 As in the over-the-counter market cases, manipulation and
failure to disclose such activities are independent violations of the
247
Rule.
2.

Over-the-Counter Market

As distinguished from the central marketplace of a securities exchange, the over-the-counter market consists of numerous brokers
offering to buy or sell securities by telephone or teletype. To facilitate
this process, they place bid and asked quotations248 in sheets which are
244 15 US.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1970). Rule lob-5 was not promulgated until four years after
the case was decided; however, the conduct alleged would have also been in violation of
lOb-5 because of the similarity of the provisions. The court's citation to the second clause of
§ 17(a) is evidence that disclosure was not made.
245 Although the principal market for listed securities is typically an exchange, they
may be traded in the over-the-counter market.
246 Accord, Thornton v. SEC, 171 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1948) (sales of listed security in
over-the-counter market based on price on exchange without disclosure of defendant's
manipulation of exchange market); Archie H. Chevrier, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7579 (April 22, 1965) (out of 204,890 shares traded, defendant bought 153,600 and
sold 137,300; under these and other circumstances, violated Exchange Act § 9(a)(2)); Adams
& Co., 33 S.E.C. 444, 446-47, 456-57 (1952) (10b-5 violation not to disclose activities proscribed by Exchange Act § 9(a)(2)); cf. Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 301 U.S. 703 (1937) (Securities Act § 17(a)(2) case decided before promulgation of
the Rule; failure by defendant, who did over 75% of trading at increasing bids, to disclose
rise in price due to his actions); Kidder Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559, 571 (1945) (Exchange
Act Rule 15cl-2 violation to conceal from public that market price not reached independently).
247 In SEC v. Otis & Co., 106 F.2d 579, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1939), aff'g 18 F.Supp. 100,
(N.D. Ohio 1936), a broker was held to have violated Securities Act § 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a)(2) (1970) (and surely would have been held to have acted contrary to lob-5 had it
then been promulgated) but not Exchange Act § 9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1970), when he
traded without disclosing that persons owning about one-third of the issuer's stock agreed
to restrict the disposition of their shares and that the broker's purchases of the stock on the
exchange stimulated the market. The infirmity was failure to reveal that sales were not "at
the market"--the price in a free market. This case has been interpreted to mean that anything which interferes with the demand or supply of a security must be disclosed. See Note,
Manipulation of the Stock Market Under the Securities Laws, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 651, 676
(1951).
248 Brokers have the option of inserting quotations consisting of a bid price at which
they might be willing to buy, an asked price at which they would consider selling, or, if
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circulated to the financial community. More recently, an automated
system dubbed NASDAQ 249 has supplemented the sheets by providing
quotations for some over-the-counter securities. While neither the
sheets nor NASDAQ reflects actual transactions, the quotations they
contain are evidence of a security's price. 250 Usually two or more
firms, called market makers, regularly enter bids on a security. 251 A
broker can influence the market of an over-the-counter security by
either manipulating the price of the security or controlling and dominating the market.
Manipulation is clearly a breach of lOb-5, whereas making a
market just as certainly is not. It is unclear if control and domination
of a market is proscribed,252 although concealment of manipulation,
market making, or control and domination may be independent violations. Disclosure of manipulation or control and domination may be
253
insufficient to cure the original wrong.
Manipulation continues to constitute a basis for administrative
actions and for private suits, although the SEC has recently shifted its
emphasis to the control and domination approach.2 54 In manipulation
cases, the SEC typically states that a violation of Exchange Act section
they do not desire to quantify their position, "BW" (bid wanted) or "OW" (offer wanted)
quotations.
249 NASDAQ refers to the computerized quotation system of the NASD.
250 Moore & Co., 32 S.E.C. 191, 195 n.6 (1951). The bids are not legally binding offers
but are exploratory in nature. Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 323 (1941). For a fuller discussion,
see notes 423-26 infra.
251 Exchange Act Rule 17a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-9 (1972), requires reports of market
makers, and defines a market maker as
a dealer who, with respect to a particular security, holds himself out (by entering
indications of interest in purchasing and selling in an interdealer quotations
system or otherwise) as being willing to buy and sell for his own account on a
continuous basis otherwise than on a national securities exchange.
252 One author states that the SEC's reliance on nondisclosure may be due to the
private nature of the over-the-counter market in which trades are not publicized. Bloomenthai, The Case of the Subtle Motive and the Delicate Art-Control and Domination in
the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets, 1960 DuxE L.J. 196, 203.
253 In Shelley, Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5837 (Dec. 22,
1958), the Commission held that a disclosure that respondent "controlled the market
in the ... stock and would manipulate and drive or push the market up" was "misleading
in failing to disclose that such action would be illegal under the anti-fraud provisions."
Id. at 8; accord, Bloomenthal, supra note 252, at 203. In Associated Investors Sec., Inc.,
41 S.E.C. 160 (1962), although the proposed manipulative plan was disclosed in an offering
circular pertaining to the securities, the disclosure was not even discussed as a possible
defense. Practically, disclosure as a cure may be unimportant since few brokers will
admit to such activity. See generally notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
254 See notes 269-321 and accompanying text infra. Manipulation can be practiced
even though the broker does not control the market. Note, Regulation of Stock Market
Manipulation,56 YALE LJ. 509, 532 (1947).
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9(a)(2) 255 is also a lOb-5 offense, 256 and then proves the 9(a)(2) elements: 257 effecting "a series of transactions 258 which creates actual or
apparent trading in the security or alters its price, for the purpose of
inducing others to purchase or sell such security. Manipulation under
lOb-5 is not limited to wash sales, matched orders, or other fictitious
devices commonly employed in pre-1934 manipulative schemes. The
act of buying, selling, or issuing quotations with intent to affect prices
is sufficient.2 59 Clear evidence that the manipulative activities were for
the purpose of inducing others to buy or sell is rarely present. The SEC
will presume such purpose if a broker buys at rising prices and sells out
at the raised prices. 26 0 Manipulation of one market may also affect another. Thus, manipulation of the "inside market" 261 constitutes a manipulation of the "outside market,"' 26 2 and manipulation of a stock
255

15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1970).

Duval Sec., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7655 (July 23, 1965)
(10b-5 case using manipulation to assist unregistered distribution); R.L. Emacio & Co.,
35 S.E.C. 191, 199-200 (1953) (manipulation prior to becoming underwriter); Halsey,
Stuart & Co., Inc., 30 S.E.C. 106, 111 (1949) (§ 9(a)(2) applies to over-the-counter
market through lOb-5); cf. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3505 (Nov. 16, 1943)
(Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act § 15 make Exchange Act § 9(a)(2) applicable to
over-the-counter markets); Masland, Fernon & Anderson, 9 S.E.C. 338, 345-47 (1941) (Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2 case involving § 9(a)(2)-type manipulation); Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C.
319, 328 (1941) (Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2; gives at least the same protection to over-thecounter markets as Exchange Act § 9(a) gives to securities exchanges); Martin, BrokerDealer Manipulation of the Over-the-Counter Market-Toward a Reasonable Basis for
Quotations, 25 Bus. LAw. 1463, 1466 (1970); Note, supra note 247, at 675.
257 Subsection (2) is not the only subsection of Exchange Act § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)
(1970), to which lOb-5 applies for over-the-counter securities. Section 9(a) contains four
other subdivisions which should be equally applicable.
258 "Transactions" include either purchases and sales or bids in the sheets. Adam &
Co., 33 S.E.C. 444, 450 n.7 (1952); Kidder Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559, 569-70 (1945).
"OW" (offer wanted) or "BW" (bid wanted), as well as numerical quotations, can be
a "transaction." M.S. Wien & Co., 23 S.E.C. 735, 739-40, 745 (1946) (10b-5 over-the-counter
manipulation decision). A bid on NASDAQ would also qualify as a "transaction." As few
as three transactions have been held to satisfy the "series" requirement. See Kidder Peabody
& Co., supra at 568.
259 American Bank & Trust Co. v. Barad Shaff Sec. Corp., 335 F. Supp. 1276, 1281
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (roundrobin sales at increasing prices); R.L. Emacio & Co., 35 S.E.C. 191,
199-200, 202 (1953) (quotations for requisite purpose and having proscribed effect violated
lOb-5); Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc., 30 S.E.C. 106, 112 (1949) (10b-5 over-the-counter case
in which SEC stated that "a manipulation can be accomplished without wash sales,
256

matched orders, or other fictitious devices').
260

Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc., 30 S.E.C. 106, 124 n.28 (1949). Further, "only the

strongest countervailing evidence will be sufficient to overcome the presumption." Id.
261

The "inside price" relates to sales among brokerage firms; the "outside price"

relates to the amount the public is charged.
262 Cf.

Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 325 (1941) (Exchange Act Rule 15c-2 case; the

markets move together).
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exchange price while the broker is trading the same security in the
263
over-the-counter market has also been condemned.
The most common of the other forms of manipulation is the
placing of bids in the sheets (or presumably NASDAQ) by a broker
engaged in a distribution.2 64 Less common is the situation in which a
20 5
broker does not distribute all his shares to the public in an offering.
In one instance the SEC disciplined a broker for promising in an
offering circular to maintain the market for a security at increasingly
higher levels.2 6 Finally, a major securities firm has been condemned
2
for establishing and maintaining a work-out market.

67

In these situations, in addition to the lob-5 violation arising from
the manipulative activity, a second lOb-5 offense for concealment of a
263 Thornton v. SEC, 171 F.2d 702, 703 (2d Cir. 1948) (sales in over-the-counter
market without disclosure of manipulation on exchange breaches 10b-5); Adams & Co.,
33 S.E.C. 444, 457 (1952) (same); cf. Russell Maguire & Co., Inc., 10 S.E.C. 332, 347-49
(1941) (Securities Act § 17(a) violated by an over-the-counter distribution attended by
manipulation on exchange, even if Exchange Act § 9(a)(2) not breached).
264 Exchange Act Rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1972), governs bidding during
distributions. Conformity to Rule lOb-6 should insure against a lOb-5 breach. But bidding
during a distribution unprotected by Rule 10b-6 violates lOb-5. See, e.g., Tager v. SEC,
344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965) (bidding during underwriting); Strathmore Sec., Inc., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8207 (Dec. 13, 1967), petition for review denied, 407
F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (underwriter did not place all shares in Regulation A offering
and made bids during further distribution); Duval Sec., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7655 (July 23, 1965) (bids during unregistered distributions); Woods &
Co., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 725, 726 (1963) (broker bid for, and got other brokers to bid for, stock
he was distributing).
265 Withholding shares from the public and placing them instead with officers,
directors, and other persons associated with the issuer was condemned in H. Hentz & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8973 (Sept. 2, 1970), and Hopp & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8887 (May 21, 1970). The practice of placing a large
percentage of an underwriter's shares in hot issues with insiders was discussed in SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6097, at 3 (Oct. 23, 1959), where the Commission
noted that the Rule may be violated by such activity since the initial supply of the
security is restricted and the public is not informed that the market is controlled by the
persons who then sell. In RA. Holman & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
7770 (Dec. 15, 1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966), modified on other grounds, 377 F.2d
665 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 991 (1967), an underwriter was disciplined for placing
shares of an offering with relatives and friends, repurchasing them immediately after the
offering, and subsequently selling them to the public.
266 Associated Investors Sec., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 160, 167-69 (1962).
267 In Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743
(Nov. 12, 1965), a work-out market was described as a situation where "no sell orders
from customers were to be accepted or executed by registrant unless offsetting buy orders
for at least an equal number of shares were on hand." Id. at 12 (footnote omitted). A
work-out market also resulted in the discipline of Richard N. Cea, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 8662, at 4-5 (Aug. 6, 1969).
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material fact is made out by a broker's failure to disclose his activity
268
to his clients.
The elements required to prove manipulation have been more
clearly delineated than those necessary to show control and domination
of an over-the-counter market.2 9 The Commission recognized this in
one of its early opinions:
Every over-the-counter dealer who "specializes" in a security,
in the sense that he effects a high percentage of the transactions in
the security, and in the sense that he is the principal buyer and
seller and is most familiar with the affairs of the issuer and the
state of the market, to some extent dominates the market ....His
trading volume may be the backbone of the market in the security
and his determination to pay more or less may be determinative of
market movements. 270
The absence of a definitive standard for domination and control cases
has been criticized. 271 The Commission's opinions, which significantly
outnumber court decisions in this area, must be assigned partial blame.
The SEC's hesitation to establish guidelines may stem from its belief
that any maximum level of activity permitted would soon become the
normal trading pattern, and from its recognition of the variety of
factors which can contribute to market domination. The imbroglio
is compounded because domination and control cases usually include
other lOb-5 violations as well. 272 One way to treat this topic is simply
268

R.L. Emacio & Co., 35 S.E.C. 191, 200 (1953) (failure to disclose that defendant

arbitrarily fixed and maintained prices was a violation); Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc., 30
S.E.C. 106, 112 (1949) (manipulation of "utmost materiality" to buyers); cf. Barrett & Co.,
9 S.E.C. 319, 328-29 (1941) (Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2 violated by concealment of manipulation); cases cited in note 319 infra (violation to conceal control and domination of market).
269 Control and domination of a market can be effected by one firm alone (as is
most often the case) or by two or more brokers acting in concert. Examples of the second
situation are Sterling Sec. Co., 39 S.E.C. 487 (1959) (in concert with another broker); S.T.
Jackson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 631 (1950); see cases cited in notes 302-04 infra (use of other
brokers in scheme); cf. Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319 (1941) (Exchange Act Rule 15d-2 case
in which two or three brokers established joint account).
270 Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 874-75 (1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C.
Cir. 1949).
271 Martin, supra note 256, at 1469-70, after discussing the absence of standards,
draws an analogy to the broker's duty to investigate (see notes 74-122 and accompanying
text supra)and suggests that a broker be held to violate lob-5 only if he has no reasonable
basis for his quotation. However, given the myriad facts on which a decision is based,
and time to think about the situation, only rarely would a broker who is controlling the
market be unable to supply some justification for his bid. See note 313 and accompanying
text supra.
272 Martin, supra note 256, at 1465, notes that two-thirds of the SEC cases involved
misrepresentation, over one-third involved a violation of Exchange Act Rule 10b-6, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1972), and one-quarter involved unreasonable mark-ups. Also, the
Commission often discusses only a violation of a narrow rule under Exchange Act § 15
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to list 73 those factors that have been relied on for the conclusion that
a market was dominated.
Factors connected with a broker's market activity which the courts
and the SEC have relied upon in finding market domination include:
the broker bid on most days; 274 few others bid at the same time; 2 75
respondent-broker accounted for a large percentage of the trading;2 76
the broker kept increasing his bid;277 the broker was often high bid(c)(1), 15 US.C. § 78o (1970), without mentioning whether the broad antifraud rules (such
as lOb-5) are also breached.
273 The listing is in no particular order. The factors assume a bull manipulation
(one which raises the price of the security). In a bear manipulation (depressing stock
prices), which is practically unheard of, many of the factors would necessarily be reversed.
In addition to those listed below, Bloomenthal, supra note 252, at 207, suggests that a
finding of control and domination may be easier to justify when customers repose special
trust in the broker and he controls their investment decisions. The presence of other
lOb-5 violations, such as misrepresentations concerning the stock, no doubt aid in finding
domination. Id. at 215.
The presence of one or more factors will not compel a conclusion that domination
and control exist. Concomitantly, the absence of one or more factors will not dictate
the opposite result. Furthermore, many are good market-making practices despite evidencing control and domination. The guideline approach, however, seems the best available.
274 Pennaluna & Co. v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861, 869 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1007 (1970), aff'g SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8063 (April 27, 1967) (bids on all
but two days during a three-month period); J.H. Goddard & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7618 (June 4, 1965) (quotations on all but 11 days during a year
period); Advanced Research Associates, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 579, 604 (1963) (responsible for all
quotes for seven months with insignificant exceptions); Theodore A. Landau, 40 S.E.C.
1119, 1126 (1962) (bids on 72 of 75 days); Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652, 657 (1961)
(bids on 80 of 82 days); cf. Daniel & Co., Ltd., 38 S.E.C. 9, 11-12 (1957) (Exchange Act Rule
15cl-2; bids on 45 of 56 days and no bids on other 11 days); Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 325
(1941) (Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2 decision; bids every day).
275 Advanced Research Associates, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 579, 604 (1963) (with insignificant
exceptions, responsible for all bids in seven-month period); Theodore A. Landau, 40
S.E.C. 1119, 1126 (1962) (only numerical bid on 57 of 75 days and others not too active);
Sterling Sec., Co., 39 S.E.C. 487, 491 (1959) (only dealer making market in Los Angeles
area); Floyd A. Allen & Co., Inc., 35 S.E.C. 176, 182 (1953) (only bid in sheets for three
months, except for four days); Harry Marks, 25 S.E.C. 208, 216 (1947) (no one else making
quotations); cf. Daniel & Co., Ltd., 38 S.E.C. 9, 11-12 (1957) (Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2
used; bids by others on 11 of 56 days). But see Edgerton, Wykoff & Co., 36 S.E.C. 583, 587
(1955) (sole bidder for two months of six-month period but no violation of lOb-5).
276 Pennaluna & Co. v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861, 869 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1007 (1970) (by far greatest volume); J.H. Goddard & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7618 (June 4, 1965) (primary wholesale and retail seller); Advanced Research Associates, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 579, 605 (1963) (73% of purchases and 65% of sales). As to
whether only the buy side or sell side of a market can be dominated, see SEC v. Otis &
Co., 18 F. Supp. 100, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1936), aff'd, 106 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1939) (domination
of buy side of market).
277 Pennaluna & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8063 (April 27, 1967),
aff'd, 410 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970) (kept raising its bid);
F.S. Johns & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7972 (Oct. 10, 1966), aff'd
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der; 278 the respondent was usually the broker raising the bids;2 9 the
280
broker placed bids only when necessary to maintain the price;
the broker could set prices arbitrarily; 21 substantially all trades were
made at prices quoted by the broker; 28 2 the broker traded at or near
the bid price; 28 3 the broker could have purchased below the bid price
but instead raised his bid; 28 4 the broker increased his bid price even
though he was long; 2 5 the broker purchased at a price higher than the
sub nom. Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967) & Winkler v. SEC, 377 F.2d 517
(2d Cir. 1967) (price went up although no demand for buying); Advanced Research Associates, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 579, 604 (1963) (bids went up over period); Bruns, Nordeman &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 652, 657 (1961) (stock doubled and defendant raised bid nine times; increasing bids most commonly used means to create false appearance of activity); S.T.
Jackson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 631, 651-52 (1950) (price kept increasing); Floyd A. Allen & Co.,
Inc., 35 S.E.C. 176, 182 (1953) (bids kept going up); cf. Duval Sec., Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7655 (July 23, 1965) (over-the-counter manipulation case;
"arbitrary and increasing prices'); Gob Shops of America, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 92, 99-101 (1959)
(proceeding to issue stop order with regard to offering circular which did not disclose
broker's domination of market; bid raised nine times in 82 days; SEC stated that "[t]he
insertion of increasingly higher bids in the sheets is the most universally employed device
to create a false appearance of activity in the over-the-counter market'); Barrett & Co.,
9 S.E.C. 319, 327 (1941) (decision interpreting Exchange Act Rule 15d-2; stock advanced
14 times due to defendant's bid).
278 Pennaluna & Co., v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861, 869 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 US.
1007 (1970) (out of 56 days with at least two firms bidding, defendant was high bidder on
34 days and equal to high bidder on 13 days); J.H. Goddard & Co., Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7618, at 3 (June 4, 1965) (during a one-year period, defendant
was high bidder on 86 days and equal to high bidder on 96 others); Bruns, Nordeman & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 652, 657 (1961) (high bid on 51 of 82 days and equal to high bid on 23 other days);
Floyd A. Allen & Co., Inc., 35 S.E.C. 176, 182 (1953) (other's quotations generally lower);
cf. Daniel & Co., Ltd., 38 S.E.C. 9, 11-12 (1957) (Exchange Act Rule 15d-2 used; respondent's bid higher or equal to other bids); Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 325 (1941) (Exchange
Act Rule 15cl-2 applied; always higher).
279 J.H. Goddard & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7618, at 3
(June 4, 1965) (of 94 times price was raised during period, 39 times done by defendant
alone and 22 by defendant and others at same time); Bloomenthal, supra note 252, at 211
n.43.
280 Cf. R.L. Emacio & Co., 35 S.E.C. 191, 198 (1953) (over-the-counter manipulation
case; broker making bids only when necessary to peg prices); SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 3056, at 4 (Oct. 27, 1941) (manipulation may not exist if broker let price sette before selling, but other factors, such as purchases "particularly calculated to raise market prices," still suggest manipulation). In Edgerton, Wykoff & Co., 36 S.E.C. 583, 588 (1955),
the hearing examiner concluded that respondent had raised prices on strategic days, but
the Commission held that such a finding was not proven.
281 Harry Marks, 25 S.E.C. 208, 216-17 (1947).
282

Id. at 216.

283 Advanced Research Associates, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 579, 605 (1963); Bloomenthal, supra
note 252, at 211 n.43; cf. Gob Shops of America, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 92, 102 (1959) (stop order
proceeding alleging offering circular failed to disclose domination of market; bulk of sales
made at or below broker's own bid quotations).
284 Advanced Research Associates, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 579, 605 (1963).
285 Pennaluna & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8063 (April 27, 1967),
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bid on the prior day; 2 6 the broker increased his bid although he could
satisfy the demand from his inventory; 287 the broker suggested that
his customers purchase the security; 28 there was little likelihood of
an independent market developing; 289 a limited number of shares were
being traded by the public; 29 0 the price declined when the broker
stopped bidding; 291 respondent bought for his customers at higher
prices than other brokers were paying on the same day; 292 the broker
repurchased securities from others for more than he sold them; 293 the
broker was short but continued to sell short at increasing prices he
set; 294 and the broker maintained a wide spread between his bid and
29 5
asked prices to cover his short position.
Opinions have also considered the broker's profit motive, including whether respondent-broker was relatively inactive in the
security until an opportunity came for him to make a profit, such as
becoming an underwriter for an offering 296 or obtaining a large block
aff'd, 410 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970); cf. Gob Shops of
America, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 92, 102 (1959) (stop order proceeding because offering circular
failed to reveal domination); R.L. Emacio & Co., 35 S.E.C. 191, 195 (1953) (over-the-counter
manipulation case where broker frequently had long position when he made high bid);
Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 819, 825 (1941) (Exchange Act Rule 15c-2 decision). Such activity
is clearly incompatible with the usual role of a market maker.
286 Floyd A. Allen & Co., Inc., 35 S.E.C. 176, 182 (1953) (done in ten cases).
287 J.H. Goddard & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7618 (June 4,
1965).
288 Bloomenthal, supra note 252, at 214-17 (SEC has not taken this position in so
many words).
289 Id. at 207. In Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 875 (1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d
228 (D.C. Cir. 1949), the SEC held that there was no domination "to the extent that there
exists the possibility of an independent market in the security."
290 Bloomenthal, supra note 252, at 207-08; cf. Gob Shops of America, Inc., 39 S.E.C.
92, 101, 103 (1959) (proceeding to suspend offering circular for failure to reveal market
domination; small supply and broker bought up more); Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 324
(1941) (Exchange Act Rule 15c-2 case; float only 10% of issued stock).
291 Floyd A. Allen & Co., Inc., 35 S.E.C. 176, 182 (1953) (decline from $1.65 to $1.00);
cf. R.J. Koeppe & Co. v. SEC, 95 F.2d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 1938) (Securities Act § 17(a)(2)
case involving manipulation on an exchange and over-the-counter sales; price receded
two-thirds after defendant stopped buying); Gob Shops of America, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 92, 101
(1959) (stop order proceeding instituted because offering circular concealed market domination; price "rapidly dropped").
292 S.T. Jackson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 631, 652 (1950) (could have supplied out of inventory).
293 Id. (bought from customers and dealers).
294 Sterling Sec. Co., 39 S.E.C. 487, 492 (1959).
295 Id.
296 Floyd A. Allen & Co., Inc., 85 S.E.C. 176, 178-81 (1953); see Duval Sec., Inc., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7655 (July 23, 1965) (distribution of stock in violation
of Securities Act § 5); cf. Gob Shops of America, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 92, 99, 105 (1959) (bids
raised when brokerage firm knew it was to be undervriter; decision involved stop order

1972]

RULE 10b-5 AND BROKER-DEALERS

of the security; 297 whether he had a source from which to obtain the

security so that he could sell out at higher prices (the source might consist
of options, 298 a large block of the security, 299 or a hidden source of supply
such as a large stockholder or a fictitious accounts"); and whether the
broker liquidated his inventory quickly after the price rose. 301
Another set of factors might involve the use of other brokers in
the scheme, including situations in which other, ostensibly independent brokers bid without disclosing that they were acting for respondent; 30 2 in which respondent guaranteed to purchase securities from

other brokers at a profit to them if they placed bids; 303 and in which
on offering circular which concealed broker's domination of market); R.L. Emado & Co.,
35 S.E.C. 191, 194 (1953) (10b-5 over-the-counter manipulation decision).
297 Pennaluna & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8063 (April 27, 1967),
aff'd, 410 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 US. 1007 (1970).
298 Cf. Gob Shops of America, Inc., 89 S.E.C. 92, 98 (1959) (stop order proceeding
on offering circular which failed to disclose domination of market; broker had warrants);
Masland, Fernon & Anderson, 9 S.E.C. 38, 342-43 (1941) (warrants to purchase stock;
Exchange Act Rule 15d-2 case); Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 328 (1941) (Exchange Act Rule
15c1-2 manipulation decision; manipulated to price where options could be profitably
exercised).
299 Pennaluna & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8063 (April 27, 1967),
aff'd, 410 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970); cf. Gob Shops of
America, Inc., 89 S.E.C. 92, 98 (1959) (in stop-order proceeding instituted for failure to
disclose market domination, SEC noted that firm had "substantial long position" and
that its partners also had stock interests so they had direct financial reason to advance
stock price). In Theodore A. Landau, 40 S.E.C. 1119, 1124 (1962), respondent bought stock
for his wife at a low price prior to the offending actions.
300 J.H. Goddard & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7618 (June 4,
1965) (purchases from controlling stockholder); Wayne Jewell Co., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7235 (Feb. 12, 1964) (controlling persons sell after other brokers confirm
purchase).
301 S.T. Jackson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 631, 653 (1950) (infer manipulative purpose if
raises price and immediately makes sales from inventory at higher prices); cf. Gob Shops of
America, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 92, 105 (1959) (stop order issued because offering circular did not
disclose domination of market; partners of broker sold their stock); M.S. Wien & Co., 23
S.E.C. 735, 744 (1946) (10b-5 over-the-counter manipulation case).
302 Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1965) (two other broker-dealers
persuaded to make bids in sheets); Woods & Co., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 725, 726 (1963) (bids by
other brokers at respondent's request); Advanced Research Associates, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 579,
604 (1964) (bids made in respondent's own name or through other brokers); cf. MS.
Wien & Co., 23 S.E.C. 735, 739-40, 743-44 (1946) (using another broker-dealer to make
respondent's bid impermissible if other broker is ostensibly independent and both raise
bid at same time); Masland, Fernon & Anderson, 9 S.E.C. 38, 345 (1941) (Exchange Act
Rule 15cl-2 manipulation decision; quotes supplied by respondent who bought back stock
from bidders at a profit to them). This practice is dangerous because it creates the
appearance of a more active market, thus inducing purchases of the security by others.
303 SEC v. Pearson, 426 FR2d 1339, 1342 (10th Cir. 1970) (other brokers induced to
enter bids in advance of market with understanding that another broker-dealer would
repurchase securities bought as result of those bids at still higher price); FS. Johns &
Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7972 (Oct. 10, 1966) (defendant
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respondent made bids for another broker when respondent must have
known of that broker's distribution. 0 4
The following factors have been successfully employed as defenses
to a charge of controlling and dominating the market: an independent
market existed; °5 the broker dealt with informed people who had
access to information about the issuer and the market;3 6 other brokers
bid higher than respondent and he generally did not raise his bid when
he was high bidder; 0 7 the broker raised and lowered his bid;80 8 the
broker bought and sold during the same period; 30 9 the volume of his
purchases approximated that of his sales; 310 after buying and driving
up the price, he permitted the market to settle before selling; 311 and re312
spondent stabilized within the meaning of Exchange Act Rule lOb-7.
On the other hand, certain defenses have been rejected: the security
was undervalued before the price was raised and the increased price
reflected its true value;3 13 investors suffered no financial loss;314 the
guaranteed to repurchase securities from other bidders at profit to them), aff'd sub nor.
Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1967) (other broker's disciplinary proceeding
upheld) &Winkler v. SEC, 377 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1967).
804 Theodore A. Landau, 40 S.E.C. 1119, 1124 (1962) (defendant could not have been
mere trading house for other broker since "could not have been ignorant" of such
broker's distribution); see Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1967) (defendant
should have known that his bids were part of scheme).
305 Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 875 (1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir.
1949). Query if this is not the equivalent of stating the desired conclusion as a factor to
be weighed.
306 21 S.E.C. at 875 (informed persons "can weigh investment in the security as
against investment in others').
307 Edgerton, Wykoff & Co., 36 S.E.C. 583, 587-88 (1955) (of 12 days when high bidder,
on eight days bid was same on one or more prior days).
308 Id. (of 28 days on which other brokers had higher bids, on 13 days defendant
lowered bid from prior day). But see Gob Shops of America, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 92, 99
(1959) (market dominated even though raised bids nine times and lowered them twice).
309 Bloomenthal, supranote 252, at 213.
310 Id. at 214.
811 Cf. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3056 (Oct. 27, 1941) (discussion

of Exchange Act § 9(a)(2); rebuttable presumption).
312 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7 (1972); see Bloomenthal, supra note 252, at 214.
313 S.T. Jackson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 631, 653 (1950) (no defense since market price not
set by free market forces); cf. Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc., 30 S.E.C. 106, 112 (1949) (10b-5
over-the-counter manipulation case; good faith belief that stock undervalued no defense);
M.S. Wien &c Co., 23 S.E.C. 735, 745 (1946) (over-the-counter manipulation; immaterial that security had value equal to advanced prices); Masland, Fernon & Anderson, 9 S.E.C. 338, 344 (1941) (Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2 construed in manipulation case;
no defense since antimanipulative provisions are designed to protect investors and
with "equal force" to keep market open). In Gob Shops of America, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 92,
101-02 (1959), the Commission stated that "respondents' assertion that the price of other
stocks had also risen is ... no defense."

314 Cf. Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., Inc., 306 F. Supp. 177, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
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manipulation was disclosed; 315 state securities officials approved the
scheme;3 16 the broker acted in good faith;3 17 and the broker was some318
times long and other times short.
The broker's concealment of domination and control from his
customers is an omission to state a material fact and a lOb-5 breach.
Sales "at the market" carry a representation that the market is free,
open, and competitive. 319 The broker need not actually represent that
a sale is "at the market" or that there is no domination, since under the
shingle theory he is deemed to represent impliedly that any price he
quotes is the market or bears a reasonable relationship to the market.8 20
Whether disclosure will protect a broker who has manipulated or controlled the market is uncertain.8 21
In a private suit for damages against a brokerage firm which
allegedly "made, created and controlled" prices while distributing
stock, a court noted that recovery could be had under Exchange Act
Rule 15cl-8, 322 and indicated that a lOb-5 claim might also exist if the
8 23
allegations- were true and the broker's actions had injured plaintiff.
In addition to manipulating or dominating and controlling the
market, brokerage firms may run afoul of lOb-5 if they fail to disclose
to their customers who trade in a stock that they are a market maker.
aff'd, 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971) (does not matter that plaintiff did not pay more for
stock if defendant broker failed to disclose he was market maker); M.S. Wien & Co., 23
S.E.C. 735, 745 (1946) (over-the-counter manipulation; immaterial "that the purchasers
may have suffered no out-of-pocket loss"); Russell Maguire & Co., Inc., 10 S.E.C. 32, 350
(1941) (Securities Act § 17(a) decision regarding exchange prices; absence of loss to
investors no defense).
815 See note 253 and accompanying text supra.
316 Associated Investors Sec., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 160, 169 (1962).
Id.
318 Bloomenthal, supra note 252, at 214.
319 E.g., J.H. Goddard & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7618
(June 4, 1965); Advanced Research Associates, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 579, 607 (1963); Bruns,
Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652, 659 (1961); Sterling Sec. Co., 59 S.E.C. 487, 491-92 (1959);
S.T. Jackson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 651, 654-55 (1950).
Exchange Act Rule 15d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-8 (1972), requires a broker to disclose
to his customer that no independent market exists for an over-the-counter security which
the broker is distributing. Exchange Act Rule 15d-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cd-5 (1972),
is not relevant since it deals with a broker controlling the issuer of securities rather
than the market for the securities.
320 See note 400 and accompanying text infra (broker's secret profits). The shingle
theory is discussed in notes 45-69 and accompanying text supra.
821 See note 66 and accompanying text supra (disclosure must be clear and understandable). See also notes 447-48 and accompanying text infra.
322 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-8 (1972).
323 Schraufnagel v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 91,827, at 95,850 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
317
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In the signal case in this area, Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., Inc.,324
the Smith, Barney firm, at the request of a customer, prepared a report
strongly recommending that he purchase certain stocks in which it
made a market, knowing that he would rely on the report. The customer accepted the advice, despite disclosure of the firm's role as
principal in the sale, and was sold stock from the firm's own inventory.
The district court imposed liability on Smith, Barney, noting that its
market making activities were material, 25 even though the firm's
26
market making status could be ascertained from the quotation sheets,
other brokers were also making a market so that Smith, Barney may
not have been the dominating factor, and Smith, Barney charged no
more than if the securities had been obtained through regular channels.
When the Second Circuit considered the case on appeal, 27 it held that
the market making function was a material fact since disclosure "would
indicate the possibility of adverse interests which might be reflected
in Smith, Barney's recommendations.1 32 The customer, having shown
causation in fact, was permitted to recover. Chasins was soon distinguished in one district court case, 329 but has met with approval in
two more recent cases. 330 As yet, no ascertainable standard for determing when market making activity must be disclosed has been established.
D.

Boiler Room Activities
The boiler room331 persists despite efforts to curb it.3- 2 Boiler
room operations violate lOb-5, 3 3 and persons engaged in such activities
324 505 F. Supp. 489, aff'd, 806 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 488 F.2d 1167 (2d

Cir. 1970).
325 805 F. Supp. at 495-96.
326 For an interesting contrast, see notes 444-45 and accompanying text infra.
327 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
328 Id. at 1172. The Court of Appeals noted that the Commission had been considering a rule regarding disclosure of market making status. Id.
329 Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 558 (D. Md. 1971).
330 Cant v. A.G. Becker & Co., Inc., [1971-1972] CCH FeD. SEC. L. RP.
93,47
(N.D. Ill.
1971); see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 4448 (U.S. April

24, 1972).
331 The boiler room has been described as
a concerted, high-pressure effort-typically by telephone-to sell a large volume

of one or several promotional or speculative low-priced securities to unknown
persons without any concern for the suitability of such securities in the light of
the customers' investment needs or objectives and by the use of false and deceptive means. The sales techniques used are by their very nature not conducive to
an unhurried, informed and careful consideration of the investment factors
applicable to the securities involved. The securities are frequently of a newly
established company in an industry enjoying an active period of expansion
which has attracted wide public attention.
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are held to a higher standard than that imposed in more conventional
circumstances. 334 Although a sizable portion of the SEC's administrative actions have arisen in this area,a 35 the boiler room is more important historically than as a current abuse covered by the Rule. A number
of selling practices first found to be lOb-5 infractions when conducted
in boiler rooms were subsequently found to be violative of the Rule
in a broader range of situations 3 36
Mac Robbins & Co., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 116, 119-20 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316
F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963) (footnotes omitted). See generally Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597
n.14 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
894 (1963); 44 N.Y.U.L. Rv.1191, n.3 (1969). For a more detailed discussion, see SPECIAL
STUDY pt. 1, at 265-68; Note, A Symptomatic Approach to Securities Fraud: The SEC's
Proposed Rule 15c2-6 and the Boiler Room, 72 YALE L.J. 1411, 1411-16 (1963).
332 In 1962, the SEC proposed Exchange Act Rule 15c2-6 which was designed to
eliminate boiler rooms. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6885 (Aug. 15, 1962).
The proposed rule would have made solicitations by telephone of stocks under $10
illegal unless certain exceptions applied, and additionally would have imposed rather
extensive bookkeeping requirements. The proposal was strongly criticized (see, e.g., Note,
supra note 331, at 1420-21, 1426-27), and the Commission eventually withdrew it. See SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7517 (Jan. 22, 1965). One unresolved difficulty
was to define "boiler room" without encompassing other, legitimate practices. See Cohen,
Book Review, 35 U. Cm. L. R .399, 406 (1968).
333 See, e.g., United States v. Goldberg, 401 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1099 (1969) (criminal case); Vanasco y. SEC, 395 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1968) (affirmance
of barring of salesman who worked in boiler room); Seaboard Sec. Corp., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7967 (Sept. 30, 1966); Triangle Investors Corp., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7902 (June 20, 1966); Hamilton Waters & Co., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7725 (Oct. 18, 1965); Woods & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7178 (Nov. 29, 1963); J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88 (1962), aff'd
per curiam sub nom. Hersh v. SEC, 325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937
(1964); Best Sec., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931 (1960).
34 Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1963) (higher duty to prospective customers owed in boiler room situation); see Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 n.14 (2d Cir.
1969) ("high duty of truthfulness'); Harold Grill, 41 S.E.C. 321, 324-25 (1963) ("particularly high degree of inquiry required"). Since the Berho decision, the law has expanded
brokers' duties in situations where a boiler room is not present, so the Second Circuit's
statement may currently have less force.
335 But see 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1191, 1193 & n.16 (1969), where the writer claims that
"virtually all" cases involved boiler rooms-a probable overstatement.
336 See notes 74-156 and accompanying text supra (doctrine of suitability and duty
to investigate before recommendation).
The Mac Robbins litigation is instructive in this regard. The SEC first held that a
firm and nine of its salesmen violated lob-5 by using false sales material and making
recommendations without adequate basis. Two salesmen appealed to the Second Circuit,
which remanded the case to the Commission to determine if the Commission was attempting to establish a rule for all cases or merely for boiler room operations. The SEC
clarified its decision by limiting its holding to boiler rooms, and the Second Circuit
affirmed. Mac Robbins & Co., 40 S.E.C. 497, remanded sub nom. Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d
112 (2d Cir. 1961) & Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961), on remand sub nom.
Mac Robbins & Co., 41 S.E.C. 116 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d
Cir. 1963).
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A typical boiler room operation involves making misrepresentations or omitting material facts by long-distance telephone, recommending a security without adequate basis, advising on securities
regardless of their suitability to the customer, and in some cases
337
churning accounts--each an independent violation of the Rule.
Not every element need be present for a broker to run afoul of lOb-5,
nor need there be a specific finding that a boiler room exists. 338 The
absence of misrepresentations and omissions and churning of customers' accounts should not exonerate a broker. 3 9 Similarly immaterial
should be the method of communication employed in the campaign 4 °
and the speculativeness of the security. 8 41 Thus, in the boiler room
context, 42 where the suitability of the touted security is not considered
or the customers are unknown, any high-pressure campaign constitutes
an infraction of the lOb-5 suitability requirement. The Rule's duty
to investigate is also violated whenever recommendations are made
3 43
without adequate basis.
No customer has yet recovered in a reported decision under
337 See notes 74-232 and accompanying text supra; notes 348-80 and accompanying
text infra.
338 James De Mammos, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8090, at 4 (June 2,
1967), affd, No. 81469 (2d Cir., Oct. 13, 1967) (unnecessary to determine whether operation
truly boiler room).
339 R. Mu

mor,

supra note 85, at 90 (Mr. Cohen) (although the SEC had not then

so held, boiler room even without misrepresentations may violate lOb-5); Cohen &
Rabin, supra note 11, at 707.
340 Of course, a means of interstate commerce or the mails must be used at some
point in the scheme. See note 5 supra.
341 Although the typical suitability situation involves speculative securities sold to
an elderly widow, there seems to be no theoretical reason why the suitability doctrine
could not also be breached by a broker's sale of blue chip securities to a swinger who
asked for recommendations on speculative investments. See note 136 and accompanying
text supra.
842 This is not to suggest that in the absence of a boiler room situation the suitability

doctrine and duty to investigate may not be violated. See notes 74-156 and accompanying
text supra.
343 A salesman in a boiler room cannot satisfy his duty to investigate the issuer by
relying on material furnished by his employer. See Alfred Miller, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 8012, at 5 (Dec. 28, 1966) (cannot rely on controlling person's information during high pressure sales campaign); M.J. Merritt & Co., Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7878, at 5 (May 2, 1966) ("reliance was hardly warranted" in
boiler room); Harold Grill, 41 S.E.C. 321, 324-25 (1963) (reliance on "obviously inadequate
information furnished by [salesman's] employer" insufficient); Mac Robbins & Co., Inc., 41
S.E.C. 116, 128-29 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963) (do not
set rule where no boiler room exists, but where one is in operation, cannot rely); cf.
United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1963) (Securities
Act § 17(a); apparent that boiler room operation going on and literature specious on its
face). See also note 105 and accompanying text supra.
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lOb-5 344 against a broker for losses sustained on securities sold in a
boiler room operation. A cause of action must surely exist, however,
if the customer can prove a causal relationshipp4 between his injury
and the broker's acts, 346 in addition to the elements ordinarily necessary
347
for an SEC disciplinary proceeding.

III
BROKER ACTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH A CUSTOMER'S ORDER

In the course of executing a trade for a customer, a broker can
commit a catalog of deeds proscribed by Rule lOb-5, including excessively trading his account (or churning), violating the margin rules,
obtaining secret profits and other illegal compensation, executing
trades while insolvent, sending inaccurate confirmations, trading without authorization, and unreasonably delaying execution.

A.

Churning

A broker or dealer churns-excessively trades, engages in excessive
activity, or overtrades-when, to obtain commissions, he causes securities in his customer's account to be bought and sold with a frequency
greater than is mandated by the customer's financial needs and resources and the size of his account. 48 Churning may result in discipline
through an administrative action, a private suit for damages, and
criminal prosecution. 49
344 Recovery has been permitted under Securities Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77! (1970).
See Herring v. Hendison, 218 F. Supp. 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
345 No reliance by customers need be proved in a disciplinary proceeding. Hamilton
Waters & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7725, at 6 (Oct. 18, 1965).
Compare Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 4448 (U.S. April 24, 1972).
346 In a case where plaintiff-customer alleged that his broker was operating a boiler
room, the court never discussed the factors necessary for recovery, having concluded that no
such operation in fact existed. Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1240-41 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970) (securities not speculative and no high pressure
selling or misrepresentations).
347 See generally notes 331-43 and accompanying text supra.
348 Other definitions can be found in Moscarelli v. Staum, 288 F. Supp. 453, 457
(E.D.N.Y. 1968); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 432 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Behel, Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C.

163, 165 (1947). Compare Note, supra note 157, at 315-16, with Note, Churning by Se-

curities Dealers,80 HARv. L. REv. 869 (1967).
349 The Rule is violated whether the securities in the account are traded on an
exchange or in the over-the-counter market. R.H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467, 476-80
(1955), aff'd per curiam, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956) (in one
account all but two securities listed and in another both listed and over-the-counter).
The purchase of speculative securities, however, may make the charge of churning easier
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The lOb-5 duty to refrain from overtrading arises from the ubiquitous shingle theory, as well as principles of express or implied
agency.3 50 Rule lOb-5 is violated when a broker-dealer is in fact a
common-law agent or possesses an amount of customer trust and confidence sufficient to create an implied agency relationship. The Rule,
therefore, reaches trading done by a brokerage firm in either a
broker-agent or dealer-principal capacity.8 5 1
The Rule is not the only prohibition against excessive trading.
Exchange Act Rule 15cl-7(a) 352 prohibits churning, but only where
the customer has granted formal discretionary authority. The NASD
has promulgated a rule proscribing excessive trading activity,85 3 and
common-law remedies are available. 4
Three elements comprise the offense of churning under lOb-5:
control by the broker over purchases and sales in the account, excessive
or objectionable trading activity, and profit motivation by the broker.
The first of these requirements is clearly satisfied when an account is
discretionary or when the broker has received a power of attorney
from his customer. 35 Control can also be indirect. For example, a de
to sustain. Cf. Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 718,
69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 241 (1968) (common law case; unsuitability of securities "colors ...
and supports" over-trading charge).
350 E.g., MoscareIli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (shingle theory);
J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88, 98-99 (1962), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Hersh v. SEC, 325
F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964) (shingle theory); see RESATEMENT (SEcoND) or AGENCY § 389 (1958) (agent acting adverse to principal's interest). The
agency basis apparently applies to all situations; the shingle theory may not. See notes
45-73 and accompanying text supra.
351 R.H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467, 470-78 (1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956) (several accounts churned; some as principal, some as
agent, some a mixture); Behel, Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163, 168 (1947) (dealer-principal held
for churning; dictum that agent can also churn). Acting as a dealer facilitates the fraud
since commissions need not be disclosed. Id.
352 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-7 (1972). In a discretionary account, the decision to buy or
sell securities is lodged initially in the broker.
353 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 2, CCH NASD SEc. DEAL S MANUAL
2152. The same provision which governs suitability has been construed to prohibit
churning. See Samuel B. Franklin & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7407,
(Sept. 3, 1964); First Sec. Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589 (1961); Thomas Arthur Stewart, 20 S.E.C. 196
(1945).
The New York Stock Exchange had a rule prohibiting excessive trading in discretionary accounts (Rule 435(2)), but the provision was deleted in 1968. The American
Stock Exchange maintains a rule prohibiting excessive transactions in discretionary
accounts. Am. Stock Exch. Gen. Rule 422, 2 CCH Am. STocK Excis. GUmE
9442.
854 Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 699, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 222 (1968); Pierce v. Richard Ellis & Co., 62 Misc. 2d 771, 310 N.Y.S.2d 266 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. 1970).
355 Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 33
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facto discretionary account is created, and the control element satisfied,
when an investor evidences trust and confidence in his broker by regularly following his advice.3 56 A finding of indirect control is made
easier by the customer's na'vet6 and lack of business and securities
experience.3 57 At the other extreme is the customer who makes his own
investment decisions. He cannot successfully allege churning, despite
(Nov. 12, 1965) (trading discretion given); J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88, 97 (1962), aff'd
per curiam sub noma. Hersh v. SEC, 525 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
937 (1964) (power of attorney given); cf. Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 890
(1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act
§ 15(c)(1); oral or written discretionary authority).
366 Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (broker can churn if
he determines trading due to trust and confidence); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283
F. Supp. 417, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970) (formal vesting of discretion unnecessary); Russell L. Irish, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7687, at 3 (Aug. 27, 1965), aff'd, 367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1966) (generally
followed broker's recommendations); Looper & Co., 38 S.E.C. 294, 296 (1958) ("reposed full
trust and confidence" in respondent); cf. Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., [1964-1966
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
91,621 (S.D. Cal. 1965) (relied on broker and
followed his advice); Samuel B. Franklin & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7407 (Sept. 3, 1964) (NASD review): E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 382
(1945) (Exchange Act Rule 15ci-2 decision; formal discretionary power not needed).
357 Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 838 (E.D. Va. 1968)
(plaintiff and husband had no business experience; completely naive); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 30-33 (Nov. 12, 1965)
(customers included editor, salesman, and teacher; none experienced investors); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 905-06 (1960) (customers were semi-retired real estate
broker, veterinarian's assistant, semi-retired farmer and school teacher, and retired
doctors); Walter S. Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323, 325 (1948) (customer had no experience
in business world); cf. Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH
FEn. SEc. L. Ran.
91,621 (S.D. Cal. 1965) (Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act Rule
15cl-7 case; plaintiff was school teacher and not skilled in securities transactions). On
the other hand, some business or securities experience will not necessarily preclude a
finding of trust and confidence. See Weiser v. Shwartz, 286 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. La. 1968)
(although no securities experience, plaintiff was member of advisory boards of insurance
company and bank); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 423 (N.D. Cal.
1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (some prior securities dealings); Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8500, at 4 (Jan. 22,
1969), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Klopp v. SEC, 427 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970) (had
some business experience); Shearson, Hammill & Co., supra at 33 (had a prior account);
Reynolds & Co., supra at 905 (some customers had limited securities experience). Another
aid in finding control is the existence of some personal relationship between the customer
and his broker.
Widows have been victims in a large number of churning cases. E.g., Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., supra; First Sec. Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589, 590 (1961) (elderly widow); Reynolds
& Co., supra at 905; R.H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467, 470 (1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 523
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 852 U.S. 844 (1956); Behel, Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163, 165
(1947) (two elderly widows); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 869 n.7 (1946), aff'd,
177 F2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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the volume in the account, 58 since his broker exercised no control
over the buy and sell determinations.359
No mathematical formula can establish a volume of trading which
per se violates the Rule since an overriding subjective consideration
-the customer's needs and resources-must be superimposed on the
objective factors discussed below. 860 As a consequence, an elderly
widow who pays her living expenses out of income from securities
should be considered to have an investment account which will support
less activity by a broker under 1Ob-5 than will a trading account opened
by a wealthy speculator. 361 Typically, a court or the Commission will
recite a series of numbers and ratios and then decide, based on a sub355 But query whether a broker has an obligation, particularly to an unsophisticated
customer, to warn him of the adverse effects of the customer's multiple trades. This
question was left open in Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611, 615 (D. Mass. 1955).
359 Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (if customer initiates,
no churning "in the absence of any fiduciary relationship'); Thomson & McKinnon, 35
S.E.C. 451, 454-56 (1953) (customers who induced trades were relatively knowledgeable); cf.
Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir. 1970) (commodity
churning; 81 calls to broker in 45 days); E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 380
(1945) (profit drain on account responsibility of customer initiating transactions).
360 Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 846 (E.D. Va. 1968) (look at
customer's financial condition or expressed wishes, and nature of account; regard totality of circumstances to see if churning occurred); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283
F. Supp. 417, 432, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th
Cir. 1970) (no formula; determine by looking at account as a whole; look at customer's
needs and objectives); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7743, at 30 (Nov. 12, 1965) (judge in "the light of the nature of such accounts and
the financial resources and investment needs and objectives of the customers'); Norris
& Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 890 (1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (important
consideration is "the 'character' of an account'; cf. Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity
Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 134 (Sth Cir. 1970) (commodity churning; fact question and not
determined by precise rule); First Sec. Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589, 591 (1961) (NASD sanction
reviewed; based largely on customer's financial situation); NASD Rules of Fair Practice
2152 (Board of Governors policy reArt. III, § 2, CCH NASD SEc. DEA E.s MANUAL
garding churning; no specific standards available). The requirement that a broker must
determine the customer's needs and objectives relates churning and suitability. See notes
123-56 and accompanying text supra.
361 Walter S. Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323, 329 (1948) (normally greater activity in trading
account than investment account); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 891 (1946),
aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (normally greater activity in trading account); see
Samuel B. Franklin & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7407, at 7 (Sept. 3,
1964) (accounts of two widows could not be considered trading accounts under circumstances); c. First Sec. Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589, 591 (1961) (cannot treat as trading account
where customer substantially dependent on income). Even trading accounts may be
churned, however. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 432 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970); Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8500, at 5 (Jan. 22, 1969), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Klopp v. SEC, 427 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970).
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jective impression of the facts, whether or not a broker is guilty of
churning.
The most important statistical test in excessive trading opinions
is turnover in the account, the ratio of the value of securities bought
and sold to the value of the stocks and bonds in the account. 0 2 A
closely related test is the percentage of securities sold within a short
time of purchase, 03 a higher percentage obviously suggesting excessive
activity more strongly. Certain types of trading have also been used as
evidence of a proscribed level of activity: purchases followed by sales
and then the immediate reinvesting of the proceeds in another security;8 64 buying, selling, and then repurchasing the same security; 365 and
862 Although other definitions are used, the one which has gained the most currency
in determining the turnover rate is computed
by dividing the cost of the purchases by the average investment, the latter
representing the cumulative total of the net investment in the account at the
end of each month, exclusive of loans, divided by the number of months under
consideration.
Looper & Co., 88 S.E.C. 294, 297 n.6 (1958); accord, Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 30 n.72 (Nov. 12, 1965); J. Logan & Co., 41
S.E.C. 88, 94 n.11 (1962), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Hersh v. SEC, 325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964); Reynolds & Co., 89 S.E.C. 902, 906 n.10 (1960).
The turnover rates in cases where churning has been found vary widely. In Pierce
v. Richard Ellis & Co., 62 Misc. 2d 771, 310 N.Y.S.2d 266 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970), a common
law case, the turnover was apparently ten times in one month. Rule lOb-5 cases with the
highest turnover are Shearson, Hammill & Co., supra at 30-31 (average of eight and seven
times per month in two different accounts), and Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8500, at 3 (Jan. 22, 1969), rev'd on other grounds
sub noma. Klopp v. SEC, 427 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970) (2.3 times per month). A relatively
low turnover rate will not necessarily insulate the broker. See Richard N. Cea, SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8662, at 10 (Aug. 6, 1969) (3.73 times in 58 months
or once every 15.5 months); J. Logan & Co., supra, 41 S.E.C. at 95 (3.8 times in 56 months
or once every 14.7 months).
386 Among the cases citing this factor are J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88, 94-97 (1962),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. Hersh v. SEC, 325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 937 (1964); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 906-07 (1960); Behel, Johnsen &' Co., 26
S.E.C. 168, 166 (1947). These cases consider the number of transactions reversed, thereby
applying a different standard than turnover which is based on transfers of dollar amounts.
864 Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 840, 842, 846 (E.D. Va.
1968); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 435-36 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified
on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 31-33 (Nov. 12, 1965); Russell L. Irish, SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7687, at 3-4 (Aug. 27, 1965), aff'd, 367 F.2d 637 (9th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967); J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88, 91 (1962), aff'd
per curiam sub nom. Hersh v. SEC, 325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
937 (1964); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 906 (1960); Behel, Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163,
165 (1947). This practice is usually referred to as "in-and-out trading."
365 R.H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467, 470-71, 474, 479-80 (1955), aff'd per curiam,
231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 852 U.S. 844 (1956); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21
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selling a security from one account while causing another account to
purchase it.366 Another set of mathematical criteria considers the
broker's profit rather than the volume of trading. Cases compare the
commissions and mark-ups generated by the allegedly churned account
with the value of the investments in the account, 6 7 the total income of
the salesman8 68 or firm,86 9 and the broker's profits gathered from other
accounts. 70o A further circumstance is the loss sustained while the investor's account was overtraded.3 71 Finally, some types of trades are
sufficient on their face to prove churning without recourse to the above
indicia. 72
The final element necessary to establish a churning offense is a
S.E.C., 865, 891-94 (1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); cf.Pierce v. Richard Ellis
& Co., 62 Misc. 2d 771, 310 N.Y.S.2d 266 (N.Y.C. CiV. Ct. 1970) (common-law case).
866 J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88, 92, 99 (1962), af'd per curiam sub nom. Hersh v.
SEC 325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964); Looper & Co., 38
S.E.C. 294, 296 (1958); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 886 (1946), af'd, 177 F.2d
228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Oxford Co., Inc., 21 S.E.C. 681, 688-89 (1946). This activity is often
referred to as "cross-trading."
867 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 424-25, 435-36 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 30-33 (Nov. 12, 1965); Reynolds & Co.,
39 S.E.C. 902, 906-07 (1960); Looper & Co., 38 S.E.C. 294, 297 (1958); cf. Newkirk v.
Hayden, Stone & Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FE. SEc. L. REP.
91,621 (S.D.
Cal. 1965).
868 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified
on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (51%); Samuel B. Franklin & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7407, at 5 (Sept. 3, 1964) (30% and 46%); Behel,
Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163, 166 (1947) (one-third); cf. Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co.,
[1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,621 (S.D. Cal. 1965) (17%). See also
notes 373-74 and accompanying text infra (profit motive of broker as element of churning).
869 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 1970) (4.7% of
office income although less than 0.1% of accounts in that office).
870 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (50 times
average account), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). It is no defense that the turnover is less than in other accounts. Cf. First Sec. Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589,
592 (1961) (customer's account "one of the more active').
871 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 424 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp.
724, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Richard N. Cea, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8662,
at 9-10 (Aug. 6, 1969); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7743, at 30-33 (Nov. 12, 1965); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 906-07 (1960); Looper
& Co., 38 S.E.C. 294, 297-98 (1958); Walter S. Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323, 329 (1948). A showing
of no loss will not necessarily exonerate the broker. See notes 377-78 and accompanying
text infra. However, it is appropriate in this situation to consider general market trends
during the period of churning to protect the broker from being penalized for a general
downturn in the securities markets.
372 J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88 (1962), afd per curiam sub nom. Hersh v. SEC,
325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 196a) (semble), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964); cf. E.H. Rollins &
Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 382 n.52 (1945).
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showing that the broker intended to reap profits at his customer's expense, or that the broker induced trading without regard for the consequences to his customer's account.3 7 3 Even though cases regularly
treat this final element as a component of a churning offense, its
presence seems a foregone conclusion once control and an excessive
volume of trading are shown. Opinions sometimes rely on other lOb-5
violations-such as obtaining secret profits-to bolster the conclusion
that the broker's intent was to make profits. 374
If control, excessive purchases and sales, and broker motivation are
shown, adequate defenses are not readily available. The investor's
wealth 375 and the broker's intent 7" are not protection, nor is a profit in
the account, whether measured against the initial balance 377 or against
the value the portfolio would have had at the end of the period had it
been kept intact.3 78 In some investor suits for damages, courts have
373 Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 841-42, 845 (E.D. Va. 1968);
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other
grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) ("purpose of the broker to derive profits for himself
while disregarding the interests of the customer'); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 907
(1960); Looper & Co., 38 S.E.C. 294, 301 (1958) ("desire to produce income"); Behel, Johnsen &. Co., 26 S.E.C. 163, 165 (1947) (transactions "induced solely for the purpose of
obtaining profits'). This is not to say that intent is a prerequisite. See note 376 and accompanying text infra.
374 Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7748 (Nov.
12, 1965) (secret profits); Looper & Co., 38 S.E.C. 294, 300 (1958) (secret profits); R.H.
Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467, 485 (1955), aff'd per curiam, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956) (secret profits); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 874
(1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); see Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 457
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) (must determine, inter alia, if any misrepresentations made); cf. E.H.
Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 381 n.50 (1945) ("evil of overtrading" emphasized by unconscionable mark-ups); Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App.
2d 690, 718, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 241 (1968) (common-law decision; unsuitability of securities
in account "colors ... and supports" churning). In Walter S. Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323, 329
(1948), the Commission stated that the volume and frequency of transactions alone might
not be sufficient to find churning, but the taking of secret profits evidenced the respondent's desire to benefit himself.
375 Richard N. Cea, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8662, at 10 (Aug. 6,

1969).
376 See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970) (specific
intent to defraud unnecessary); cf. First Sec. Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589, 592 (1961) (NASD appeal).
See also text following note 880 infra concerning intent in private rights of action.
377 Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 842, 847 (E.D. Va. 1968);
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other
grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7743, at 31 (Nov. 12, 1965); R.H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467, 475
(1955), aff'd per curiam, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956); Behel,
Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163, 166 (1947).
378 Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 32
(Nov. 12, 1965); Samuel B. Franklin & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7407,
at 5 (Sept. 3, 1964). Query whether churning could be negatived if the broker could
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barred recovery if the customer received a confirmation of each trade
and monthly statements in a form plainly revealing the volume of
79
trading taking place.
In private rights of action, which are permitted for
overtrading,5 0
proving reliance, causation, and a form of scienter should pose little
problem if churning has occurred. Reliance is a foregone conclusion in
most cases because the broker controls the account. Proving that the
broker's action caused the loss would merely involve establishing a loss
to the customer through the transaction, and it would be a rare broker
indeed who could show that he was unaware of the ill effects excessive
trading would have on an account.
B.

Violation of the Margin Rules
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has promulgated a series of regulations which restricts the right of brokers and
dealers to extend credit to their customers or to arrange for the extension or maintenance of credit for them. 81 In the past, violations of these
regulations have been held to give rise'to private rights of action under
section 7 of the Exchange Act.882 There is, however, relatively little
show that the customer made at least as much as he would have made in a properly managed
account. Cf. First Sec. Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589, 592 (1961) (customer's good income from
investments held not determinative).
379 Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611, 614-15 (D. Mass. 1955). The principle may
have been accepted in other cases but is certainly rejected on the facts. Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 431, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430
F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970) (confirmations misleading and plaintiff could not tell
account churned); accord, Weiser v. Shwartz, 286 F. Supp. 389, 393 (E.D. La. 1968); Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., 19 64 -19 66 Transfer Binder] CCH FE. SEc. L. REP.
91,621

(S.D. Cal. 1965); see Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 842 (E.D. Va.
1968) (customer not alerted by incomplete confirmations). The Commission has not whole-

heartedly embraced this defense. See Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7743, at 31-32 (Nov. 12, 1965); Looper & Co., 38 S.E.C. 294, 297 (1958)
(questions raised by some customers); R.H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467, 470, 479 (1955),
aff'd per citriam, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956) (broker reassured customers after complaint); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 893 (1946),
aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
880 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970); Stevens v.
Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 845 (E.D. Va. 1968); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288
F. Supp. 453, 457-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Leonard v. Colton, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fa. Sac. L. REP. 92,284 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (may be actionable); Lorenz v. Watson,
258 F. Supp. 724, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1966); cf. Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., [19 64-1966
Transfer Binder] CCH Fa. SEc. L. REP. 91,621 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
81 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1 to .8 (1972).
882 See, e.g., Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), af'd
per curiam, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); Remar v. Clayton
Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949). But see Exchange Act § 7(f), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78g(f) (1970).
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authority on the question of whether a lOb-5 claim is also cognizable. 383
Under the margin rules, a customer must, within a reasonably
short time after purchase, either pay for a security he buys or contribute
adequate collateral to secure a loan. Should he fail to do so, or neglect
to provide additional collateral when necessary, the broker must sell
that part of the customer's securities which will bring him into conformity with the margin regulations. Both the customer's initial purchase and the broker's sale pursuant to the margin regulations are
events which can trigger lOb-5 liability.8 4 In the initial purchase, any
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact by the broker which is
relied on by his customer is grounds for a private right of action if the
38 6
broker knew or should have known385 his statement was misleading.
The following are examples of statements falsely made: the broker can
obtain margin which the customer cannot;38 7 the method of financing
suggested is usual and involves no greater risk than normal; 8 8 margin
is not available at all, or less can be borrowed than is actually available,
with the result that the broker obtains more money from his customer; 8 9 or margin is available on terms more favorable than they
actually are, so the customer enters into a transaction he would not
otherwise make.89 0 A broker's concealment that a transaction breached
the margin rules would also be a lOb-5 infraction if the illegality were
a material fact.3 91
A customer who has failed to comply with legitimate demands for
additional margin or to pay for his securities within the requisite time
period may not sue under the Rule if he is sold out in conformity with
law, even though his broker may have promised not to sell.39 2 On the
383 See Exchange Act Rule lOb-16, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1972) (disclosure of finance
charges).
384 In H.F. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 833, 886-37 (1948), a broker was held to
have violated lOb-5 because he asked his customer for additional margin when none was
really necessary.
a85 A broker has a duty to know the securities laws. Carter H. Corbrey & Co., 29
S.E.C. 283, 288 (1949).
386 See generally notes 157-232 and accompanying text supra.
387 H.F. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 833, 835, 837 (1948).
888 Glickman v. Schweickart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670, 673-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
389 H.F. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 833, 835, 837 (1948) (representation bank could
lend only 50% whereas limit really 70%).
390 Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1956) (dictum); c. Comment, Credit Regulation in the Securities Market: An Analysis of Regulation T, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 587, 620
(1967).

391 See Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a Basis for Civil Liability, 66 CoLum. L.

Rav. 1462, 1484-85 (1966). See also Comment, supra note 390, at 620-23.
892 Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971) (without allegation of fraud or scienter, suit nothing more than breach of contract action).
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other hand, a sale by a broker should be deemed a conversion, and
hence actionable by the customer,8 93 if appropriate demands for additional collateral have not been made3 94 or if the broker sells more
securities than is necessary to meet the statutory norm. 95 A customer
should also have a right to damages if his broker sells him out in the
mistaken belief that the customer did not pay on time or did not have
adequate collateral on deposit.3 96
C. Brokers' Secret Profits and Other Illegal Compensation
A brokerage firm acting as agent is allowed to charge a reasonable
commission. When the firm acts as a dealer-selling securities to or
buying them from its customer for its own account-it is entitled to
reasonable compensation in the form of a mark-up (sales price above
market) or mark-down (purchase price below market). The temptation
to increase their compensation beyond permissible bounds, considering
the likelihood that such an increase will go undetected, 97 has led
brokers to develop a variety of practices violative of lOb-5. These artifices include a dealer exacting unreasonable mark-ups or mark-downs,
a broker charging excessive commissions, an underwriter obtaining
larger compensation than is disclosed, a brokerage house positioning
another firm between it and the security's primary source, self-preferment by a broker-dealer, and payment of secret rebates by a broker.
The majority of cases in this area concern brokers' undisclosed
commissions or dealers' unreasonable mark-ups or mark-downs in the
over-the-counter market. The first and most difficult question involves
the compensation of an over-the-counter dealer. The dealer is entitled
to a reasonable mark-up when he sells to his customers, and a reasonable
mark-down when he buys from them. 898 This rule is usually expressed
393 See notes 500-27 and accompanying text infra (broker converting customer's
property).
394 This should be true regardless of whether sufficient collateral is actually held
by the broker. But ef. Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir.
1971) (contract action not available if customer is adequately informed; no discussion of
proceeding under a tort or conversion approach. The customer could, of course, waive the
requirement of notice in his margin agreement.
395 This is equivalent to a conversion by the broker, and intent to misappropriate
is therefore unnecessary. See note 510 and accompanying text infra.
396 See note 395 supra.
397 Many customers are too unsophisticated to detect these frauds; even knowledgeable
clients may not realize they are paying illegally increased brokerage fees.
398 In the case of a customer exchanging one security for another, the market
value of the securities surrendered by the customer is presumed to be reasonably related
to the market value of those received. Walter S. Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323, 326 (1948) (switches of
securities within lOb-5); cf. Jack Goldberg, 10 S.E.C. 975, 978, 980-81 (1942) (representation
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in terms of the shingle theory:8 9 9 a statement by a dealer with respect

to the price of a security carries with it the implied representation that
such price bears a reasonable relationship to the prevailing market
price. 0 0 Controversy generally centers on what is "reasonable" and how
the mark-up or mark-down should be computed.4 1 The Commission
once proposed a rule which would have required every dealer executing
an over-the-counter transaction to reveal to his customer the best independent bid or asked price, 402 but, due to industry pressure, it was not
40 3
adopted.
Mark-up (and mark-down) must be distinguished from the dealer's
profit. The latter is defined as the difference between what the dealer
pays for a security and the price at which he later sells it to the customer. This profit is not the concern of the securities laws. 40 4 Rather,
Rule lOb-5 regulates the difference between the price charged to the
customer and the security's market value on the date of sale. Consequently, a dealer would violate lOb-5 if he bought a security at $10 and
thereafter sold it to a customer for $7 when the prevailing market price
by implication); NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 4, CCH NASD SEc. DnLX.Es MANuAL 2154 (NASD rules, which are analogous to 10b-5-imposed limitations, have been interpreted by the Association's Board of Governors so that exchanges of securities are
treated as cash purchases. See also SPECiAL STUnY pt. 2, at 6-7. Thill Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7342, at 8 n.1 (June 11, 1964) (for NASD purposes, in an
exchange include mark-up on sale in determining fairness of purchase mark-up).
399 See notes 45-69 and accompanying text supra. Not all dealers, however, are
subject to the shingle theory.
400 E.g., William Harrison Keller, Jr., 38 S.E.C. 900, 905 (1959); Herbert R. May &
Russell H. Phinney, 27 S.E.C. 814, 880-31 (1948); cf. Lawrence R. Leeby, 13 S.E.C. 499,
505 (1943); Scott McIntyre & Co., 11 S.E.C. 442, 446 (1942); Jack Goldberg, 10 S.E.C. 975,
980-81 (1942); Allender Co., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1057 (1941). As a wrinkle on the usual formulation, the quoted price must bear a reasonable relationship to the price in a free, unmanipulated market. See Comment, supra note 65, at 735.
401 A dealer has no duty to disclose the mark-up or mark-down; rather, he need
only ensure that the amount is reasonable. Arleen W. Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629, 637 n.11 (1948),
aff'd, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Knauss, supra note 11, at 638-39. In Chasins v. Smith,
Barney & Co., Inc., 305 F. Supp. 489, 495 (S.D.N.Y.), motion to amend denied, 306 F. Supp.
177 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971), the court held that a dealer was
under no duty to disclose the price he received on resale of the subject bonds because,
under the circumstances, the disclosure would not have affected the customer's decision
to sell.
402 The proposed rule would have made compensation disclosure requirements
consistent in the trade since disclosure of compensation is required of over-the-counter
brokers and in exchange transactions, but the over-the-counter dealer is immune from
revealing his compensation. See Knauss, supra note 11, at 637-38.
403 See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3940 (April 2, 1947).
404 Cf. Maryland Sec. Co., 40 S.E.C. 443, 446 (1960) (appeal from NASD sanction;
price paid weeks prior to sale cannot be used as contemporaneous cost); G. Alex Hope,
7 S.E.C. 1082, 1084 (1940) (Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act Rule 15c1-2; do not
condemn profit from market rise).
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was $2, even though the broker would have sustained a $3 loss. Similarly irrelevant is a dealer's spread-the price the customer is charged
less the amount the dealer paid for the security on the same day,405
except to the extent that the contemporaneous cost evidences the prevailing market. 40 6 The dealer should not be penalized for obtaining
securities at a price less than current market price.
4 07
Mark-up equals cost to customer minus prevailing market price,
with the customer's cost equal to the fair market value of all consideration
surrendered which is proximately related to the transaction. Determination of the prevailing market price has been a constant battle. It is
408
generally considered appropriate to use the inside or wholesale price.
Various measures of such price have been suggested, but the SEC has
continuously held "that, absent countervailing evidence, a dealer's contemporaneous cost is the best evidence of the market price for the purpose of computing mark-ups."40 9 Such a standard raises a host of prob405 SEC v. Seaboard Sec. Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
91,697, at 95,563 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
406 See notes 409-22 and accompanying text infra.
407 E.g., SEC v. Seaboard Sec. Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
91,697, at 94,563 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Mark-downs are measured by the difference between
the prevailing market price and the amount the selling customer receives.
408 The wholesale or inside price is the one at which dealers trade among themselves;
dealer-customer transactions are consummated at the outside or retail price. Cf. Merritt,
Vickers, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7409, at 5 (Sept. 2, 1964), aifd, 353
F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1965) (appeal from NASD sanction; mark-up measured over "current
wholesale, not retail, market price").
409 Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 24 n.57
(Nov. 12, 1965) (emphasis added); accord, Barnett v. United States, 319 F.2d 340, 344 (8th
Cir. 1963) (affirming SEC order); Associated Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 738, 741 (10th Cir.
1961); Century Sec. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8123, at 7 (July 14, 1967),
aff'd sub noma.Nees v. SEC, 414 F.d 211 (9th Cir. 1969); J.A. Winston & Co., Inc., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7337, at 9 (June 8, 1964); Paul Carroll Ferguson,
39 S.E.C. 260, 263 (1959); William Harrison Keller, Jr., 38 S.E.C. 900, 905 (1959); cf. Charles
Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944) (contemporaneous cost and quotation sheets in absence of evidence to the contrary). The same
rule for ascertaining prevailing market price pertains in NASD proceedings as well. See,
e.g., Gateway Stock & Bond, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8003, at 3
(Dec. 8, 1966); J.A. Winston & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7334,
at 8-9 (June 5, 1964); General Investing Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
7316, at 3 (May 15, 1964) (discussing the "market maker" exception); Naftalin & Co., Inc.,
41 S.E.C. 823, 826-27 (1964); Maryland Sec. Co., 40 S.E.C. 443, 446 (1960); Boren & Co., 40
S.E.C. 217, 220 (1960); Samuel B. Franklin & Co., 88 S.E.C. 908, 910 (1959), affd, 290 F.2d
719, 725 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889 (1961); Managed Inv. Programs, 37 S.E.C. 783,
786 (1957).
This measure of prevailing market price applies whether the dealer sells from his
inventory (a trade in which he has risk) or sells a security he purchases in response to the
receipt of the customer's order (a riskless transaction). Cf. Naftalin & Co., Inc., supra at
826-27; NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 4, CCH NASD SEC. DEALEs MANUAL

2154.
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lems. First, the maximum time between the dealer's purchase and sale to
his customer permissible to qualify under the "contemporaneous cost"
concept is unclear; cases generally refer to same-day purchases, 410 although longer intervening periods have been recognized. 411 Second, the
decisions assume the price paid for the security is the dealer's "contemporaneous cost."412 Any related internal expenses are excluded and
are to be recouped, if at all, in the mark-up upon the sale of the security.
Third, when a dealer makes more than one purchase near the time of
the sale, the purchase nearest in time to the sale is used. In the absence
of evidence as to which is closest, "fairness [to the dealer] requires that
the highest c6st of purchase be used."4 1 The Commission rejected its
staff's recommendation that the average of the contemporaneous costs
be employed, reasoning that a declining market could cause a mark-up
which seemed reasonable in the morning to become unreasonable in the
afternoon. 41 4
A number of dealers have overcome the presumption that conIn JA. Winston & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7587 (June 8,
1964), the SEC decided a lOb-5 case arising out of the same transactions which gave rise
to an appeal from an NASD sanction which the Commission had decided three days
earlier. The Commission dismissed an argument that the issue of current market price
must be determined differently for NASD appeals and lOb-5 cases. Id. at 9 NASD cases on
the issue of prevailing market price are therefore sound authority for the antifraud provisions.
A salesman not knowing of his firm's contemporaneous cost is not held for violation
of lOb-5 on the basis of those costs. Cf. Langley-Howard, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7986, at 7 (Oct. 26, 1966). Compare Mark E. O'Leary, SEC Securities
Exchange Act Relase No. 8861, at 7 (July 25, 1968).
410 E.g., Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743,
at 24 (Nov. 12, 1965) (reject claim that should average contemporaneous costs over entire
day); cf. General Investing Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7816, at 3
(May 15, 1964) (NASD appeal; disciplined firm successfully argued against same day
contemporaneous costs since it was market maker); Maryland Sec. Co., 40 S.E.C. 443,
446 (1960) (appeal from NASD sanction; same day cost price); Samuel B. Franklin
& Co., 38 S.E.C. 908, 910 (1959), af'd, 290 F.2d 719 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889
(1961) (NASD review; use same-day sales for mark-downs); Managed Inv. Programs, 87
S.E.C. 783, 786 (1957) (NASD appeal; "price paid for a security on the same day").
411 SEC v. Seaboard Sec. Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RnP.
91,697, at 95,563 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (same day, day before, or day after); William Harrison
Keller, Jr., 88 S.E.C. 900, 904 (1959) (some purchases and sales one day apart but use cost
anyway); cf. Scott McIntyre & Co., 11 S.E.C. 442, 444-45 (1942) (comparison of costs within
one or two days of sale). See also note 404 and accompanying text supra.
412 Any brokerage commission the dealer incurs, as when he purchases securities on
an exchange and thereafter sells them in the over-the-counter market, should be part of
his contemporaneous cost.
413 Century Sec. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8123, at 7 (July 14,
1967), aff'd sub nom. Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969); accord, Shearson, Hammill
& Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 24 (Nov. 12, 1965).
414 See cases cited in note 418 supra.
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temporaneous cost is the best evidence of market value. In a few cases,
the price at which respondent sold to other dealers418 or the price
which dealers were charging one another during the applicable period 416
has been deemed controlling. A dealer can also rebut the presumption
by proving he acquired his securities at a discount, as, for example,
417
when he purchases a large block having a relatively thin market.
A market maker418 poses special problems. As the Special Study
of the Securities Markets indicated,4 19 use of a market maker's contemporaneous cost might discourage his activity since the spread
allowable might be insufficient to justify the risk of maintaining a position.420 Absent proof of unusual circumstances such as these, bids and
offers placed in the quotation sheets cannot supplant the contemporaneous cost standard. 421 A different result should be mandated by the use
415 See Mark E. O'Leary, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8361, at 7-8 (July
25, 1968) (contemporaneous sales to other brokers preferred over contemporaneous cost);
Century Sec. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8123, at 7 (July 14, 1967),
aff'd sub nom. Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969) (use contemporaneous prices in

sales to other dealers if higher than contemporaneous cost); cf. Gateway Stock & Bond,
Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8003, at 4 (Dec. 8, 1966) (NASD appeal;
use member's contemporaneous price to other dealers). See also Shearson, Hammill &
Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 24 (Nov. 12, 1965).
416 Cf. Gateway Stock & Bond, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8003, at
4 (Dec. 8, 1966) ("other inter-dealer sales"); Langley-Howard, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7986, at 6 (Oct. 26, 1966) (NASD appeal; "transactions between other
dealers" taken into consideration).
417 Cf. Langley-Howard, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7986, at 7
(Oct. 26, 1966) (NASD appeal; to prevent block from being dumped, member bought at
low price to protect its customers); Strathmore Sec., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 7864, at 3 (April 18, 1966), aft'd, 407 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (NASD case;
third party tried for over two weeks to sell block but no one would buy); Boren & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 217, 220-21 (1960) (obtained block at special concession). The burden of proving
the concession is on the dealer. Cf. Kenneth B. Strucker Inv. Sec., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7823, at 3 (Feb. 15, 1966) (NASD appeal).
418 A market maker is a dealer who holds himself out as willing to buy or sell an
over-the-counter security on a continuous basis.
419 SPEcLA STUDY pt. 2, at 645-68.

420 When the SEC faced this issue it utilized other dealers' offers to determine the
market price. Cf. General Investing Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7316,
at 3 (May 15, 1964) (appeal from an NASD sanction).
421 Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 24
(Nov. 12, 1965) (do not use quotations where there are substantial sales to dealers); cf. Gateway Stock & Bond Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8003, at 3 (Dec. 8, 1966)
(appeal from NASD sanction; low priced speculative securities with wide spreads); Naftalin
& Co., 41 S.E.C. 823, 826-28 (1964) (NASD proceeding appeal; extent of use of quotations in
sheets depends on number of circumstances and not overcome by speculative securities).
But in Thill Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7342, at 6-8 (June 11,
1964), the SEC held that the NASD was wrong to use contemporaneous sales prices of
other dealers and, in their absence, bids in the sheets, to measure mark-downs where the
respondent obtained oral bids from other dealers in an active market, the securities were
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of the automated NASDAQ system, since within that system a broker is
required to trade at the price he inserts.4 22
Another measure of prevailing market price must be utilized in the
absence of contemporaneous cost. A number of organizations, among
them the National Quotation Bureau, Inc., publish sheets in which dealers place their bid and asked quotations. Quotations for securities of
issuers which meet certain standards are also reported on the automated
NASDAQ system. Because usually more than one firm is interested in a
security, the sheets and NASDAQ system often reflect a range of bid
and asked quotations. The figures in the sheets do not represent actual
transactions or even firm offers in the legal sense; rather, they are in the
nature of feelers among dealers as to the price at which a sale might be
made. 428 Nevertheless, the prices in the sheets are generally considered
prima facie evidence of the prevailing market in the absence of contemporaneous cost.424 Since a broker must trade at his NASDAQ

prices, these perhaps offer more accurate indices of market. The sheets'
and NASDAQ's quotations, however, are not controlling when factors
so indicate, 425 and are of little value for low-priced securities with a

wide spread between the bid and offer quotations. 426

nonspeculative, most had more than one market maker, and the spread between the bid
and offer was narrow.
422 See note 249 supra.
423 Merritt, Vickers, Inc. v. SEC, 353 F.2d 293, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1965) (not firm offers
and subject to change); Allender Co., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1058 (1941) (not actual transactions
or firm bids).
The quotations in the sheets represent the wholesale or inside market, but do
furnish some indication of the retail price. Allender Co., supra. See note 408 supra.
424 Weber v. SEC, 222 F.2d 822, 823 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 947 (1956)
(sheets used as evidence); Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., Inc., 318 F. Supp.
1339, 1345-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (lender can rely); SEC v. Seaboard Sec. Corp., [1 9 6 4 -1966
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP'.
91,697, at 95,563 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (sufficient
proof in absence of contrary evidence); SPEClAL STuDY pt. 2, at 650 (use quotations in sheets
if no contemporaneous cost); cf. Merritt, Vickers, Inc. v. SEC, 353 F.2d 293, 296-97 (2d Cir.
1965) (burden on broker to prove special circumstances), aff'g SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7409, at 4-5 (Sept. 2, 1964) (permissible to use sheets); Charles Hughes &
Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 438 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944) (Securities
Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act § 15(c)(1); concurrent prices and sheets permissible in
absence of contrary evidence); Samuel B. Franklin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 908, 910 (1959), aff'd,
290 F.2d 719 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889 (1961) (appeal from NASD sanction;
use quotations in sheets if no contemporaneous cost); Mitchell Sec., Inc., 37 S.E.C. 178,
182 (1956) (NASD appeal; quotations in sheets prima fade proof); Scott McIntyre & Co.,
11 S.E.C. 442, 445 n.1 (1942) (Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2;
quotations in sheets some indication); Allender Co., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1054, 1057-58 (1941)
(other general antifraud provisions invoked; persuasive indication although not conclusive).
425 In a case reviewing a NASD-imposed sanction, the SEC stated:
It seems clear that the propriety of using quotations as evidence of prevailing
market price must be tested in the light of all relevant circumstances, e.g., the
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Even when reference is made to the sheets or NASDAQ, the
proper quotation must be chosen. Some cases refer simply to the asked
quotations. 427 When more than one asked figure appears, the rule
seems to be that the higher asked governs.4 2 8 Although the respondent
dealer would have been held to have violated the Rule in most reported
cases regardless of which quotation was used, 429 these distinctions do
430
make a difference in planning future mark-ups.
Some exceptions have developed to the high-asked-price rule, as,
for example, when amounts paid for the security indicate that the
high asked quotation is not reliable. 431 Also, when the high quote
is placed by the dealer, it may not be controlling, since any charge to
customers could be justified by raising the asked price to an arbitrary
nature of the security, the breadth of the market and whether it is independent
of the dealer relying upon the quotations, the spread in the quotations, and the
functions of the dealer.
Naftalin & Co., 41 S.E.C. 823, 828 (1964); see Gateway Stock & Bond, Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8003, at 3 (Dec. 8, 1966) (quotation not generally tested by
interdealer sales not reliable guide).
The obverse occurs when salesmen of a firm do not realize that the quotations in the
sheets are not an accurate reflection of the market. In that situation, the salesmen do not
violate lOb-5. Cf. Langley-Howard, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7986,
at 7 (Oct. 26, 1966) (NASD sanction appeal). Compare Mark E. O Leary, SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8361, at 7-9 (July 25, 1968).
426 Cf. Costello, Russotto &cCo., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7729, at
4 (Oct. 22, 1965) (appeal from NASD disciplinary action; quotations "likely to be subject
to negotiation"); Naftalin. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 823, 828 (1964) (review of NASD disciplinary
proceedings; quotations subject to negotiation).
427 SEC v. Seaboard Sec. Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sc. L. Rm.
91,697, at 95,563 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. General Investing Corp., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7316, at 2 (May 15, 1964) (appeal from NASD decision; use representative
quotations); Boren Sc Co., 40 S.E.C. 217, 220-21 (1960) (NASD review); United Sec. Corp.,
15 S.E.C. 719, 725, 728 (1944).
428 This is the price most favorable to the dealer. Shearson, Hammill Sc Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 24 (Nov. 12, 1965) (if respondent made no
sales to other dealers on date of sale to customer, use highest sales price to other dealers
on closest day or lowest inside asked price at time of sale to customer, whichever is less);
cf. Managed Inv. Programs, 87 S.E.C. 783, 786 (1957) (NASD appeal); Mitchell Sec., Inc.,
37 S.E.C. 178, 182 (1956); E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 355 n.15 (1945) (Securites
Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act Rule 15d-2; high exchange price for the day used in determining market price but SEC said that it "undoubtedly, for the most part, emplo[ies]
a method too generous to the respondents").
429 Perhaps the most accurate indication of prevailing market is the mean between
the low asked and the high bid quotations.
430 Broker-dealers can determine whether their customer prices are appropriate only
if they can determine which price to use in computing the mark-up.
431 Cf. Merritt, Vickers, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7409, at 5
(Sept. 2, 1964), af'd, 352 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1965) (review of NASD proceeding; permissible
to use "low ask" quotation because member's quotation was at most times only higher
entry and purchase price showed it to be unreliable).
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level.432 Still another exception is recognized when the bulk of the
quotations are on the asked side; a buyers' market then exists, and the
43
quotes are merely for the purpose of negotiation.
In addition to the issue of which price to use, the problem of which
quotation sheet to employ has been discussed in two cases. In one involving a firm based in California, the SEC relied on the West Coast
section of the National Quotation Bureau's sheets.434 In the second case,
the proper sheets were held to be those dated the day of the dealer's sale
to his customer, not those published on that date.435
When there is neither contemporaneous cost nor any quotation
in the sheets or NASDAQ, the price of interdealer trades should be
used to establish the prevailing market price. Without at least this
minimal evidence, the SEC or a private party would find it extremely
difficult to prove that a dealer's price was not reasonably related to
the prevailing market.
Contemporaneous cost, or in its absence the high asked quotation
in the sheets or on NASDAQ, is presumed to be the prevailing
market price. This price is a prerequisite to ascertaining whether the
mark-up charged by the dealer was fair.43 The mark-up or mark-down
permissible under Rule lOb-5 must be determined on a case-by-case
basis.48 7 The NASD, to which most brokerage firms belong, has adopted
its own guidelines for the percentage mark-up and mark-down allow432 Cf. Costello, Russotto & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7729, at 3-4

(Oct. 22, 1965).
433 Cf. JA. Winston & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7334, at 8
(June 5, 1964) (appeal from NASD sanction; purchase always made at or below the high,
and usually the low, asked quotation).
434 Boren & Co., 40 S.E.C. 217, 220-21 (1960) (NASD appeal).
435 Costello, Russotto & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7729, at 3
(Oct. 22, 1965). The National Quotation Bureau receives quotations on Day 1 and publishes
sheets containing those quotations on Day 2. However, the sheets published on Day 2 bear
the date of Day 1, so sheets dated a particular day reflect quotations submitted on that
day. It is reasonable to assume that quotations given early in the day are representative
of the market for the rest of the day. Id.
436 Mark-ups are expressed in terms of a percentage. A dollar amount is not used.
Although use of a percentage can be misleading when applied to a small dollar volume
(see Samuel B. Franklin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 908 (1959), affd, 290 F.2d 719 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 889 (1961)), the percentages permitted may be higher.
The percentage is obtained by dividing the price charged the customer, less the
prevailing market price, by the prevailing market price. See Mitchell Sec., Inc., 37 S.E.C.
178, 181 (1956). For example, a sale to a customer at $11 when the prevailing market was
$10 would result in a 10% mark-up. Mark-downs are computed by dividing the prevailing
market price, less the price the dealer paid the customer, by the price paid to the customer.
See Clarence Earl Thornton, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7693, at 2 (Aug. 31,

1965).
437

Cf. Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 389 (1939).
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able.438 While the NASD rules do not, of course, establish the limits
of lOb-5, they do furnish a useful comparative scheme. The NASD's
Rules of Fair Practice provide that a member acting as a dealer must
trade at a fair price taking into account market conditions, expenses
involved, and a reasonable profit for the dealer. 43 9 The NASD's Board
of Governors has interpreted this provision to mean that "[u]nder
certain circumstances a mark-up in excess of 5 percent may be justified,
but on the other hand, 5 percent or even a lower rate is by no means
always justified. '440 The Board also noted that the five percent figure
is only a guideline, not a rule, and cannot be used to justify excessive
expenses. It observed that a number of factors are relevant in determining the size of a permissible mark-up: common stock may justify
a greater percentage than a bond; an inactive security may allow for
a higher mark-up; the mark-up generally increases as the security's
price decreases; a larger percentage may be permissible when the
dollar volume of the transaction is small; disclosure of the mark-up
bears on its reasonableness; and the nature of the dealer's business
and costs may justify greater mark-ups. 441 The five percent NASD guide
438 See note 20 and accompanying text supra (private rights of action implied under

the NASD rules).
Firms which are not members of the NASD are under similar restrictions by virtue
of Exchange Act Rule 15b10-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-2 (1972), which requires that they
"observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade."
439 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 4, CCH NASD SEC. DEATRs MANUAL
2154.
440 Id.

441 Id. The Board further construed the Association's rules to be applicable to trades
where the dealer is at risk, to riskless purchases and sales, and to exchanges of securities,
but not to sales under a prospectus or offering circular. Id.
Generally speaking, expenses out of the ordinary in connection with the sale should
justify a somewhat larger mark-up. However, respondents have been singularly unsuccessful
in arguing this point. See Paul Carroll Ferguson, 39 S.E.C. 260, 263 (1959) (no special services
shown); William Harrison Keller, Jr., 38 S.E.C. 900, 906 (1959) (no showing of unusual
expenses or services); ef. Kenneth B. Stucker Inv. Sec., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7823, at 3-4 (Feb. 15, 1966) (review of NASD disciplinary action; rejecting services
primarily related to promotion and sale of issuer's stock); Thill Sec. Corp., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7342, at 9-11 (June 11, 1964) (NASD appeal; conferences to
develop business, driving to and from customers' homes, and research on actively traded
securities not sufficient; abnormal analysis time spent should have been the subject of a
separate contract); General Investing Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
7316, at 5 (May 15, 1964) (rejecting argument that expenses of large inventory and expenses incurred in extensive solicitation efforts justify mark-ups where same securities
generally available from other brokers); Midiand Sec., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 333, 335, 338 (1960)
(review of NASD sanction; expenses cannot justify excessive mark-up; SEC classified the
following services as not "unusual": maintaining a ready market, not charging customers
a commission for selling stock used in payment for purchases, accepting collect longdistance telephone charges, and, without cost to customers, keeping certificates and
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does not apply to lOb-5 proceedings, and may in fact be a stricter standard than any requirement imposed by the Rule; 442 yet, ten percent
44 3
mark-ups are clearly beyond the Rule's permissible limits.
Dealers caught violating the implied representation that their
prices are reasonably related to the prevailing market have interposed
a number of defenses. The representation may, according to the Commission, "be obviated either by the independent knowledge of the
customer or by full and complete disclosure of facts and circumstances
which will permit the customer to decide whether or not the transaction should be completed." 44- Mere constructive knowledge of the
breaking certificates into smaller numbers of shares at actual cost); Samuel B. Franklin
& Co., 38 S.E.C. 908, 912 (1959), aff'd, 290 F.2d 719 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889
(1961) (NASD appeal; no evidence of special circumstances to justify greater mark-up
"such as unusual expenses in connection with particular transactions [or] extraordinary
services rendered to customers'); SpECIAL STuDY pt. 2, at 648 (in NASD proceedings involving riskless transactions, can take into account "expenses of checking markets, solicitation
of order and research or other advisory services," but these expenses cannot be excessive).
442 In an NASD appeal, the Commission held that "an undisclosed mark-up which
is not so excessive as to constitute fraud [under the Rule] might nevertheless violate
business ethics [and hence the NASD Rules]." Herrick, Waddell & Co., Inc., 25 S.E.C. 437,
446 (1947).
443 Arnold Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7813, at 5 n.9 (Feb. 7,
1966) ("mark-ups of more than 10% are unfair even in the sale of low-priced securities').
Mark-downs in the securities industry are traditionally less than mark-ups. See generally Costello, Russotto & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7729, at 5 n.15
(Oct. 22, 1965); Thill Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7342, at 8 n.1
(June 11, 1964); SPEcAL STUDy pt. 2, at 626-27. The permissible percentage for markdowns may therefore be less than that allowed for mark-ups, all other factors being equal.
The SEC's view that mark-ups of 5.2% to 7.7% were illegal was not contested in one
case. See Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 24
(Nov. 12, 1965) (workout market). Other relatively low mark-ups which have been condemned include: 8.5% to 78.9% (E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 357-58 (1945)) and
5A% to 22.7% (Shearson, Hammll & Co., supra at 24). The spread between other dealers'
bid and asked quotations on the day in issue are not evidence of a reasonable mark-up. Cf.
Samuel B. Franklin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 908, 911-12 (1959), aff'd, 290 F.2d 719 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889 (1961).
444 Alexander Smith, 22 S.E.C. 13, 17 (1946). See generally Paul Carroll Ferguson, 39
S.E.C. 260, 263 (1959) (fraud to charge unreasonable price without disclosure); William
Harrison Keller, Jr., 88 S.E.C. 900, 905 (1959) (implied representation arises in absence of
disclosure); cf. William J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601, 622 (1942) (cure by charging correct
price or disclosing); Jack Goldberg, 10 S.E.C. 975, 980 (1942) (cure by reasonable price or
disclosure); Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 389 (1939) (avoid fraud by disclosure or reasonable price).
In Arleen W. Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629, 639-40 (1948), an investment adviser was disciplined for selling securities to her clients without disclosing either the best price obtainable or the cost of the securities. The Commission rejected the argument that a clause
in a contiact was sufficient and held that disclosure must be "clear enough so that a client
is fully apprised of the facts and is in a position to give his informed consent." The Court
of Appeals agreed. 174 F.2d 969, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
In contrast to the federal securities antifraud provisions (Securities Act § 17(a), 15
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prices, e.g., when they are published in newspapers, or mere access to
market information is insufficient to overcome the implied representation. 445 Nor has the SEC permitted dealers to increase their mark-up
on sales for, the purpose of recouping losses sustained in purchases
from their customers, 446 or to escape discipline if the mark-up on some
sales was fraudulent (even though the average mark-up was not excessive).." 7 Other unsuccessful defenses which have been argued 448 are:
the securities were of good quality,449 the customer's financial position
was improved, 450 the intrinsic value of the security was higher than
market,45 ' and the customers ratified the transactions. 452
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), and Exchange Act Rule 15ci-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1972)), under
the NASD rules disclosure is only one element to be considered when a matter of business
ethics is concerned. See note 441 and accompanying text supra. See also Herrick, Waddell
& Co., Inc., 25 S.E.C. 437, 446 (1947) (NASD proceeding in which mark-up disclosed);
Thill Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7342, at 10 (June 11, 1964)
(appeal from NASD sanction; disclosure made).
445 See William Harrison Keller, Jr., 38 S.E.C. 900, 906 (1959) (customer entitled to
rely on implied representation even if he has access to market information); E.H. Rollins
& Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 362 (1945) (construing Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act
Rule 15cl-2; customers could have ascertained true spread since most bonds listed on New
York Stock Exchange and prices reported in newspapers, but mere access to information
does not overcome implied representation); United Sec. Corp., 15 S.E.C. 719, 727 (1944)
("any person, regardless of his knowledge of the market or his access to market information,
is entitled to rely on the implied representation ... that customers will be treated fairly').
446 Cf. E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 363-64 (1945) (Securities Act § 17(a)
and Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2; invalidates part of scheme to maintain customer's confidence); Trost & Co., Inc., 12 S.E.C. 531, 534-35 (1942) (violation when unreasonable
prices charged in individual transactions).
447 William Harrison Keller, Jr., 38 S.E.C. 900, 906 (1959) (inappropriate to determine
mark-up on average basis); cf. E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 370 (1945) (must look
at each transaction individually); United Sec. Corp., 15 S.E.C. 719, 728 (1944) (Securities Act
§ 17(a) and Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2; do not average since dealer should act fairly atall times); Trost & Co., Inc., 12 S.E.C. 531, 535 (1942) (Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange
Act Rule 15cl-2); William J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601, 622 (1942) (do not use average
mark-up since can conceal excessive mark-ups in average).
448 A purported justification based upon a dealer's risk-taking was rejected as insubstantial in SEC v. Seaboard Sec. Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
91,597, at 95,564 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Although a firm's right to a profit is one factor to be
considered under the NASD rules (see Boren & Co., 40 S.E.C. 217, 220 (1960)), a firm's losses
cannot justify unreasonable mark-ups under lob-5. See Arnold Sec. Corp., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7813, at 5-6 (Feb. 7, 1966). It is no defense that other dealers
are charging excessive mark-ups. Cf. Amsbury, Allen &. Morton, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7834, at 4 (March 7, 1966) (NASD appeal).
449 Cf. William J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601, 622 (1942).
450 See E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 373 (1945) ("yields and profits to the
funds do not provide a defense"); cf. William J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601, 622 (1942).
451 Mitchell Sec., Inc., 37 S.E.C. 178, 181-82 (1956).
452 Cf. Trost & Co., Inc., 12 S.E.C. 531, 538 (1942) (Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange
Act Rule 15cl-2; not understood by them).
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A brokerage firm can violate lOb-5 not only as a dealer in the
over-the-counter market, but also when acting as an over-the-counter
agent. The firm bears the same responsibilities whether acting as a
broker-agent4 53 or as the implied agent for the customer. 454 As an
agent, the broker must obtain the best possible price for the customer,455 and cannot receive any remuneration beyond that agreed
to by his principal, the customer.
The issue is not the reasonableness of a broker's compensation, as
was the case with an over-the-counter dealer,456 but is whether any
profits have been concealed from the customer. 457 Brokers have obtained secret profits by misrepresenting the purchase or sale price,458
453 When acting as a broker, the firm stands in the classic principal-agent relationship
with its customers. Harry Marks, 25 S.E.C. 208, 215 (1947); cf. NASD Rules of Fair Practice
Art. IM, § 4, CCH NASD SEc. DEAums MANuAL
2154 (applies to broker-dealer acting
as agent or dealer).
454 Although buying or selling for its own account, the firm is deemed an agent if it
has its customer's trust and confidence. Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228,
231-32 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'g 21 S.E.C. 865 (1946) (implied agency); Herbert R. May &
Russell L Phinney, 27 S.E.C. 814, 830 (1948) (implied agency due to trust); cf. Trost &
Co., Inc., 12 S.E.C. 531, 536 (1942) (Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2;
firm instructed to act as agent but acts as principal); Allender Co., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1054
(1941). A riskless transaction-where the broker does not sell from inventory-does not
involve an implied agency relationship. Knauss, supra note 11, at 689 n.133. For a discussion of the implied agency theory, see notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.
455 Sinclair v. SEC, 444 F.2d 899, 400 (2d Cir. 1971); Thompson & McKinnon, SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8810 (May 8, 1968); Herbert R. May & Russell H.
Phinney, 27 S.E.C. 814, 880 (1948); Oxford Co., 21 S.E.C. 681, 690 (1946); cf. RD. Bayly &
Co., 19 S.E.C. 773, 786-87 (1945)
456 Excessive compensation would, however, raise problems under the NASD rules
even if disclosed. NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. I, § 4, CCH NASD SEc. DEALMS
MANUAL
2154.
457 Moore & Co., 32 S.E.C. 191, 195 (1951); Arleen W. Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629, 687 n.11
(1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (any profit, in the absence of disclosure, is
secret profit); Harry Marks, 25 S.E.C. 208, 215 (1947) (had to divulge all profit except
commission unless customer informed; self-preferment case); Oxford Co., 21 S.E.C. 681,
688-93 (1946); cf. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 786 (1944) (Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act § 15(c)(1); all undisclosed
profits forfeited). Therefore, a broker cannot defend an absence of disclosure by proving that
the price charged the customer was reasonably related to the market. Arleen W. Hughes,
supra at 637 n.11.
458 Investment Registry of America, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 745, 755-56 (1946); cf. Scott Mc-

Intyre & Co., 11 S.E.C. 422, 444 (1942) (lies in 70% of agency transactions).
A number of dealer cases have held that the price quoted by a broker or a dealer
carries with it an implied representation that such a price is reasonably related to the
prevailing market. See William J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601, 621-22 (1942) (Securities
Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2); Jack Goldberg, 10 S.E.C. 975, 980 (1942).
This certainly has less effect in the case of a broker where any compensation will previously
have been disclosed and agreed upon. Cf. notes 401-03 supra.
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overcharging commissions, 459 and billing customers too much for incidental expenses. 460 A broker is insulated from liability for generating
secret profits, however, if prior to the transaction there is full disclosure to the customer, in a clear and understandable manner, of
the nature and extent of the broker's compensation. 461 As with an
over-the-counter dealer, a broker is not exonerated merely because
462
his clients suffered no injury.
Securities exchanges usually handle trading not done in the overthe-counter market. A customer desiring to purchase or sell on an
exchange engages a broker to act as his agent. There is little authority
relating to brokers' secret profits derived from trading on an exchange,
but the rules pertaining to over-the-counter brokers arguably should
463
apply with equal force.
When firms act as underwriters, rather than as brokers or dealers,
they can also violate the Rule by selling shares at an offering price404
not reasonably related to the actual market price or by substituting
their own shares for the securities to be underwritten.4 5 These activi459 Cf. Scott McIntyre & Co., 11 S.E.C. 442, 444 (1942) (overcharges on commissions).
On the other hand, occasional mistakes (see General Sec. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 635, 636 (1945)
(ten instances in four years aggregating less than $15)) or commissions equal to less than the
comparable rate on an exchange (ci. Boren & Co., 40 S.E.C. 217, 221 (1960) (NASD sanction
reviewed)) will not form the basis of a disciplinary action.
460 Investment Registry of America, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 745, 755-56 (1946) (deducting
excess charges for interest, brokerage commission, taxes, and postage); cf. Scott McIntyre
& Co., 11 S.E.C. 442, 444 (1942) (Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2;
overstated charges).
461 Arleen W. Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629, 639 (1948) (clear disclosure before completion of
transaction), aff'd, 174 F.2d 969, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (disclosure not sufficient where clients
did not understand); Moore & Co., 82 S.E.C. 191, 196 (1951) (need customer's "informed
consent based upon a full disclosure of every vital particular touching the transaction").
Accordingly, partial disclosure is insufficient. Cf. Allender Co., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1054 (1941)
(Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2; customer's knowledge that some profits were made not enough). Concerning the minimum disclosure of compensation, see
William J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601, 619-20 (1942).
Exchange Act Rule 15cl-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-4 (1972), requires an over-the-counter
broker to disclose, at or before the completion of any transaction, the source and amount
of his commission or other remuneration.
462 Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (broker-dealer disciplined even
though no client injured and majority of clients filed brief with court stating that they
understood arrangement).
463 In E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 847, 355-75 (1945), the SEC treated overthe-counter bonds and listed bonds similarly and used the high exchange price for the day
to compute mark-ups although noting that this was undoubtedly too generous to respondent. Id. at 355 n.15; accord, United Sec. Corp., 15 S.E.C. 719, 726-28 (1944) (over-thecounter and exchange treated together; high sale or high offer price used).
464 Indiana State Sec. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 118, 120-21 (1957) (implied representation that
offering price reasonably related to market).
465 Cf. David Joel Benjamin, 38 S.E.C. 614, 618 (1958) (Securities Act § 17(a) and
Exchange Act § 15(c)(1)).
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ties give the appearance more of misrepresentation than implied
466
representation.
Another method broker-dealers have used to gain illegal compensation is "interpositioning," whereby a broker acting for a customer
buys from or sells to another firm which is not a major source of the
security, and which nets out the transaction by selling to or buying
from the primary source. 467 If interpositioning is proved, both the
initiating and the interposed firms may be disciplined. 468 Although
interpositioning usually involves over-the-counter transactions with
a firm which is not a market marker,469 the doctrine also applies to
sales of listed securities to an over-the-counter firm in the third
market.470 Generally, if not invariably, the initiating firm receives a
benefit from either the interposed firm or a third party.471' Proof of
the benefit should not be necessary to make out a lOb-5 violation if
466 See generally notes 157-232 and accompanying text supra (broker misrepresentation).
In SEC v. Guaranty Bond & Sec. Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. RU.
92,928 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), an underwriter was enjoined from concealing from
his customers that he was pocketing the difference between the sums left with him by the
customers and the 5% interest he paid.
467 The interposed firm can act either as an agent or a principal, but in either case
any charge is absorbed by the original customer. SPEciAL SvtUY pt. 2, at 620.
468 Sinclair v. SEC, 444 F.2d 399, 401 (2d Cir. 1971) (employee of initiating broker);
Hoit, Rose & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8563, at 2 (April 7, 1969)
(interposed firm disciplined); Folger, Nolan, Fleming & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 8489 (Jan. 8, 1969) (initiating firm violates the Rule); Thompson & McKinnon, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8310, at 3-4 (May 8, 1968) (initiating
firm disciplined); Delaware Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8128
(July 19, 1967) (initiating firm violates Rule); cf. W.K. Archer & Co., 11 S.E.C. 635, 642-43
(1942), aft'd, 133 F.2d 795, 800 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943) (interposed
dealer).
In George A. Brown, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8160, at 4-5 (Sept. 19,
1967), a broker was exonerated from an interpositioning charge when it was shown that
the interposed firm often turned down the offer to act as intermediary, the initiating firm
frequently checked the primary source of the security (in this case, an exchange) to see
if it was getting the best price, most covering transactions took place after the interposed
dealer bought the security, and the interposed firm had losses on many trades. Compare
Sinclair v. SEC, 444 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1971) (no proof shown of due diligence to ascertain
best price).
469 Folger, Nolan, Fleming & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8489
(Jan. 8, 1969); Thompson g- McKinnon, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8310, at
3-4 (May 8, 1968).
470 George A. Brown, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8160, at 4-5 (Sept. 19,
1967) (charges dismissed). The interposed firm then covers its activities by selling or buying
on the exchange. In the third market, listed securities are sold off the exchange much like
their over-the-counter counterparts.
471 The benefit can take any number of forms. See, e.g., Hoit, Rose & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8563, at 2 (April 7, 1969) (cash payment by interposed
firm and referral of its business); Folger, Nolan, Fleming & Co., Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8489 (Jan. 8, 1969) (reciprocal interposing agreement; kick-back

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:869

the customer is injured by not receiving the best price.4 2 The mere
presence of any such undisclosed benefit, however, should suffice to
render the interpositioning illegal, without a showing of harm to the
customer. 47 3 In most cases the interposed broker garners a profit, but
this need not be a prerequisite to a violation if either the customer
is harmed or the initiating broker receives a benefit.47 4
Still another lOb-5 violation occurs when a broker receives a customer's order to sell a security but, sensing an imminent decline in
the market, delays the sale and instead dumps his own stock.47 5 The
same rationale should apply in a rising market where the broker puts
aside purchases for customers in order to increase his own inventory.
It is also illegal for a broker to induce his customers to purchase a
security while he is unloading his own interest in that stock. 47 6
A firm may realize illegal compensation when it ostensibly acts as
agent for a customer, but deals with another party who is in fact one of
its partners or employees, or a dummy representing their interests. 477
to initiating firm's employee); Thompson & McKinnon, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8310, at 3-4 (May 8, 1968) (to reciprocate for listed business referred to it by
interposed firms, to reward such firms for furnishing services to respondent, and to get
business of mutual fund); Delaware Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 8128 (July 19, 1967) (incentive to mutual fund salesmen to sell more).
472 Thompson & McKinnon, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8310, at 4
(May 8, 1968) (prima fade violation of lOb-5 if interposes another broker-dealer; burden
on respondent to show he obtained best price for the customer).
473 In Thompson & McKinnon, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8310, at 4
n.7 (May 8, 1968), the Commission suggested that concealment of interpositioning may be
an independent violation of the Rule. The Second Circuit found it could avoid the issue of
whether interpositioning is illegal per se in the absence of harm to customers. Sinclair v.
SEC, 444 F.2d 399, 401 (2d Cir. 1971).
474 An interposed broker's losses are, however, an indication that the customer is
receiving the best price. See George A. Brown, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8160, at 4 (Sept. 19, 1967).
475 Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 670-76 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd per curiam,
367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (securities of firm sold and private right of action sustained);
Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 11-15 (Nov.
12, 1965) (sales of shares of firm and those of employees). Delaying execution of an order
is itself a lob-5 violation. See notes 493-95 and accompanying text infra.
476 Reynolds & Co., 39,S.E.C. 902, 913 (1960). The Rule should also be considered
breached if it were the firm's stock instead. This activity, though, again shades into the
misrepresentation area. See Silverman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 331 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (plaintiff's claim that broker did not sell plaintiff out in order to avoid depressing
market and injuring broker's holdings, when combined with representation to sell plaintiffs securities in a declining market, stated a 'cause of action); Butcher & Sherrerd, Summary of Order for Public Proceeding, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
78,466 (Nov. 24, 1971).
477 Aim & Co., 36 S.E.C. 279, 280-81 (1955) (partner as executor sells securities of
estate indirectly to respondent firm which sells to customers; partner buys from the

1972]

RULE 10b-5 AND BROKER-DEALERS

Finally, the obverse of such cases will also constitute a violation;
a broker may not pay a rebate to an employee of a customer.4 78
The remedies of a customer whose broker-dealer has engaged in
the practices just discussed are not yet clearly defined. There should
be little doubt, however, as to a customer's right to recover any damages
suffered by him arising out of the broker's conduct.
estate for himself, sells to respondent which sells to customers); Henry Marks, 25 S.E.C.
208, 214 (1947) (sales from account in broker's wife's name and fictitious name to customers); Burley & Co., 23 S.E.C. 461, 463-66 (1946) (sales from partner's account through
another brokerage firm to broker for customers; purchases by customers from and sales
by them to account established for the two firms); General Sec. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 635, 636
(1945) (sales by customers to broker's wife without disclosure to customer); cf. RM). Bayly
& Co., 19 S.E.C. 773 (1945) (Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2; partner buys from clients and sells
to third party). See also notes 467-74 and accompanying text supra (interpositioning and
rebates).
In George J. Wunsch, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8714 (Oct. 7, 1969), a
group of enterprising brokerage firm employees set up a series of elaborate schemes to
defraud their employers: (1) Wunsch had his firm sell securities at or near the low price
on a day to his secret account which then, in turn, sold them to an associate's firm at or
near the day's high price, and his associates did the same; (2) he caused his firm to trade
with a dealer so that the dealer made substantial profits, part of which were rebated
to Wunsch; and (3) he caused his employer to sell securities to another broker-dealer, who
sold them to Wunsch's account, bought them back at a profit, and finally resold them to
the employer or another brokerage firm.
In Bethel, Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163, 165 (1947), a brokerage firm was held to
have violated the Rule when it sold stock from customers' accounts, used the proceeds to
buy securities for its own account, and then resold those securities to its customers at a
profit.
See generally Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 443 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1970) (salesman's offer personally to buy back shares from customer at her cost without disclosing three-fold increase sufficient to permit damage action).
478 Junger, Anderson & Co., 31 S.E.C. 747, 750 (1950) (one-half of investment company's commissions funneled through dummy account to one of its employees); E.H.
Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 382-86 (1945) (rebates sent to brother of broker who
worked for customer; brother requested that broker increase price of securities and this
should have alerted broker); cf. Herbert L. Honohan, 13 S.E.C. 754, 759-60 (1943) (construing Exchange Act Rules 10b-3 and 15c-2; payments to traders in other firms for
diverting business to respondent or selling to respondent at price so low that respondent
could make large profit on resale). See also cases involving interpositioning discussed in
notes 467-74 and accompanying text supra.
This borders on the area of give-ups, where, for example, a mutual fund directs the
executing broker to give part of his commission on the trade to another broker. The giveup ultimately rebounds to the benefit of the fund's officers or adviser in violation of lob-5.
See Winfield & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9478 (Feb. 9, 1972) (broker
is aider and abettor); Provident Management Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
9
9
No. 9028 (Dec. 1, 1970) (broker aided violation); Arthur Lipper Corp., [1 70-1 71 Transfer
hearing exof
78,126 (June 11, 1971) (initial decision
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
aminer). See generally Bernard Cornfeld, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9094
(March 1, 1971) (directing fund's give-ups to underwriter violation of lOb-5).
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Other Actions In Connection With a Customer's Order

A broker-dealer, by virtue of the shingle theory,47 9 impliedly
represents that he is solvent whenever he confirms trades, or solicits or
accepts purchase or sale orders. Engaging in business while insolvent
therefore violates lOb-5. 480 Cases sometimes refer to insolvency only as
an inability to meet debts as they become due,481 or in the sense that
assets are less than liabilities, 4 2 but the majority of opinions rely on
both definitions. 83 The SEC has occasionally indicated that transacting
business while in violation of the New York Stock Exchange's net
capital requirements also constitutes a breach of the Rule.4 84 By analogy,
a broker engaging in business while not conforming to the SEC's
own net capital rule48 5 should run afoul of lOb-5. The Commission has
also held that a broker-dealer contravened lOb-5 by effecting transactions while his books and records were confused.
479 See notes 45-69 and accompanying text supra. The implied agency theory of
liability would also seem to be applicable in at least some of the situations discussed
herein. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.
480 Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702, 707 (N.D. Ind.
1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Fliederbaum,
Mooradian & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7176, at 1 (Nov. 29, 1963); D.
Earle Hensley Co., 40 S.E.C. 849, 852 n.1 (1961); Thompson & Sloan, Inc., 40 S.E.C. 451,
454 (1961); Earl L. Robbins, 39 S.E.C. 847, 849 (1960); Harvey H. Shields, Jr., 39 S.E.C.
608, 609 (1959); Joseph J. Wilensky & Co., 89 S.E.C. 327, 329 (1959); Abraham Rosen, 89
S.E.C. 268, 270 (1959); John D. Ferris, 39 S.E.C. 116, 119 (1959); Gill-Harkness & Co., 38
S.E.C. 646, 651 (1958); Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 436, 446 (1958).
481 Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702, 705, 707 (N.D. Ind.
1968), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); W.F. Coley
& Co., 31 S.E.C. 722, 726, 728 (1950); Harold G. Wise, 29 S.E.C. 542, 543-44 (1949).
482 Acmerge Sec. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7962, at 1 (Sept. 26,
1966); Joseph J. Wilensky & Co., 89 S.E.C. 327, 329 (1959); cf. R.G. Williams & Co., Inc.,
39 S.E.C. 928, 929-30 (1960).
483 SEC v. Raymond, Bliss, Inc., 4 SEC Jud. Dec. 834 (D. Mass. 1946); SEC v. Financial Serv., Inc., 4 SEC Jud. Dec. 480 (S.D. Ind. 1945); Fliederbaum, Mooradian & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7176, at 1 (Nov. 29, 1963); Thompson & Sloan, Inc.,
40 S.E.C. 451, 454 (1961); Harvey H. Shields, Jr., 39 S.E.C. 608, 609 (1959); Abraham Rosen,
89 S.E.C. 268, 270 (1959); Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 436, 446 (1958); Cobb & Co., 38 S.E.C. 166,
167 (1958); Strousse, Thomas & Whelan, Inc., 29 S.E.C. 297, 298 (1949).
484 Joseph V. Shields, Jr., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8484, at 2 (Jan.
3, 1969); see SEC v. Charles Plohn & Co., 433 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1970); Pickard & Co.,
Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8447, at 2 (Nov. 14, 1968) (violation
of lOb-5 and other rules for, inter alia, noncompliance with NYSE financial requirements).
485 Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1972).
A broker selling securities of his own enterprise must disclose violations of the

Commission's net capital rule. See note 229 and accompanying text supra.
486 Joseph V. Shields, Jr., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8484, at 2 (Jan. 3,
1969); Acmerge Sec. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7962, at 1 (Sept. 26,
1966); see Pickard & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8447, at 2 (Nov.
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The Rule also prohibits misleading confirmations. 4 7 Accordingly,
a confirmation must accurately state the amount to which the customer
is entitled and the transaction to which it relates must be authorized. 48
Failing to deliver a confirmation or delivering it when no trade was
4 9
made is also a transgression of the Rule.
Distinct from but related to confirmation violations are instances
of unauthorized trading. A stockbroker breaches the Rule if he
executes a trade for a customer's account either without any authority49° or in excess of his limited authority.491 The shingle theory
is again the source of these prohibitions. 49 2
14, 1968) (books not current, and this and other acts constituted violations of lOb-5 and
other provisions).
487 A confirmation is a document delivered by a broker-dealer to a customer disclos-

ing the terms of a completed transaction. Exchange Act Rule 15cl-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-4
(1972), also governs confirmations. It requires a broker or dealer, at or before the comple-

tion of a transaction, to give the customer a written confirmation.
488 L.B. Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7806, at 3 n.4 (Jan. 28,
1966) (dictum) (confirmation to initiate order, commonly called "wooden order," violates
lOb-5); Shelley, Roberts & Co., 38 S.E.C. 744, 751 (1958) (confirmations of unauthorized
sales false since confirmation is representation of effective orders or authority); First
Anchorage Corp., 34 S.E.C. 299, 303-04 (1952) (confirmation false since secret profit not
reflected; also false since transactions unauthorized and confirmation impliedly represents
existence of antecedent orders); D.S. Waddy & Co., 50 S.E.C. 567, 369 (1949) (falsely stating
amount realized on sale). See also William I. Hay, 19 S.E.C. 397, 409, 410 (1945) (confirmation "carried with it the implication that the purchase had been made in full adherence
to brokerage principles" and "that a security in actual existence, received or receivable
in due course, has been purchased'); R.D. Bayly & Co., 19 S.E.C. 773, 785, 787 (1945)
(Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2; failure to disclose secret profit). But see Schraufnagel v.
Broadwall Sec., Inc., [1966-67 Transfer Binder] CCH Fa. SEc. L. RP. 91,827 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (no recovery for damages suffered when confirmation sent out on unauthorized
transaction because plaintiff did not rely); General Sec. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 635, 636 (1945)
(two understatements of proceeds received from sales during four-year period and amounting to less than $15 held inadvertent errors).
489 W.F. Coley & Co., 31 S.E.C. 722, 724 (1950); D.S. Waddy & Co., 30 S.E.C. 367, 368

(1949) (confirming when no transaction took place); H.F. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 853,
835, 838 (1948) (failure to confirm); cf. Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 444
(ND. Ill. 1967) (false representation that purchase made); E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18
S.E.C. 347, 575, 378 (1945) (Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2; absence of confirmation).
490 Kavit v. A.L. Staum & Co., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.

91,915 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (do not dismiss allegation of unauthorized short sale); Amalgamated Inv., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8255, at 1 (Feb. 9, 1968) (sales
without authority and other securities substituted); L.B. Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7806, at 3 (Jan. 28, 1966) (dictum); R.A. Holman & Co., Inc., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7770, at 10 (Dec. 15, 1965), aff'd, 566 F.2d 446 (2d Cir.
1966), modified on other grounds, 377 F.2d 665 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 991 (1967);
Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 30 (Nov. 12,
1965); J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88, 98 (1962), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Hersh v. SEC,
325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964); Thompson & Sloan, Inc., 40
S.E.C. 451, 454 (1961); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 909 (1960); Shelley, Roberts & Co., 38
S.E.C. 744, 751 (1958); Looper & Co., 38 S.E.C 294, 297, 501 (1958) (together with churning
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Still another broker practice condemned under the shingle theory
is the failure of a broker to execute his customer's order promptly in
accordance with trade custom. 493 An insight into the speed with which

a broker must usually act can be gleaned from a case in which the SEC
concluded, on rather atypical facts, that a three-day delay was permissible.4 4 The acceptable time delay is flexible. An hour or even a matter
of minutes might be inexcusable for a small block of an actively traded,
volatile security if communications facilities were readily available.
Conversely, a week or two would not seem unreasonable for a very
large block of a little-known and only sporadically traded security. With
the added element of interference by the broker with the customer's
property, a delayed execution becomes a misappropriation by the
broker of his customer's funds (in the case of a buy order) or securities
(in the case of a sell order).495
and secret profits); First Anchorage Corp., 34 S.E.C. 299, 301-04 (1952); D.S. Waddy & Co.,
30 S.E.C. 367, 368 (1949). See generally Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 363-64
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 898 U.S. 958 (1970) (underwriter cannot confirm purchases without
at least true indication of interest from customer); Stephen Goldberg, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9430 (Nov. 20, 1971) (confirmations mailed to issuer's customers).
A high percentage of cancelled orders is acceptable evidence that customers did not agree
to buy securities.
491 Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 31
(Nov. 12, 1965) (discretion limited to when customer on trips); Shelley, Roberts & Co., 38
S.E.C. 744, 751 (1958) (confirming for twice the number of shares); First Anchorage Corp.,
34 S.E.C. 299, 303 (1952) (stock powers given with instructions to sell particular stock;
instead, other securities bought and sold).
492 First Anchorage Corp., 34 S.E.C. 299, 304 (1952).
493 Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 443-44 (ND. Ill. 1967) (representation that sales made when in fact never executed); Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F.
Supp. 668, 670-73 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd Per curiam, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (delaying execution of sale order while unloading broker's own securities of same class); see Leo G. MacLaughlin Sec. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7783, at 1 (Jan. 5, 1966)
(shingle theory requires execution); Reynolds & Co., 89 S.E.C. 902, 913 (1960) (withholding
buy orders until stock price manipulated upward); William Rex Cromwell, 38 S.E.C. 913,
915 (1959) (purchase orders); Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 436, 446 (1958); W.F. Coley & Co.,
31 S.E.C. 722, 726 (1950); Silverman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FE. SEc. L. REP.
93,065 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (in discretionary account where brokerdealer represented would sell out at small loss, cause of action stated where customer alleges
reason for delaying sale was that firm did not want to lower market price of security
which firm also held); cf. Carl J. Bledung, 38 S.E.C. 518, 521 (1958) (construing Exchange
Act Rule 15cl-2; purchase orders). See also Sills & Co., 38 S.E.C. 931, 933 (1959) (broker
converted funds obtained on false representation that would purchase securities); note
536 and accompanying text infra (absence of adequate facilities to consummate transaction).
494 Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C. 311, 335 (1952) (order given on Sunday to
partner in Cuba, next day holiday, following day had trouble getting through to New
York, and order made next day).
495 Failure to execute promptly is equivalent to forcing the customer to make an
unsecured loan to the broker. See Warning to Broker-Dealers on Bucketing, SEC Securities
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Finally, selling securities which are fictitious0 6 or which are subject
to a lien placed on them by the broker,497 violates the Rule. Failure to
ascertain whether securities a customer is selling must be registered
499
under the 1933 Act4 98 may also violate the Rule.

IV
BROKER ACrIONS SUBSEQUENT TO EXECUTION OF A
CUSTOMER'S ORDER

The Rule prohibits a stockbroker, upon completion of a transaction, from misappropriating his customer's funds or securities, or
delaying delivery of the customer's property. A broker can misappropriate his customer's property by any number of methods, all of

which violate the Rule. 500 Securities can be sold501 or pledged50 2 withExchange Act Release No. 9459 (Jan. 14, 1972). A broker may, however, without liability
orally refuse to execute an order at the time it is placed. See Courtland v. Walston & Co.,
Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,378, at 91,945 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
See also notes 500-27 and accompanying text infra (misappropriation treated). Failure to
deliver securities after purchase, and withholding proceeds of a sale, are discussed at notes
528-38 and accompanying text infra.
496 Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 443-44 (NJD. IlI. 1967); D.S. Waddy
& Co., 30 S.E.C. 867, 368 (1949).
497 Richard A. Sebastian, 38 S.E.C. 865, 868-69 (1959) (implied representation that
customer will have clear title); cf. Morrison Bond Co., 11 S.E.C. 125, 133 (1942) (Securities
Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2 case). See generally note 502 and accompanying
text infra (broker pledging customer's securities without authority).
498 In its earlier releases, when the Commission discussed exemptions from registration under the 1933 Act and violations of the antifraud rules, it was careful to keep the
two concepts separate. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 6721 (Feb. 2, 1962)
& 8638 (July 2, 1969). The line between the two was less clear in a 1971 release. See SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9239 (July 1, 1971).
499 A broker who negligently sells stolen securities while acting in his usual capacity
is not liable under the Rule to the true owner. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,748 (N.D. Ill.
1970).
600 Conversion of customer's property is also prohibited under common law. 1
W. BLACK, THE LAW OF STOCK EXCHANGES, STOCKBROKERS AND CuSroaMERs § 551, at 372-73

(1940).
501 See e.g., American Canadian Enterprises, Ltd., 39 S.E.C. 606, 607 (1949); D.S. Waddy
& Co., 50 S..C. 367, 568 (1949); HF. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 833, 834, 836 (1948). See also
notes 490-92 and accompanying text supra (unauthorized trading by broker).
502 SEC v. Raymond, Bliss, Inc., 4 SEC Jud. Dec. 834, 855 (D. Mass. 1946) (pledge to
secure broker's own loan); John D. Ferris, 59 S.E.C. 116, 118 (1959) (to secure broker's
personal bank loan); William Rex Cromwell, 38 S.E.C. 913, 915 (1959) (collateral for
personal loan); W.F. Coley & Co., 31 S.E.C. 722, 724-26 (1950) (pledges for debts of firm
and individual in firm); Investment Registry of America, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 745 (1946) (pledge
for respondent's borrowings); see SEC v. Charles Plohn & Co., 433 F.2d 376, 377 (2d Cir. 1970)
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out authority, transferred to another customer,508 or obtained by misrepresentation or concealment. °0 Except where securities are obtained
by ruse, these means can be employed to convert those securities delivered to a broker-dealer in anticipation of a sale, those held by him
for safekeeping, and those he receives for a customer after a recent
purchase.50 5 Customers' monies, whether they are amounts paid for
the purchase of a security, amounts held by the broker-dealer for safekeeping, or amounts received from a sale of a security, 50 6 can likewise
be converted in a variety of ways. A broker could fail to return monies
when requested,5 07 spend the funds without authorization,508 or fail
to apply funds as directed.50 9 Although negligent action by the broker
(allegation by Commission that lOb-5 violated by illegally pledging securities); Bernard
& Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8273, at 1 (March 15, 1968) (false representations to induce customer to furnish securities as collateral for broker's bank loan);
H.F. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 833, 834 (1948) (using bonds as collateral for other security
trading). See generally Exchange Act Rule 8c-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.8c-l (1972).
503 William Rex Cromwell, 38 S.E.C. 913, 915 (1959); Shaver & Co., 36 S.E.C. 92, 94
(1954).
50- E.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 442-43 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (obtained without customer's
understanding of what was taking place); Tadashi Yamamoto, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 8536, at 1 (Feb. 25, 1969) (representation that needed to buy seat on
exchange); Bernard & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8273, at 1 (March 15,
1968); Amalgamated Inv., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8253, at 1 (Feb.
9, 1968) (misrepresentation that issuer would make changes); W.F. Coley & Co., 31 S.E.C.
722, 724 (1950) (needed for litigation).
505 E.g., Thompson & Sloan, Inc., 40 S.E.C. 451, 454 (1961) (misappropriated securities
held for safekeeping); William Rex Cromwell, 38 S.E.C. 913, 915 (1959) (shares delivered
after purchase); W.F. Coley & Co, 31 S.E.C. 722, 725-26 (1950) (shares delivered to be
broken into smaller denominations; bonds obtained for customer's account after sale;
stock held for safekeeping which broker did not sell when instructed to do so); Kenneth
Leo Bauer, 26 S.E.C. 770, 773 (1947) (misappropriation of securities delivered for sale);
cf. Carl J. Bliedung, 38 S.E.C. 518, 521 (1958) (took shares received for customer after!
purchase). Consequently, misappropriation can actually take place before, at the time of,
or after a transaction.
506 See cases cited in notes 523-24 infra (conversion of funds for purchase of securities
or proceeds from sale); cf. Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
253 F. Supp. 359, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (broker converted monies from securities account
presumably to offset commodity losses); H.F. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 833, 834 (1948)
(misappropriation of funds from margin account).
507 Joseph Garofalo, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9429 (Nov. 22, 1971);
W. PaossER, HANBOO or s-nE LAw or ToaRs § 15, at 89 (4th ed. 1971) (common law).
508 E.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Fierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 144
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); William Rex Cromwell, 38 S.E.C. 913, 915
(1959); Cobb & Co., 38 S.E.C. 166, 167 (1958); Frank S. Kelly, 32 S.E.C. 636, 637 (1951)
(broker loaned customer's money to partnership engaged in steel business); W.F. Coley &
Co., 31 S.E.C. 722, 724 (1950); D.S. Waddy & Co., 30 S.E.C. 367, 368 (1949); Jesse S. Lockaby,
& Co., 29 S.E.C. 271, 273 (1949).
509 Calvert Sec. Corp., 35 S.E.C. 141, 143 (1953) (did not apply to purchase price of
other properties as was agreed upon).

1972]

RULE lOb-5 AND BROKER-DEALERS

will not suffice to make out a lOb-5 misappropriation, conscious wrongdoing need not be proven; all- that is necessary is intent to exercise
dominion over the property. 510
Administrative penalties may be imposed and civil remedies are
available when a misappropriation violation is established. 511 Of
course, when a customer's property is subject to the broker's lien or
is held in a margin account as necessary collateral there can be no
lOb-5 violation. A customer must satisfy the lien or conform to the
margin requirements before he may reclaim his goods. 512 Unauthorized
transactions, themselves an infraction of the Rule, necessarily involve a
misappropriation.51 3
The final clause of 10b-5 stipulates that claims must arise "in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security." Actions by a
broker occuring prior to or in connection with the execution of an
order clearly satisfy this requirement; the same is not necessarily true
in the case of misappropriation. There is some indication that acquiring property by misrepresentation is a lOb-5 offense, while converting or embezzling it may not be, unless the broker planned his
actions from the time he obtained possession. 51 4 More correctly, the
question should be whether obtaining by false pretenses, converting,
or embezzling satisfies the "in connection with" requirement. 51 5
Several alternatives are available to satisfy the "in connection
with" aspect of the Rule, whether the broker obtains property by ruse,
conversion, or embezzlement. When securities rather than cash are
taken, the act of conversion may constitute a sale by the customer. 16
510 Cf.

W. PROSSER, supra note 507, at 83 (common law).

511 Civil recoveries were permitted in Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp.

417, 442-43 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970), and
Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. II. 1967).
512

See generally notes 381-95 and accompanying text supra (margin rules).

513 See notes 490-92 and accompanying text supra.
514 103 CONG. Rxc. 11,638 (1957) (SEC's legislative program); Hearings on S. 1178-82
Before Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
369 (1959); 3 Loss 1429 n.21. Under common law, the tort of conversion requires no intent
to take the property, just intent to exercise dominion. W. PRossER, supra note 507, at 83.
515 Since no distinction among these three concepts is necessary for our purposes, the
words will be used interchangeably.
516 This is the only way to explain the holding of some cases. In Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 442-43 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430
F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970), a broker was held liable for damages for obtaining shares by
ruse. There was no mention of any purchase or sale to which the conversion could be
related. In Kenneth Leo Bauer, 26 S..C. 770, 773 (1947), the Commission held that a
broker violated the Rule when he obtained a stock certificate by false representations
and then did not return it. Accord, W.F. Coley & Co., 31 S.E.C. 722, 724 (1950) (obtaining
securities by misrepresentation and pledging ten months later). In Thompson & Sloan,
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In addition, if the broker misappropriates securities received by the
him for the customer's account after executing a purchase orderlT
or securities delivered by the customer for sale, 518 that sale or anticipated sale should provide the requisite nexus. Another possibility
for satisfying the "in connection with" clause is the broker's subsequent
pledge 19 or sale of the appropriated securities, provided the conversion and pledge or sale are related. A rebuttable presumption that,
at the time of the conversion, the broker intended to make the subsequent sale or pledge would establish this relationship, although such
a presumption seems contrived.520 Finally, it could be argued that the
broker impliedly represents that securities delivered to him for sale
or upon execution of a purchase order will not be converted., 21
Finding a purchase or sale on which to rely is more difficult when
cash or other non-securities 522 are converted. Little trouble should be
encountered where funds are given to a stockbroker to pay for securities his customer ordered, 523 or where the funds given the stockbroker
Inc., 40 S.E.C. 451, 454 (1961), the respondent retained customers' securities for safekeeping and was held to have violated lOb-5 by thereafter appropriating the securities. The result can be explained under either the conversion theory or an implied representation
concept (see note 521 and accompanying text infra). Under common law, a converter is
forced to buy the item in question. W. PRossER, supra note 507, at 80. The statutory defi-

nition of sale is not very helpful in this context. See Exchange Act §§ 3(a)(13), (14), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13), (14) (1970).
517 William Rex Cromwell, 38 S.E.C. 913, 915 (1959); cf. Carl J. Bleidung, 38 S.E.C.
518, 521 (1958).
518 Kenneth Leo Bauer, 26 S.E.C. 770, 773 (1947).
519 SEC v. Raymond, Bliss, Inc., 4 SEC Jud. Dec. 834, 835 (D. Mass. 1946), involved
an injunction against violations of lOb-5. The broker was accepting customers' securities
for safekeeping and then pledging them to secure his own loans. Unless the broker's conversion or pledging can supply the "purchase or sale" required by the Rule, it is difficult
to see any other source. Accord, W.F. Coley & Co., 31 S.E.C. 722, 726 (1950) (almost five
months after purchased shares for customer, pledged without authority).
520 The broker could rebut the presumption by pointing to the lapse of time between the conversion and his pledging or sale, or to the intervening adverse change of
circumstances which would drive him to such an act. This is quite similar to the investment intent in private placements applied prior to the adoption of Securities Act Rule
144, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972).
521 The representation can arise from the broker being in business or from his soliciting, accepting, or executing the customer's order. But it is broader than the usual
shingle theory concept which implies a representation at an instant in time. The representation in the text continues from the time a customer buys securities or delivers them
to the broker until the broker converts them. Of course, it should be no defense if a broker
obtains custody of the certificates, disavows this implied representation, and then converts.
522 An example of a non-security might be a commodity future. A conversion by a
broker of securities and non-securities as part of the same scheme would all be within
lOb-5.
523 E.g., Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1967); SEC v.
Kelly, [1948-1952 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 90,497 (N.D. IMl. 1951) (pre-
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represent proceeds of a sale of securities. 524 Then, too, if a brokerage
firm uses the converted monies to purchase securities, or perhaps even
to make or pay off a loan,525 the "in connection with" language would
be satisfied.52 6 Finally, a broker representation might generally be im5 27
plied that no conversion of customers' monies will be effected.
Late delivery to a customer of purchased securities or of funds
obtained from a sale is another activity occurring after a trade which
may be proscribed. Under the shingle theory, a broker impliedly
represents that he will consummate a transaction promptly in accordance with trade practice.5 28 That is, absent a clear understanding to
the contrary,5 a stockbroker is deemed to represent at the time of the
liminary injunction granted); Joseph J. Wilensky, 39 S.E.C. 327, 328-29 (1959); Cobb &
Co., 38 S.E.C. 166, 168 (1958); Shaver & Co., 36 S.E.C. 92, 94 (1954).
524 D. Earle Hensley Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 849, 852 (1961); Sills & Co., 38 S.E.C. 931,
933 (1959); William Rex Cromwell, 88 S.E.C. 913, 915 (1959); Lewis H. Ankeny, 29 S.E.C.
514, 516 (1949).
525 As to whether a loan is a security which can be purchased or sold, see 1 Loss 546.
526 See notes 519-20 and accompanying text supra for a caveat which is equally applicable here-the subsequent use must have been contemplated at the time of conversion.
527 See note 521 and accompanying text supra.
None of the above, however, can explain the result in Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 361, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (misappropriation
to cover losses in non-securities account).
528 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8363, at 1 (July 29, 1968); Leo G. MacLaughlin Sec. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7783, at 1 (Jan. 5, 1966); D.
Earle Hensley Co., 40 S.E.C. 849, 852 n.1 (1961); Ned J. Bowman Co., 89 S.E.C. 879, 883
(1960); Joseph J. Wilensky & Co., 39 S.E.C. 327, 329 (1959); John D. Ferris, 39 S.E.C. 116,
119 (1959); Harold G.Wise, 29 S.E.C. 542, 544 (1949); Lewis H. Ankeny, 29 S.E.C. 514, 516-17
(1949); cf. Carl J. Bliedung, 38 S.E.C. 518, 521 (1953) (Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2 decision;
two to five month delay). Late delivery or nondelivery has also been held to be a lOb-5
violation without reference to the shingle theory. E.g., Richard A. Sebastian, 38 S.E.C. 865,
868-69 (1959); Shaver & Co., 36 S.E.C. 92, 94 (1954); W.F. Coley & Co., 31 S.E.C. 722, 726
(1950); Jesse S. Lockaby & Co., 29 S.E.C. 271, 273 (1949).
This concept is broad enough to require an underwriter to make delivery of certificates
promptly after the closing with the issuer or selling stockholders. There are instances,
however, where this is not done. Since the representation is implied at the time of a trade
or a solicitation for a trade, the "in connection with" part of the Rule is satisfied.
529 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6778, at 1 (April 16, 1962); Lewis H.
Ankeny, 29 S.E.C. 514, 516 (1949); cf. Carl J. Bliedung, 38 S.E.C. 518, 521 (1958) (construing
Exchange Act Rule 15ci-2). A broker-dealer should not be penalized for a delay in delivery
caused by events occurring after the trade is made which were unforeseeable at the time of
the trade and beyond the control of the broker-dealer. Thus, a dealer should not be criticized if he confirms a trade, having gone short to do so in anticipation that he will be able
to cover by purchasing the required shares in the actively traded market, and then finds
that trading in the security is suspended immediately thereafter by the SEC for a reason
which the broker neither knew nor should have known. On the other hand, suspension of
trading is generally not an excuse for failure to complete a transaction when a broker
is long. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7920 (July 19, 1966).
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trade that he will deliver to his customer with reasonable promptness
the securities purchased or the proceeds from the sale.5 30 A customer's
demand for possession of property which his broker is holding for
safekeeping should also be protected by the implied representation
of speedy delivery.5 3 1 Violation of the duty can give rise to civil 532 and

administrative remedies. Naturally, the broker's duty to deliver
promptly does not apply to property the customer desires the broker
to hold,5 m or that which is subject to a broker's lien or is required
collateral in a margin account. The time period in which delivery
must be made should begin when the transaction is executed 3 4 and
end when delivery is made under the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code. 53 5 When so computed, the reasonable time for delivery is

relatively short. Additionally, the SEC has opined that a broker violates
the Rule when he does not have adequate facilities to consummate
the trade by prompt delivery, 536 when he knows the transfer agent
530 Particularly in the early cases, the SEC emphasized the question of whether at or
before the transaction the broker intended to make prompt delivery. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8363, at 1 (July 29, 1968); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6778 (April 16, 1962); Ned J. Bowman Co., 39 S.E.C. 879, 883 (1960); Lewis H. Ankeny,
29 S.E.C. 514, 516-17 (1949); Jesse S. Lockaby & Co., 29 S.E.C. 271, 273 (1949); Kenneth Leo
Bauer, 26 S.E.C. 770, 775 (1947).
531 Once again the problem of what constitutes "in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security" arises, but the difficulty can be resolved by reliance upon one of the
theories outlined above with regard to misappropriation. See notes 516-27 and accompanying text supra.
532 Examples of damages include loss of interest on monies or loss of dividends, interest, or other distributions on a security. Similarly, if a customer is unable to sell a
security because of his broker's slow delivery, damages (if provable) flowing from the
broker's act should be recoverable. In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417,
442-43 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970), a registered representative who failed to deliver 20 shares to his customer and who later fraudulently obtained the other 100 shares which he did deliver, was held liable for the value
of all 120 shares.
533 But see Exchange Act Proposed Rules 15c3-3 and 15c3-4, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9388 (Nov. 12, 1971) (segregation of customers' property).
534 Measurement from the time a transaction should have been executed would
penalize the broker twice--once for delaying execution (see notes 493-95 and accompanying text supra) and a second time for delaying delivery.
535 UNIFORM COMMERCLAL CODE § 8-313. The New York State version of this provision
was construed in the first (now superseded) opinion in Shaw v. Dreyfus & Co., [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,608 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969) (sending purchase
confirmation when broker has not yet acquired security not delivery to customer).
536 Joseph V. Shields, Jr., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8484, at 2 (Jan. 3,
1969); Pickard & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8447, at 2 (Nov. 14,
1968).
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for the security is backed up, 37 or when he knows the dealer from
whom he purchases makes slow delivery. 38
V
OTHER AcTIONS OF BROKER-DEALERS

A.

Broker's Duty to Supervise and Train Employees

A brokerage firm may be subject to administrative sanctions,
civil remedies, and criminal penalties under a variety of theories when
one or more persons associated with it violate l0b-5. The firm could, for
example, be held liable as an aider-and-abettor, 39 a controlling person, 40 or the principal of a wrongdoing agent. 41 These doctrines are
applicable in all areas governed by the Rule. However, two other concepts-absence of adequate supervision and lack of sufficient training
-are unique to the broker-dealer field.
SEC decisions prior to 1964 generally held that firms and supervisors failing adequately to supervise employees who breached the Rule
were subject to the imposition of administrative sanctions as participants in the fraud.5 42 In 1964, Congress adopted comprehensive amendments to the 1934 Act, including section 15(b)(5)(E) which provides
an independent statutory basis for disciplining a broker, dealer, or
supervisor in the public interest if he
has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing violations of [the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, or the rules or regulations thereunder], another person who
commits such a violation, if such other person is subject to his
supervision. For the purposes of this clause (E) no person shall be
deemed to have failed reasonably to supervise any person, if(i) there have been established procedures, and a system for
applying such procedures, which would reasonably be expected
537 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8363, at 1 (July 29, 1968); see Exchange
Act Proposed Rule lOb-14, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8413 (Sept. 25, 1968)
(issuer must provide adequate transfer facilities).
538 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8363, at 1 (July 29, 1968). Also, the
broker-dealer who does not make prompt delivery to another broker violates lOb-5. John
D. Ferris, 39 S.E.C. 116, 118-19 (1959).
539 E.g., Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1969).
540 E.g., Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 710 (D. Minn. 1968).
541 E.g., Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 840, 845 (E.D. Va.
1968).
542 See cases cited in note 545 infra.
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to prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation
by such other person, and
(ii) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations incumbent upon him by reason of such procedures and
system without reasonable cause to believe that such procedures
and system were not being complied with.54

Since this provision is a codification of the prior cases, 544 no distinction
will be made between decisions construing it and those enunciating
the pre-1964 law.
In the Commission's view, failure to supervise provides an
independent basis for charging a firm or supervisor with a lOb-5 infringement.5 45 While some courts have reached the identical result by
similar reasoning,5 4 6 others have imposed lOb-5 liability by intertwining supervision with the controlling person provision of section
20(a) of the 1934 Act which renders a controlling person responsible
to the same extent as the controlled person "unless the controlling
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the
543

15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5)(E) (1970).

544 Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8500,

at 6 n.9 (Jan. 22, 1969), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Klopp v. SEC, 427 F.2d 455 (6th
Cir. 1970).
545 F.S. Johns & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7972, at 13
(Oct. 10, 1966), aff'd sub nom. Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967) & Winkler v.
SEC, 377 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1967); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 7743, at 25-30 (Nov. 12, 1965); Victor R. Redstone, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7516, at 4 (Jan. 22, 1965); Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 470, 480-81 & n.34
(1963); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 916-17 (1960); Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C.
311, 339-40 (1952); see Midland Sec., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 635, 639-40 (1961); Best Sec., Inc., 89
S.E.C. 931, 934 (1960); cf. Kidder Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559, 573 (1945); E.H. Rollins &
Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 891 (1945). The SEC on occasion has confused supervision and
controlling person liability. See, e.g., Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 15 S.E.C. 584, 601 (1944).
The post-1964 SEC cases have not been models of clarity either. In Armstrong, Jones &
Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8420, at 12 n.27 (Oct. 3,1968), aff'd, 421 F.2d
859 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 898 U.S. 958 (1970), the Commission held that Exchange Act
§ 15(b)(5)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5)(E) (1970), had to be alleged in the order for the proceedings, and that failure to supervise could not be made into a violation without reliance
on that section. Therefore § 15(b)(5)(E) in a sense preempted the case law upon which it
was based. This imposes no hardship concerning administrative proceedings since the
SEC's Division need only add another paragraph to its order. But where does it leave the
private litigant? He can, of course, rely on Exchange Act § 20(a), 15 US.C. § 78t (1970), in
combination with failure to supervise (see notes 546-49 and accompanying text infra).
Alternatively, he can allege violations of lOb-5 and 15(b)(5)(E) in his complaint (see note
546 infra). Such tactics may enable the private litigant to survive a motion to dismiss.
546 In Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. II. 1967), the court
held, relying on Exchange Act § 15(b)(5)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5)(E) (1970), that a failure to
supervise renders the supervisor liable. In R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 696-97
(2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 852 U.S. 844 (1952), the court affirmed a sanction which had been
based on lack of supervision.
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act. 5 4 7 The latter group of cases imposes on the firm the burden of

proving adequate supervision to satisfy the "good faith" requirement
of section 20(a).54 8 The SEC and judicial approaches seem to reach the
same result, although differing from a respondeat superior theory which
would permit the firm to escape lOb-5 liability if its employee's misfeasance was not within the scope of his employment.5 49
The duty of supervision necessitates that supervisory procedures
be established, and that the responsibilities under the system be reasonably discharged. 50 The system should cover all areas of the firm, 5 '
with particular emphasis on new offices, inexperienced personnel, and
geographically remote operations. 552 A firm cannot wait for customer
complaints and then implement the system. 5 3 Prompt and in-depth
investigation of any hint of irregularity is required. 54 It is no defense
547 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970).
548 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 438-39, 443 (N.D. Cal. 1968),

modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (churning and two separate
transactions; as to the latter, liable on dual ground of respondeat superior and failure

"to comply with the requirement for internal supervision as provided in section 20(a)');
Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724, 732-33 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (reference to Exchange Act § 20
(a) and to view that lack of supervision is itself a violation); cf. Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288
F. Supp. 453, 460 & n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (margin violations).
549 Comment, Brokerage Firm's Liability for Salesman's Fraudulent Practices, 36
FoRDHAm L. REV. 95, 97 (1967).
550 Breach of either part of this obligation is a lob-5 offense. For example, only the
duty to apply supervisory procedures seems to have been violated in Richard J. Buck,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8482, at 11-12 (Dec. 31, 1968), aff'd sub nom.
Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969).
551 F.S. Johns & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7972, at 13
(Oct. 10, 1966), aff'd sub nom. Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967) & Winkler v.
SEC, 377 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1967).
552 Richard J. Buck, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8482, at 11-12 (Dec. 31,
1968), aff'd sub nom. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969) (dose supervision over
new officers and personnel; large organizations require utmost vigilance); Shearson,
Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 29-30 (Nov. 12, 1965)
(executive committee cannot rely on regional personnel; branch offices require more
supervision); Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 443, 463-64 (1963) (large organizations and
new offices require more supervision; expanding facilities, inexperienced personnel, and
increased business pressure require more vigorous effort); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C.
902, 916-17 (1960) (good system "especially imperative" in large organizations; no defense
that firm growing, personnel inexperienced, or pressured by new business). Some of the
checks which should be built into the system are described in Michael Shaub, SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8113, at 4 (June 30, 1967); Sutro Bros. & Co., supra
at 462; Comment, supra note 549, at 102-04; cf. Exchange Act Rule 15b10-4(c), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15b10-4(c) (1972).
553 Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 917 (1960).
554 Richard J. Buck, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8482, at 12 (Dec. 31,
1968), aff'd sub nom. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969) (slightest indication of
irregularity mandates utmost vigilance); Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 443, 463 (1963);
Reynolds &Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 916 (1960).
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that the supervision at other firms is worse 5 5 or that supervisors had no
notice of any nonconformity. 516 Indeed, the very occurrence of a fraud
might be considered evidence of lack of proper supervision.5 17
A firm's failure to train adequately employees whose acts breach
the Rule may also be a violation of lob-5. Because violations by insufficiently trained personnel can be expected, the broker-employer is
accountable for such violations when they occur.558
B.

Broker With Inside Information

A broker-dealer inherits myriad problems when he possesses what
is commonly called "inside information"-information he knows or
should know has been obtained improperly and has not been disseminated to and absorbed by the investing public. 55 9
Brokerage firms have many antennae for inside information, but

they usually 560 obtain their knowledge in one of three ways. First, the
information might come from a person associated with them who acts
as a director, officer, employee, or controlling stockholder of the cor-

porate issuer.561 Second, information might be received in a business
capacity, as when the firm acts as an underwriter or evaluates the fair-

ness of a merger. 562 Finally, and most commonly, a broker can receive
555 Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8500,
at 8 (Jan. 22, 1969), rev'd on other grounds sub noma.Klopp v. SEC, 427 F.2d 455 (6th
Cir. 1970); F.S. Johns &-Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7972, at 13
(Oct. 10, 1966), aff'd sub nom. Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967) & Winkler v.
SEC, 377 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1967). As to prior industry standards, see SPECIAL STUDY pt. 2,
at 557-58 (supervision over traders).
556 To rule otherwise would place a premium on a firm remaining ignorant concerning employee misdeeds, a result contrary to the goal of the supervisory requirement.
557 Comment, supra note 549, at 105.
658 SEC v. Rapp, 804 F.2d 786, 790 (2d Cir. 1962) (inadequately trained salesmen
making false representations); Triangle Inv. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7902 (June 20, 1966) (officers and registrant violated lOb-5 in that they "employed
salesmen whom they failed to provide with suitable training."); cf. 89 TEMsPLaE L.Q. 493,
495 (1966) (duty to hire competent personnel). As to the qualifications of securities personnel, see Comment, supra note 65, at 681-700.

559 See Note, Rule 10b-5: -The Effect of Insider Trading Decisions on the Security
Analyst, 54 MINN. L. R.Ev. 147, 161-69 (1969) (definition of "inside information').
560 See R.D. Bayly & Co., 19 S.E.C. 773, 784 (1945) (broker's intent to gain control of
issuer).
561 Pennaluna & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8063, at 10-12 (April
27, 1967), af'd, 410 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970) (partner of
broker held directorship of issuer); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (registered
representative a director); Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 157 (1968) (partner of firm a director of issuer).
562 A whole series of cases arose out of inside information Merrill Lynch received
when acting as lead underwriter for Douglas Aircraft. E.g., Smachlo v. Merrill Lynch,
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a "tip" which he knows or has reason to know was obtained improperly.5 68 The source of the data and whether the news was unsolicited are irrelevant. 564 Nor does it matter that the recipient did not
know the information was not yet publicly released if he should have
known it was not.55 5 It is no defense that a broker-dealer reaped no
monetary gain from his illegal use of the facts. 560
The difficult problem of when information actually known by one
of a firm's partners, officers, directors, employees, or agents will be
56 7
imputed to the firm should be a matter of common-law agency.
Constructive notice should be imputed to individuals lacking actual
knowledge who work for a firm where the news is known if a typical
brokerage employee with comparable experience would have been
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,148
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Shulof v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH FE. SEC. L. REP.
93,147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Investors Management Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971); City Associates, SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8509 (Jan. 31, 1969); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968). See generally Lewis v.
Spiral Metal Co., 317 F. Supp. 905, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (defendant broker was issuer's underwriter and adviser); Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8511 (Jan. 31, 1969) (broker was underwriter); M.S. Wien & Co., 23 S.E.C. 735 (1946).
Information about the stockbroker's client as well as about his merger partner would
be considered inside information.
563 Mates Fin. Servs., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8836 (March 9, 1970)
(from director of issuer); George J. Wunsch, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8713
(Oct. 7, 1969); Blyth & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8499 (Jan.
17, 1969) (from employee of Federal Reserve; government securities involved); Herbert L.
Honohan, 13 S.E.C. 754 (1943), modified, 16 S.E.C. 297 (1944).
564 Cf. Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267,
at 9 n.18, 12 n.Z5 (July 29, 1971) (broker tipping customers; customers disciplined). The
inside information was unsolicited in Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), and yet a
violation was found.
565 Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 12
(July 29, 1971).
Although the issue had been left open in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 464
n.5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), the SEC did indicate that a broker who
knew or should have known of inside information violated lOb-5. See also SEC v. Aldred
91,349 (S.D.N.Y.
Investment Trust, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FE. SEC. L. REP.
1963).
566 See notes 575-99 and accompanying text infra (violation for broker to tip, trade

for discretionary accounts, recommend, and, perhaps, act as an order clerk, market maker,
or specialist). A tipper, although violating lOb-5, makes no pecuniary profit.
567 Cf. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 211-12 (2d Cir.), rev'd en banc, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (agency rules used to impute information to corporation). As to
the common law, see REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 272-82 (1958). Although limiting
the number of persons within the firm who receive inside information is no defense if
the firm is held to violate the Rule, it may mitigate any sanction the Commission imposes
and would decrease the number of persons who could breach lOb-S.
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aware of the nature of the data. 568 When a stockbroker is acting as a
broker-agent, and a fortiori when he is a dealer-principal, his inside
information should not be imputed to his customer because the firm
is precluded from disclosing it.569
The Second Circuit established a rule of expected conduct for a
person with materialr' 0 inside information in the landmark Texas
Gulf Sulphur decision:
[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses
not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the

securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed. 57 '

From both practical and legal standpoints, a stockbroker usually cannot effectively disseminate inside information,5 72 so he must forego
"trading in or recommending" the security. Since Texas Gulf Sulphur
dealt with corporate insiders, not broker-dealers, the literal language
may not apply in all situations. The Court of Appeals' directive dearly
applies in some circumstances, however. Neither a firm nor any of its
employees having actual or constructive knowledge of material inside
information may engage in transactions with the public573 or custom568 Cf. note 171 and accompanying text supra (impute knowledge of misrepresentation to employee).
569 A similar question was left unanswered in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
456, 464 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (knowledge that insiders were
bidding). See generally Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 157 (1968) (common law construed; misrepresentation by partner of firm to plaintiff's securities salesman employed by him equivalent to misrepresentation to customer).
In a recent case, however, Judge Pollack has indicated that knowledge of a broker should
be imputed to his principal-customer. Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 323 F. Supp.
1097, 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (dictum).
570 For the court's definition of the term "material," see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-53 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
571 401 F.2d at 848 (emphasis added).
572 As a practical matter, most brokers do not have the facilities to handle press
releases' and rarely could they exert sufficient influence on the corporation to have it
promulgate a statement. From a legal aspect, even a fully-publicized broker announcement may not be sufficient to render data "public" and the stockbroker may incur some
liability to the corporation if he releases the news. See Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C.
311, 321 (1952) (not sufficient disclosure by asking issuer to make information available
to stockholders).
573 George J. Wunsch, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8713 (Oct. 7, 1969);
Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8511 (Jan. 31, 1969);
Blyth & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8499 (Jan. 17, 1969) (employee
trading for employer's account without knowledge); Pennaluna & Co., SE9 Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8063, at 9-10 (April 27, 1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d 861, 869-70 (9th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970) (director of issuer who was partner of broker
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ers,5 74 or selectively disclose the facts to persons who then trade on
the basis of such information. 575 In these respects, brokers and nonbrokers are treated alike. Yet firms perform other functions unique to
their status. For example, a stockbroker owes a fiduciary duty to a
customer who gives him discretionary authority to buy or sell securities
for his account. The customer cannot expect a firm to violate the law
by basing trades for the discretionary account on the firm's material
inside information. 57 Any conflict of fiduciary obligations is resolved
in favor of the broker-dealer's duties to the investing public and the
corporate issuer.5 77 The law does not, however, prohibit implementation of a decision to trade for the broker's own account or a discretionary account, if the broker subsequently receives inside information
578
indicating that the chosen course of action is correct.

sold using inside information); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961); see
Herbert L. Honohan, 13 S.E.C. 754 (1943), modified on other grounds, 16 S.E.C. 297 (1944)
(Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange Act Rules lOb-3 and 15cl-2; trading with trustee).
See also Lewis v. Spiral Metal Co., 317 F. Supp. 905, 907-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (issuer has no
cause of action for such activity).
574 Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8511 (Jan. 31,
1969). Common law agency and shingle theory concepts should also prohibit such activities.
In Lewis v. Spiral Metal Co., 317 F. Supp. 905, 907-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court held that
an issuer whose board of directors was fully informed had no cause of action against the
investment banking firm which advised the issuer to privately place stock at an allegedly
inadequate price and then took a major portion for its subsidiary.
A broker who acquired an option to purchase a corporation's security and then obtained favorable inside information should be permitted to exercise the option. Cf.
Ryan v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 453 F.2d 444, 447 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct.
1611 (1972).
575 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8459, at 3-5 (Nov. 25, 1968); Mates Fin. Servs., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8836, at 12 (March 9, 1970). Customers of the broker who were not tipped would have
no cause of action against the broker. Smachlo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,148 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Shulof
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FE. SEc.
L. REP. 93,147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Tipping all customers is not a solution. See Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner 8- Smith, Inc., supra, at 5 n.8.
576 Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8511 (Jan. 31,
1969) (dictum); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
577 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961); cf. Black v. Shearson, Hammill
& Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1968) (common law recovery where broker
was director of issuer and indirectly misrepresented to plaintiff-customer; conflicting
duties should be avoided in advance).
578 This concept was approved in Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961), but
rejected on the facts. Accord, Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971) (Commissioner Smith, concurring); Daum & Phillips,
supra note 163, at 957-58; Sandier & Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur; Reform in the Securities
Marketplace, 30 Omo ST. L.J. 225, 269 (1969) (extraordinary actions indicative of influence
of non-public information).
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A broker who acquires material inside information faces significant difficulties concerning previous or subsequent recommendations
of securities to his customers. Five fact patterns illustrate these difficulties. First, a broker may use inside information to formulate a new
recommendation without disclosing the nonpublic data.57 9 This has
been held to be an infraction of the Rule.58 0 Second, the newly gained
facts may indicate that the broker's previously formed recommendation
to buy or sell is incorrect. Since he must disclose any fact not in conformity with his recommendation under the reasonable basis rule,58 1
he must abstain from giving any further advice under these circumstances. 582 A broker who refuses to desist and affirmatively and falsely
represents he has no adverse data would also transgress the Rule.8 3
The third difficult situation arises when a stockbroker's data reinforces
an already-conceived recommendation to trade. It could be argued that
since the recommendation was determined independently and since
the reasonable basis rule does not require disclosure, a broker should
be able to continue making his recommendation.5 8 4 On the other hand,
the potential for abuse under this rule, in addition to the possibility
that the broker might use the inside knowledge to determine when to
change his advice, suggest the conclusion that recommendations cannot
be made after inside information is acquired. The fourth fact pattern
involves a broker who falsely informs his customer that he has material
inside information and urges a purchase or sale of a security. This misrepresentation of a material fact is grounds for a disciplinary proceeding, 8S5 and the more cogently reasoned court opinions have not
barred the customer from recovering despite his complicity in the use
of supposedly unpublicized data. 586 Finally, a broker with inside infor579 This is different from tipping in that the information is not disclosed, either
directly or by innuendo.
s0 Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8511 (Jan. 81,
1969). In Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961), the SEC said that the lOb-5
prohibitions extended to "soliciting and executing" orders, but did not elaborate.

581 See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
582 Cf. Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 83 S.E.C. 811, 821 (1952) (also supersedes duty to
issuer to keep secret); M.S. Wien & Co., 28 S.E.C. 785, 752-54 (1946) (misrepresentation

and concealment).
583 Cf. Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 862, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157
(1968) (common law opinion). But see Smachlo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,148 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Shulof
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fa.

Sac. L. RaP. 98,147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
584 See Daum & Phillips, supra note 168, at 951; Sandler & ConwiUl, supra note 578, at
269.
See notes 167-68, 196 and accompanying text supra.
586 Compare Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 50, 57-58 (S.D.N.Y.

685
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mation could dissuade his customer from trading. This should be
grounds for an administrative sanction whether or not the broker
indicates the existence of the undisclosed facts to the customer.587 A
customer should have a cause of action if his broker advises him contrary to the inside information the broker possesses.5 8 On the other
hand, a customer who was convinced to change a previously erroneous
decision by advice based on inside information will suffer no harm.
This recommendation is then actionable, if at all, only by persons
trading at about the same time. 89
No counterpart exists in other areas covered by the Rule to the
broker with undisclosed facts who receives an unsolicited buy or sell
order from a customer. There is little point590 in prohibiting the firm
from acting as a broker-agent until or unless it discloses the information.59 ' The question is more difficult when it acts as a dealer-principal
in the over-the-counter market. No objection should be posed if it buys
from or sells to its customer when inside information suggests a
contrary course. If anyone is injured, it will be the broker-dealer. But
considering the discretion vested in a stockbroker in deciding whether
to act as agent or principal, 592 he should not be permitted to profit by
selling instead of buying or buying instead of selling in such a case, even
though the inside information may play no part in soliciting the trade.9
The converse factual pattern exists when a broker receives an unsolicited order from a customer he knows or should know has material
inside information. The broker would be a party to the fraud if he
1971) (in pari delicto rejected in part because defendant was broker), with Kuehnert v.
Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969) (reaching opposite result in 2-1 decision;
defendant-tipper was corporate officer); see Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89, 92 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (cannot distinguish typical tippee case from situation where tipper is broker; do
not accept in pari delicto defense without further exploration).
587 This would satisfy the "in connection with the purchase or sale or security"
language of lOb-5. See notes 190, 212 and accompanying text supra.
588 Cf. Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (false
representations to induce customer to hold actionable).
589 Daum 8- Phillips, supra note 163, at 952; Painter, Inside Information: Growing
Pains for the Development of Federal CorporationLaw Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLTrm. L.
REv. 1361, 1388 (1965); cf. note 575 supra.
590 The customer could always go to another firm. The broker's refusal would also
raise questions as to why he followed that course.
591 Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 297 F. Supp. 736, 737 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (dictum); Painter,
supra note 589, at 1388. The broker should incur no liability for executing the trade
without disclosure. McDowell, Director's Liabilities in Securities Transactions, 22 Bus.
LAw. 76, 86 n.36 (1966); cf. notes 576-77 and accompanying text supra.
592 See 3 Loss 1500-08; 6 id. at 3702-08.
593 Acting as a dealer in any capacity should be prohibited when the inside information is not dearly good or bad, as is the case with some mergers.
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executed the trade without disclosing. 594 Whether a broker has a duty
to disclose that the customer is a director, officer, or controlling stockholder of the issuer is unclear; 595 however, in practice, no disclosure
is made.5 96
Some brokers make a market in over-the-counter securities, while
others are specialists on a securities exchange.5 97 The potential for abuse
is abundantly present when a market maker or specialist has material
inside information. Because of the broad discretion lodged in market
makers and specialists, the misuse of inside information cannot be controlled by periodic references to the trading methods of some fictional
"reasonably prudent" market maker or specialist who is presumed not
to have the nonpublic data.5 98 The alternative is to force the stockbroker to suspend all activity. In the over-the-counter market, this
might start rumors, and, if there were only one market maker, would
stop trading entirely. Similarly, there could be no buying or selling on
the exchange if a specialist were prohibited from trading. Since this
would have the effect of inducing the corporation to disclose the inside
information as early as possible-a result consonant with the purposes
of lOb-5-it is the preferable alternative g99
C.

Broker as a Plaintiff
Much attention has been given the liabilities lOb-5 imposes on
broker-dealers. A stockbroker may also enjoy the benefits of the Rule.
He can sue to vindicate violations, 60 for the Rule protects the sophisti594 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (dictum); Hughes & Treat, 22 S.E.C.
623, 626 (1946) (dictum); see SEC v. Aldred Inv. Trust, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH
FE. Sac. L. ERE.
91,849 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (SEC alleged broker violated lOb-5).
595 This "novel question" was left open in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 840 F.2d 457,
464 nA (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 882 US. 811 (1965), but the Commission has indicated that
it believes nondisclosure constitutes a violation. SEC v. Aldred Inv. Trust, [1961-1964
Transfer Binder] CCH Fmi). SEc. L. Rm.
91,349 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). If there is a duty to
disclose the name, the broker may arguably have a further obligation to elicit from the
insider whether he possesses any inside information.
596 In an exchange transaction disclosure would be difficult; in over-the-counter trades
the information is only rarely communicated.
597 For definitions of "market maker" and "specialist," see notes 827, 248-51 and accompanying text supra.
598 See generally notes 269-318 and accompanying text supra (broker controlling
market).
599 SEC v. Aldred Inv. Trust, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FE. SEc. L. REm.
91,349 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (SEC complaint alleged violation where broker with inside information placed bids); Note, supra note 163, 42 N.Y.U.L. RFv. at 712. But see Comment,
Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine,
80 U. Cm. L. Rv. 121, 157 n.161 (1962).
600 No objection was raised when brokers brought suit in some cases. E.g., Carroll v.
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cated as well as the naive. 01 However, some policies underlying the
Rule suggest that a broker's case must be stronger than that of other
plaintiffs if he is to recover. 0 2
One type of fraud is practiced solely on brokers. A broker can recover damages from a customer who places an order to buy a security
with the concealed intention of making payment on the settlement date
only if the market price rises in the interim. 6 3 Should a broker-dealer
be unable to prove that the customer's intent existed at the time of the
order, no lOb-5 claim would arise and a common-law contract remedy
would be the only available mode of recovery. 6°4
CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to delineate the extent of broker-dealer
liability under Rule lOb-5. The areas of liability discussed may not be
exhaustive; future decisions may proscribe other practices, 0 5 even practices which are now customary in the financial community. A primary
value of lOb-5 is its breadth, and the flexibility such breadth allows the
courts and the Commission in their efforts to safeguard investor in-

terests and to preserve the integrity of the securities markets.
First Natl Bank, 413 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970) (misrepresentation case); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 884 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (manipulation); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (stockholder derivative suit);
cases cited in note 603 infra.
601 Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 858, 857 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1008 (1970); Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Natl Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 992 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970).
602 The policies of equalizing bargaining position, fairness, and fostering investor
confidence indicate that this should be the result.
603 A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 875 F.2d 893, 895-98 (2d Cir. 1967); SEC Litigation
Release No. 499 (Feb. 4, 1949) (defendant enjoined from engaging in this practice); cf.
United States v. Bialkin, 881 F-.2d 956, 957 (2d Cir. 1964) (criminal case).
604 A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 875 F.2d 898, 898 (2d Cir. 1967); Patton, The "Purchase or Sale" Restriction of SEC Rule ZOb-5-Judicial Extension of a Federal Remedy,
18 CATHoic UtL. Ray. 463, 474 n.56 (1969).
605 Cf. Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., Inc., 488 F.2d 1167, 1171 (2d Cir. 1971) (permissible to outlaw a violation in first litigation on the issue); accord, Opper v. Hancock
Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 675 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 867 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966).

